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This is a study of deception in military operations with
errphasis on the Army division level. The thesis is developed
from empirical data, fundarrental processes, and decision-
making processes. It is a comprehensive analysis of the
battlefield deception process and is a basic guide to decep-
tion planning.
The thesis formulates a theory for operational military
deception as an extension of the pioneering work of Barton
Whaley. Whaley 's deception data base is analyzed to show
trends in operational deception. These trends ere combined
with rertlnent elements of game, communication, organisation,
and systems theory as well as decision-making and perceptual
and cognitive processes.
As a result of this study, the author presents
conclusions and recommendations on how deception might be
better applied to support U.S. Army division operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis was motivated by a need to provide the
military staff deception planner with a bridge between the
forrral planning steps outlined in field manuals avA the
execution of tactical operations supported by deception. The
thesis conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as
closely as possible. The U.S. Army division level is used tc
establish the context for the integration of deception into
tactical operations.
Deception must be recognized as a necessary and desirable
part of every tactical operation because it leads to surprise
and acts as a 'cr e multiplier. A successful deception
rragnifies the combat power of the deceiver and produces a
tactical advantage. The synergistic effect which can be
gained through integration of all of the combat power multi-
pliers adds to fire ard maneuver tc produce an ircrease in
force effectiveness.
The objective of this thesis is to provide information 01
the nature of cpe rational deception in a form that may assist
in the planning and execution c P ieception operations at the
U.S. Army division level.
The thesis formulates a theory for operational military
deception based on an empirical analysis of deception cases,
coverage o^ selected historical examples, and a synopsis
12
of previous work done at the strategic level. The theory
will draw heavily on the results of a joint investigation of
strategic military deception done at the Naval Pos tgredua t
e
School by a rrul tid isciplinary research grout). The seven
studies at the Naval Postgraduate School focused on the
application of game, communication , organization, and systems
theory as well as decision-making and perceptual and cogni-
tive processes. The mul tidiscipl inary approach will be
applied to tactical military deception within the framework
of the existing division force structure.
The thesis includes a presentation of rackgrcuod material
followed by a theoretical analysis of the deception process
and an empirical analysis of deception case studies. Conclu-
sions will te drawn from both the theoretical analysis and
the empirical analysis. The final section will include a
recommendation which applies the conclusions to form a theory
for tactical deception as it might be applied at the division
level. The theory will ^ocus on command and staff ^unctions,
a layered planning process, and a detailed execution process
which is based on the author's personal exuerisnce.
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II. DECEPTION JN GENERAL
Tactical deception planning in the typical U.S. Army
division is based on hiding the real and displaying the
false. Every division has standing operations procedures for
Operations Security (OPSEC) which are designed to hide the
real. Almost every offensive operation has a supporting
attack which diverts the enemy's attention because it begins
before the main attack. The supporting attacV displays the
false, reception for the defense is even easier as the enemy
does not know if you olan to defend in place at the ridgeline
or fall back to the other side of the river.
This section of the thesis provides information en what
is known about deception in general in an effort to show that
tactical deception requires more th^n a baniaid application
of simplistic maxims.
A. PROPOSITIONS ON MILITARY DECEPTION
In early 1979 a mult id isciplinary research grouu at the
Naval Postgraduate School began a joint investigation of
deception. The group's intent was to illuminate the nature
of deception, its processes, and factors that condition when
one resorts to rt n d succeeds at deception [Pef. 1] . The
result of that investigation is an excellent summary of what
is known about deception. The group's effort resulted in the
oublication of the book, Strategic Military rer.ert.icn, which
14
was edited by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine I. Herbig.
Chapter one of that book presented concepts and propositions
that would serve as a basis for formulating a theory or
deception [Pef. 2]. A compressed version of information
available in that chapter establishes a common level of
understanding of deception.
!• £P.^2§ for reception
Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of
reality done to gain a competitive advantage [?.ef. 3] .
Misrepresenting reality has both a positive bni a negative
side. The negative side of deception is the protection of
certain portions of the real operation and plans for future
operations. This is called cover and it is enforced by
security measures [Hef. 4]. The enemy attempts to break that
cover and learn what you do not want him to learn. The enemy
will continue his attempts until he learns everything or
until he runs out of time. In military terms, the commander
and his staff prepare a list of "Essential Elements of
Friendly Information (FEFI)" that rust be protected. The
FFFI list may be very similar to the enemy's list of "priori-
ty Intelligence Requirements (PIP)" which is what he is
attempting to learn.
The positive side of deception is the presentation of
the false tale, the deception story. The deception r,tnry
leads the enery away from the truth by providing clues that
can answer the enemy's ?IR. If the enemy accepts the clues
lb
as valid, he tray form the wrong conception of reality. That
wrong conception should lead the enemy to place his forces at
a disadvantage. Deception should be done to achieve a
desired reaction from the enerry. [Kef. 5]
Daniel and Herbig expressed the view that. "to be
labeled deception an act must be done to gain a competitive
advantage. This means, in effect, that there ape three goals
in any deception. The immediate dim is to condition the
target's beliefs? the intermediate aim i s to influence the
target's actions? and the ultimate aim is for thf* deceiver
to benefit from the target's actions [?ef. 6] . The three
goals must be kept in mind while planning any deception so
that the operation is properly designed toward the ultimate
aim.
2. Deception Types.
Daniel and Herbig distinguished two variants of
deception that produce somewhat different effects and operate
in different ways. The more simple of the variants, termed
ambiguity-increasing" or "A-type," confuses the target so
that the target is unsure as to what to believe [Fef. 7]
.




type," reduces ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of
one wrong alternative [Hef . 8].
The relative values of tne two variants can he shewn
by a simple one-on-one model of a battle between two force?,
blue and red. The model requires the capability for blue and
ie-
red to be visible to each other in order for the killing shot
to be delivered. The force that delivers the first killing
shot wins the battle. Blue attempts an "M-type" deception by
displaying 8 dummy that appears more real than blue himself.
Bed sees blue and the blue dummy and fires at the dummy.
Blue fires at red and wins the battle. If the blue dummy
degenerates to the point where it no longer looks better than
blue or if the original deception was based on an identical
dummy, the deception is "A-type". Red has only a fifty
percent chance of picking the correct target while blue has
only one target. Bine still has a significant advantage.
Red might delay firing until he gets close enough to tell the
dummy from the correct target, but doing so would provide
blue the opportunity to fire first. Daniel and ^erbig con-
cluded that, "deceptions planned to mislead a target into
choosing one possibility may degenerate and instead increase
ambiguity if the target resists or postpones making the
choice the deceiver intends." [Sef. £]
3. The TeceptiQn Target
Tactical deception flows from the commander who ini-
tiates the deception to the cormander who receives the decep-
tion. The deception is channeled through the planners end
lmplementers on the deceiver side to the information gather-
ing and proceessing forces on the receiver side. Daniel and
Herbig do an excellent job in presenting the conceptual flow
of information ?rom the deceiver to the target.
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The deception target is the enemy comrrar.d er . The
primary deception goal is to predispose the enemy commander
to rake the desired decision, hut it is impossible to reliab-
ly predict individual behavior reactions. The deception is
possible because patterns cf behavior are predictable in
acturial terms. The patterns of behavior can be predicted
not only for the enemy commander but also for the entire
organization which provides the information used in the com-
mand decesion. [Ref. 10]
4. Common, factors. o.f_ Successful Deception Operations,
Daniel and Rerbig found recently declassified docu-
ments which provided an interesting starting point for
addressing factors conditioning success. One document was
written by a deception planner working with the Supreme
Peadquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SEAIF) and the
other was written by German General of Infantry in World War
II, Fans von Greif f enberg. They revealed that experienced
deceivers on either side of the conflict during the
Second World War were in agreement on methods for deception.
The two reports were designed to offer advice for future use
of deception. The reports revealed similar conclusions about
how tc succeed at deception. The documents provided three
useful categories: (1) secrecy, organization, and coordina-
tion? (?) plausibility and confirmation; and (3) adapta-
bility [Ref. 111. Daniel and Eerbig added a fourth category
which was applicaDle to operational and tactical deception,
18
the prepositions of the target [Ref. 12]. The author of this
thesis adds a fifth category which is the use of the initia-
tive. All five categories seem to be important in the deter-
mination of deception success.
a. Secrecy, Organization, and Coordination
Daniel and Eerbig observed in Strategic Military
Deception that both the SBA?F planner ani von Greif f en berg
agree strongly that "knowledge that cover and deception is
(sic) being employed must be denied the enemy", "if the
strictest secrecy is not observed," says von Greiffenberg,
"all deception projects are condemned to failure from the
very start." "receiving one's own troops ^or the sake of
security," he adds, "is a normal byproduct of deception"
[Ref. 13] .
Eaniel and Ferbig wrote that the two tfW II plan-
ners argued that deception must be well organized ar^i well
coordinated else leaks may occur and deception unravel. They




where even "seeming trifles are not overlooked." They are
well coordinated when directed from one central point - that
being the highest headquarters controlling operational forces
directly benefiting form the deception [Ref. 14] .
b. Plausibility ard Confirmation of the Lie
The SEAEF ani von C-rei f fen berg documents present
a number of principles to the effect tnat tne lie must te
plausible. " To achieve this," they recortrend ed , "the li 11 be
1C
woven into a skein of truth and confirmed by more than one
source." [Ref. 15] Von Greiffenberg wrote that the deception
"must be brought into harmony with the overall situation."
[Ref. 16] It must be noted that plausibility is a relative
factor. The lie need be plausible only from an enemy's view.
c. Adaptability of reception
There are many things that can happen once a
deception is initiated. The real plan might change. The
enemy situation might change. More real information might be
obtained by either side. The deception must be able to char.ge
as reality changes. A deception that does net change with
time becomes more and more divergent from reality.
d. Target Predispositions
laniel and Herbig note that unaccountably,
neither the SEAEF planner's nor von Greiffenberg's repcrt
advised that deceivers should make use of the target's pre-
dispositions. Daniel and Eerbig postulated that deceptions
which slant the target's mind-set in directions he is pre-
disposed to take have a higher probability of convincing him
than those that run against the grain of his expectations
and assumptions. They also observed that "conventional wis-
dom is supported by experimental psychology on this pcin 1::
the stronger his predispositions, the more a target viil
ignore or twist information inconsistent with tbem." Pef
17]. It is possible that the World War II deception planner
did use enemy predispositions, but did not identify them.
2V
e. Initiative
Retaining the initiative is not a function of
"being on the offense or "being on the defense. The initiative
can be obtained regardless of the situation if the enerry
becorres so confused that he does not act. General Shernan
called it, "placing the enerry on the horns of a dilerrra."
[Ref. 18]
B. STRATEGIC VERSUS TACTICAL DECEPTION
The information presented in the book:, Strategic Military
reception, has application to the operational and tactical
levels, as well as the strategic level. The difference be-
tween the levels is defined in terms of scope of operation
hut in reality there is no sharp dividing line. Strategic
deceptions and operational deceptions "blend at about the
corps size of forces. Operational deception blends with
tactical deception at about the brigade level. Tactical
deception is composed mostly of tricks played on the enerry ^y
individual soldiers and srrall units. Tactical deception
could be considered as part of battle tactics.
For the purposes of this thesis, the operational level
will be defined as that level involving forces that are
smaller than a U.S. Arrry corps and participating in opera-
tions of a battle or a series of battles. reception plan-
ning has normally net been associated with the echelons
helow corps. The division level would typically only he
involved in the execution of corps' deception plan*-.
21
This thesis will concentrate on the division level be-
cause it has a large enough staff to accomplish detailed
planning, and it corrrrands sufficient resources to divert
forces to accomplish the deception operations. ivuch of the
division's deception planning involves consideration of the
deception capabilities of tactical units. The deception is in
support of tactical operations even though it rrust be
considered to be operational level planning.
The author of this thesis recognizes the difference be-
tween the operational level and the tactical level. Tactijal
deception is that which is planned at the operational level.
The term, tactical deception, is slightly rrisleadin^-. It is
easier to consider that tactical deception is any deception




A U.S. Arrry division cannot afford to wage a tattle of
attrition. Commanders at every echelon of "battle rust use
smart "battle management to win without -wasting resources.
One requirement of a division commander is to execute the
optimum plan which allows victory over a modern opponent that
may have a three to one advantage in combat power. Another
requirement is to maintain the forces of the division suffi-
ciently to win the battles that will follow. The lethality
of modern weapons is such that the alternative might veil be
an escalation of the war.
There is an increasing recognition on the part of all
commanders of the critical difference that integration of
combat power multipliers will play in future tattles, reten-
tion, for example, is included within the concepts of Com-
mand, Control, and Communications Coun termeasures 'C3C V ' ^r.c
Electronic Warfare (EW). Deception is now included in trie
planning for almost all division level training exercises.
While deception planning has been revived at the division
level in the past years, and interest is intensifying, the
tacticians must very soon come to grips with two significant
problems hindering the full employment or tactical iecention
at the division level. These are, first, understanding how-
to optimize deception anc, second, how to achieve integration
of the deception and the operation. These two complex
issues will be addressed in light of theory and in light of
past cdse histories, hut first the background for tactical
deception will he presented from the historical perspective.
A. FORCE EIFICTIVINFSS AND SURPRISE
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said, "Surprise is
the most vital element for success in modern war." [Ref. 19]
General MacArthur was referring to his U.N. plan for the
Inchon Landing which he was presenting to a special delega-
tion from tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff. M aoArthur argued the
risky plan through the historical precedent established in
1759 by General Wolfe in scaling the "unscalable" Heights cf
Abraham to seize French Quebec. MacArthur ohserved f "like
Montcalm, tbe North Koreans would regard an Inchon landing as
impossible. Like Wolfe, I could take them by surprise."
[Ref. 20] Evidently, complete surprise was achieved, as the
North Korean troops garrisoning the drea were not reinforced
and the landing was virtually unopposed. The operation w a s a
complete military success. Tne enemy's half -enveloped army
began a headlong retreat that, stopped only at the Yale.
That, however, was only hair of the story. since ^acArthvr
achieved those results at only minimal cost in terms of
casualties. The force effectiveness of the operation was
enhanced hy surprise such that the North Korean Peoples Army
suffered 12 times the total casualties o^ the United N'aticns
Command. [Ref. 21J
2 4
A surrrrary of data corrpiled ty a notable deception
researcher, Barton Whaley, indicates that the degree of suc-
cess in a rrilitary operation varies directly with the inten-
sity of the initial surprise. One data set of 167 battles
fought between 1914 and 1973 was divided roughly equally
according to degree of initial surprise and yielded the
following results:
TA2LE 1
SURFRISE ANT RESULTS Ci BATTL.S [Ref. c2j
t FAR EXCEEDING X ENDING IN
EXPECTATIONS DEFEAT
2 % p* -V
19 % 1 C K /




The trend suggested ty the historical evidence is that
surprise breaks the normal cause and effect rules which are
the basis for tattle tactics. Surprise is often the differ-
ence between victory and defeat regardless of the quantifi-
able force effectiveness ratios.
The force that is out canned and outgunned on the hot tie-
field needs to maximize its own forje effectiveness while
minimizing that of its opponent. Achieving surprise is a
major element in the force effectiveness ratio; however, it
is the element that is o-^ten the l?ast understood. Surprise
is difficult to quantify because it is a psychological
notion.
2t
B. SURPRISE AND DECEPTION
There are no rules which guarantee that surprise will be
achieved. Tight security or ineffective enerry intelligence
does sometimes shield intentions or clues pointing to inten-
tions resulting in the eneuy regaining unwarned. However,
absolute security is probably never achieved.
There are sorre factors which core readily to rind which
cause surprise. These factors include attacking over impos-
sible terrain, operating in in-possible weatner, and acting at
the improbable time. It seems that the key to surprise
exists in the preconceptions of the enemy. The vietirr of
surprise is one who has formed an estimate of his opponent's
intentions <=»nd capabilities which is wrong. The enemy can
be helped in the forming of his preconceptions t)j deliber-
ately misleading him.
Barton tyhaley's theory of stratagem asserts that decep-
tion is not only a mdin cause tut also an enhancer of sur-
prise. Historical data verifies this theory as follows:
TABLE 2
SURPRISE ANE C AS UAL T IIS [Ref . 23
J
NO. 01 CASES AVE. CASUALTY RATIO
SURPRISE WITH DECEPTION £9 1: 6.3
SURPRISE WITHOUT DECEPTION 2d 1: 2.0
NO SURPRISE KITE DECEPTION 5 1: 1.3
NO SURPRISE WITHOUT DECEPTION 4e 1: 1.1
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The data suggests a clear relationship between surprise and
deception in that casualty ratios are substantially greater
in cases of surprise with deception than for those of sur-
prise without deception. While surprise was gained without
deception in only one third of the cases, it was rare for
deception rot to result in surprise. It is also significant
that if deception fails to achieve surprise, it rrey still
result in a more favorable casualty ratio then if deception
was not attempted.
C. ECONOMICS OF EXCEPTION
Deception is inexpensive. The most elaborate deception
operation in history was for the Allied invasion of Europe in
1944. That operation involved only diverting for <a fe* weeks
the services of several hundred ren, a dozen or so s^ali
"boats, a few aircraft, a fair amount of radio and other
electronic gear, sorre wood, canvas, paint, and bits of
aluminum [Ref. 24j . The most costly single type of deception
operation is the diversionary attack. Thi^ is the only form
that necessarily costs lives and equipment and uses regular
combat units. Eowever, as such attacks are generally no more
effective than plausible threats of attack. they should oe
used more sparingly than they have been up to nc->i [Pef. 25] .
Deception provides a high return in that it has at least
an 80 % chance of yielding surprise. Surprise multiplies the
chances for a quick ana decisive military success, whether
measured in terms of explicitly sought goals, ground taken,
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casualty ratios [Ref . 26], Deception itself can also induce
the enemy to make inefficient use of his own resources by
causing him to make mistakes in timing or utilization.
D. TEE GENEP.AL STAFF SYSTEM AND DECEPTION
In early times, the commanders performed virtually unsup-
ported by the advice of specialized staffs. The General
Staff Systerr tegan to spread throughout the world in the 19th
century and, even then, the "Great Captains" pretty much
rraintained individual control over their battle plans. The
20th century, however, found the staff performing most of :ne
rrilitary planning and even much of the decision making. The
General Staff System allowed armies and the command and
control of armies to become very complex, but the systerr
separated the commander frorr the detailed planning and execu-
tion of functions such dS deception.
The diffusion of power fror the commander can re-
sult in very effective operations such as the British decep-
tion for the Thirc Battle of Gaza on 31 October, 1S17.
General Sir Idmund /illenby decided on a new campaign which
abandoned the previous pattern of costly frontal assaults
against the main enemy defenses at tne coast. The new stra-
tegy called for an envelopment of the Turkish army by a
cavalry sweep through its weakly defended left flank in the
desert at Beershefca. The staff attended to the details. Tne
tactical plan was engineered by Brigadeer General Guy Dawnay,
while deception was planned by Major Fichard veinert zhagen
.
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Major Mei nertzhagen used his position as chief of mil i —
tary intelligence at Allenby's GEQ to prepare a firm ground-
work of intelligence, security, and. deception. Accordingly,
he improved the monitoring of enemy radio communications by
placing a receiver on the Great Pyramid at Gizah. Fe greatly
expanded behind the lines espionage by developing a close
liaison with the Zionist intelligence service, the "\ili"
group led by Aaron Aaronsshon. Security was tightened by-
repeating a technique he had perfected in 191b against
German agents in East Africa. He discredited ana compro-
mised the enemy agents through payment and testimonial
which were "allowed" to be intercepted by enemy intelligence.
In this manner he arranged that the enemy execute its own
most effective Arab spy-master in Beersheba.
Simultaneously, Neinert zhagen developed the deception
operation. First, he arranged a reliable, rapid, and direct
communication channel for getting his information tc German
and Turkish intelligence. This was done by permitting the
Turks to capture messages thdt encded them to solve one c?
the British radio codes. Knowing that the German staff
included an efficient radio interception and cryptanalytic
team, Peinert zhagen could be confident this rase would give
him the desired channel. Beginning over a month ^e rore ihe
battle, Captain Schiller, the shief of German military intel-
ligence in Palestine, received a variety of ingenious clues
that indicated a cover target of Ga ?a instead of Eeersheba,
jo
and a later attack date. Moreover, Beersheba was mentioned
as d target for a mere feint or demonstration attack* and the
Turks were told to expect an amphibious landing behind Gaza.
This done, the next task was to lull nny doubts the enemy
might have by providing plausibly "independent" verification
in the form of a packet of faked documents. To do this
Peinertzhagen laid on his famous "haversack ruse". As his
subordinate officers had twice failed to carry this off, on
10 October, Pe inertzhagen rode off alone into the desert no-
man's land to deliver the mail. He simulated a recon-
naissance near Girheir until spotted and chased by a Turkish
patrol. At that point, feigning a wound, Meinert zhagen drop-
ped bis field glass, a life-saving water tot t le
,
his rifle
smeared smeared with horseblood, and the haversack.
Examination of Meinert zhagen 's haversack by Turkish
intelligence disclosed such personal items as a letter from
his wife", 20 pounds sterling, a flashlight, end a
letter from an officer stationed on the Gaza front. This
letter contained disparaging remarks about Allenoy's
generalship and alsc some clues as to the time and place
of the offensive. The haversack also contained official
documents, orders, maps, and other papers that confirmed dnd
elaborated on the false tire and place. Within a few hours
this "find" was passed along to Captain Schiller. Fe re-
mained properly skeptical until the following day when he
learned fron promptly decoded radio intercepts, Turkish
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patrols, freshly captured orders, and two prisoners, that
the British were feverishly seeking to recover the "lost"
haversack. All this circumstantial "confirirdtioa" had, cf
course, been rrost carefully arranged by Keinertzhagen .
This intelligence w a s brought to the attention of the
energetic corrrrander of the Palestine front, General Kress von
Eressenst ein , who issued orders on 11 October mentioning the
find and warning the officers of his command tc be nore
careful of their own secret documents. A Turkish corps order
stated that the find would allow the reinforcements to be at
Gaza in time to crush the arrogant English.
Turco-German emphasis accordingly shifted to Ga ?a . Two
divisions were moved into reserve near the co?.st and defer ses
were generally strengthened there. On 21 October 1P17,
Allenby launched the operation. It br^ke the eight-months'
stalemate by throughly surprising the German Middle East
theater commander and routing tne off-guard and off-balance
Turkish army. Victory was capped by the capture o" Jerusalem
on November 9th. Total casualty ratios were highly in favor
of the British [Eef . 27]
.
The General Staff System is a key tc addressing the full
employment o ° tactical deception at the division le/el. The
system requires that be th functional expertise and authority
reside in one staff office, but full integration o :' deception,
and operations is not achieved unless the commander provides
central direction tc establish understanding and support from
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the staff. At this point it is necessary to digress and
state that the commander rray be tne deception proponent
within the General Staff System. General ^acArthur often
vetoed the plans of his staff and implemented deception in
operations based solely on personal insight. The Korean War
operations provide evidence that his staff did not systema-
tically apply deception in that many deception measures sup-
porting a deception story were not integrated and were not
effective. The point is that even if a commander makes
deception an integral part of the operation, a systematic
planning and execution process must, be used cy the staff to
fully integrate the deception and the operations plan.
I
I. T£E G3 AS TEE DECEPTION PLANNEP
Historically, when the commander relinquished total con-
trol over deception, that function shifted to the intelli-
gence arena [Pef. 28]. Most of the deception experience
gained in war was lost during peacetime vhe^ the intelligence
staff? were allowed to decay. Military intelligence was not
even established as a permanent branch cf the LT .S. Army until
the mid 1960's. The U.S. Army revised deception responsi-
bilities when the concept for command, control, communica-
tions countermeasures (C3CM) was formed. The C3CM concept
lists the G3, not the 52, c s the principal adviser tc the
comrander regarding C3CM , to include E'w jamming, Operations
Security, and deception. The Operations Officer serves as
the revision's deception coordinator.
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Typically, the G3 priorities for fighting the rivision
echo the principles of war. Fire, maneuver, and the ether
elements of combat power receive first priority. Security and
surprise come last. The result is that the deception plan is
often done as an afterthought. The work is assigned accord-
ing to the established priorities. The available time end
assets dictate what will be done.
The G3 does not do all of this worK himself. The G3 has
a small Operations Section and a small Plans Section and
these are augmented with elements from the functional areas.
For example, the Fire Support Element from rivision Artillery
and the Air Force Liaison Team plan and coordinate all o f the
fire support for an operation. The Signal battalion provides
a Communications Support Section. The Engineer Battalion,
The Air Tefense Artillery Battalion, and the Aviation Batte-
lions all provide personnel and equipment to augment the G3.
Tven the Mlitary Intelligence Battalion provides an Elec-
tronic Warfare (FW) Section and an Operations Security
(OPSEC) Section.
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TV. TACTICAL DECEPTION GUIDANCE
A. DECEPTION PLAN EXAMPLE
The deception plan can be written as an annex to
the operations order (OPORD) using the format presented in
FM 90-2, Tactical reception. The field manual provides
the following guidance:
To coordindte the deception jredsures, the planner
creates a "notional order of battle" which is the notional
force that will he portrayed "by the task organization for
the true operdtion. The portrayal will he required for a
set time, based on the deception implementation schedule,
to feed the enemy collection system and affect the enemy
decision-maker [Ref. 29].
The deception overlay covers the battlefield deployment
for the deception ana, like any overlay, is intented to .ut
down the amount of wording required in the annex and l^ gain
clarity of understanding by the in pi emen ters of the various
requirements. It helps subordinate elements visualize what
the enemy is to "see" [Ref. 30],
*•• inception Annex to the OPORD.
The deception annex fellows the five paragrdph format
of the operations order. The paragraphs are: situation,
mission, execution, service support, dnd command dnd signal
[Ref. 31]. The format is standard for all orders.
d. Situation
The situation covers enemy forces, friendly
forces, and attachments and detachments. Usually, this
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paragraph refers to the intelligence appendix of the CPCEE
and to the notional order of battle.
b. Mission
The mission paragraph is a concise statement of
the task(s) and the purpose of the task(s); i.e., the decep-
tion story.
c. Execution
The first subparagraph provides the concept of
operation and The deception objective. There is a subpara-
graph which outlines unit tastfs for edcn unit participating
in the cover and deception operation. The final subparagraph
contains the coordinating and control measures applicable to
two or more units.
d. Service Support
This paragraph may refer tc a current administra-
tive logistic order or may provide specific instructions
concerning combat service support requirements for the cover
and deception operation.
e. Command ar\& Signal
Peference may be made to a signal appendix con-
taining communication deception details. location of decep-
tion command posts and deception command relationships may be
provid ed
.
2. Deception Implementation Schedule
The reception Implementation Schedule can he aided * s
an appendix to the reception Annex. It is £ chronological
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presentation of the deception plan, bringing together all the
activities in order to provide what amounts to a scenario o
*
the operation; in effect, a script for the actors (units).
[Ref. 32]
The schedule lists the implement at ion tiire, the as-
pect of the deception story to be supported, the task, the
unit(s) having responsibility, and applicable remarks. An
example from FM 90-2 supporting the aspect that 2nd Brigade
is making the main division effort has the following level of
scripting. The task is to portray heavier corrtrunicat ions-
electronics traffic level in the 2nd 3rigade zon : n e
actions are to pad traffic on 2nd brigade communication nets
and to allow only minlmum-essen ti al traffic on 1st brigade
communications nets. The units with responsibilities r*re 2nd
brigade, 1st Brigade, and 52nd MI 3n (CIWI). [P.ef. 33]
The schedule is completed all the way through the
initiation of the true operation, and past that tirre to
include final actions in terminating the deception.
3« Ti Appendix to the Deception Annex
The EV appendix lays out the electronic deception
tasks to he accomplished. Sines imitative communications
deception (Id) and manipulative electronic deception (ME)
usually require snme technical detail, the appendix usually
is used tc spell out tasking to both tne MI Bn (CIVI) and
maneuver unit? participating in the projection nf the decep-
tion story to the enemy signals intelligence (SISINT)
capability. In some elaborate deceptions this vay have TABS
which pive details of scheduling and the content of false
message traffic, padding, radar spoofing, etc. [Pef. 34]
Usually, however, a typical tasking for the MI Battalion
would be to introduce false information into enemy signal
intelligence channels at intervals between D-l and D-Day m
support evidence of the division main attack in the zone of
2nd Brigade and also to provide electronic countermea srres
(ECr) support to 2nd Brigade. [?ef. 35! There is a tendency
to follow the guidance provided by FM 90-2 which emphasizes
the brevity needed in the operations order.
B. EXECUTION AND RESULTS
The deception Implementation schedule separates the
deception plan into a series of deception measures which if
believed by the target will result in acceptance cf the
i
deception story. The success of the deception depends r: n zY.e
ability to plcn the appropriate deception measures <=rd o^ [he
ability to properly execute those measures. A proven exists
between planning and execution in that the aeceution annex is
only an outline and may not provide the amount o ** detail
necessary for decent rail red execution [P.ef. 3C J . The effect
on execution can he shown using historical examples of recent
efforts to use deception to aid the operation of ftrry units.
1 • JDec en t rallied Execution
Frorr 24 March to ?.8 "zv:* 1968, units c 1 the leist
Airborne Fivision participated in a ccrn c -level deception
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plan. The plan was designed to convince the enemy that the
main thrust of an attack would be in the Dong Eod area and
to the north. This was to be used to deceive the enemy of
the 1st Air Cavalry Division which planned to attack west
along Highway 9 to relieve the Khe Sanh combat base.
The concept of the operation required the 191st
Division to move one rifle company and a signal detachment
to the vicinity of Dong Hoa. The signal detachment was to
transrrit radio messages siFulating an Arrival Airfield Con-
trol Group. Communications were to be conducted as i r the
2nd Prigade, 101st Airborne Division, was moving to Dong Foa.
The ri^le company was tc conduct operations in the villages
and populated areas to obtain maximum exposure of the Scream-
ing-Eagle patch and give the impression that a much larger
force was in the area.
One airborne rifle company and 15 personnel (1
"
I
officer/14 enlisted) from Company 2, 501st Signal Battalion,
moved by air from Pue-Phu Dai airfield to Dong Eoa on 2r>
march. Two AN'VPC-49 radios and one AN/ARC-121 ra i i o
erouo accompanied the signal personnel. Operational control
of the task force passed to the Commanding General, Ire
"arine Division, upon its arrival at Dong Poa. The 15 oer-
sonnel were placed in two locations approximately ten
Kilometers apart. This enabled radio signals to emanate from
more than o^e location. The signal team simulated th.-ee
radio nets at brigade level, two radio nets for each of tr.ree
battalions, radio nets for three companies of each battalion,
and two artillery nets.
The division conld not evaluate the overall effect-
iveness of the deception operation; however, sorre observa-
tions and recommendations resulted frcu reviewing the
interna] functioning of the operation.
The scenario accompanying the signal personnel in-
cluded approximately seven messages per net per day. Al-
though ad-lib messages were used to keep the *ets active, it
was concluded that the scenario should have been expanded
with more messages.
Some personnel with peculiar speech patterns were
unable to disguise tneir voices end thereby could cnly be
used to depict the same call sign in a net. This limited
flexibility in the use of personnel. It was recommended that
radio operators be thoroughly screened to facilitate maxiniim
personnel utilization.
It was disc found that inexperienced enlisted
personnel had difficulty playing a convincing role as an
officer or senior non-commissioned officer. It was recom-
mended that serin- grade personnel conduct such ope ration? to
add credence to rddio messages. It should be noted that this
situation was the result of improper radio ~rocecu r-es .
At the termination of the sigrinl portion of the
exercise, the Marines assured the role of the units pre-
viously simulated. Transition massed smoothly, except that
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only one call sign frorr the deception scenario corresponded
with those of tne new unit. The recommendat ions stated
that the planning must insure that the simulated unit does
not unrealistically disappear. [Ref. 37]
2- fm^Hon at the 11th Hour
The tide of battle does not always provide tne tire
for detailed planning and preparations. Roger Fleetwood
Fesketh concluded his eyewitness report on tne "Fortitude"
deception that
:
"There is a tendency on the part of those who are
constantly at grips with compelling realities to regard
deception e 5 a swift p a n a cea to be invoiced when other rere
dies have failed. Although there ray be occasions when its
services can usefully be enlisted to give immediate did, it
is generally more correct to regard it as a nethod which
achieves its results by a slow and gradual process rather
than by lightning strokes." [P.ef . 38].
One reason why successful deceptions take tirre is that
the enemy needs sufficient tirre to collect, process, and
report thp deception clues. The information usually must :e
confirmed by collateral sources before it becomes intelli-
gence which is taken to the decision -maker.
Kesketh alluded to some exceptions to the tiring rule
and the author of this tmesis was involved in executing such
an exception. The Commanding General of the 25th In fir try
rivisicn during Exercise Tearr Soirit 83 decided on E-l that a
deception was needed to protect the major river crossing.
The G3 and his deception officer. the E'wC, quickly decided
that the only possible option was a maniuulat ive communica-
tions deception. The tasking was ^iven to tne 125th Mlitcry
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Intelligence Battalion (CIWI). This battalion was to gen-
erate communications traffic over the radio nets of the 2nd
brigade Task Force. The traffic was to indicate that the
assault river crossing would De conducted in the 2 Ti d Erigade
sector. The deception had to begin alrrost immed ia tely as the
main attack "began a scant 18 hours later. The lack of prep-
aration tine demanded that experienced personnel who under-
stood the friendly and enemy situation at the rTacrc-ievel be
used ds the radio operators. In fact, the six personnel
involved in the deception were the Battalion Cormander
,
tr.e
Executive Officer, the Operations Officer and tneir
respective drivers.
The personnel who executed the deception relied or/
their knowledge of stereotyping, pattern recognition, traffic
analysis, and the specific requirements for a river crossing
operation. They trdnsmitted mess-ges that they knew the
er.errv signals intelligence operators, tne counteroar ts of
soldiers found in ".heir own battalion, wcclc be searching
for. Pany of the radio transmissions were one-sided, which
was dcceptatls tecduse the ra din intercept operators are
often faced with that situation due to distances and terrain
masking. Other transmissions included the participatory
responses of the racio operators o: the actual units who ha;:
remained on the d i r
.
The deception attempt was a failure in that the en. err y
lid not relocate its armor heavy reserve p orc£ . It ney not
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have been a total failure because the tanks were not ccr-
rritted in tij-e to disrupt the actual river crossing. In
fact, one exercise controller informed the 2bth Eivision S2
that the deception activity was intercepted, analyzed, and
reported to the enerry commander. A significant arrount of
intelligence resources were committed to confirm the de-
ception story and the plans to relocate the reserve fcrce
were completed. The ambiguity of the situation generated in
part by deception at the 11th hour Toy have contributed
to the success of The division's river crossing. [Fef. 39!.
3. IHPli Gallons
The two examples in this section imply that planning
is only one part of the deception process. Tiie wartime
example indicates that there is a lack of understanding on
how h unit is to translate the situationally dependant "whet"
of the deception task into an executable and believable "how"
and when". The peacetime exercise example shows that adding
a deception effort at the last minute severely restricts the
scope o-f the deception. The last minute effort to conduct a
deception operation Tay succeed but usually in a limited way.
The deception planner must be in a position to know
the friendly and enerry tactical situation. The planner must
understand how deception causes surprise and now the enery
is going to collect those clues which build up tc the de-
ception story. Further, the planner rust know whether units
tasked to execute the deception measures have si f ^i -lent
A?
assets and appropriate training to do the job properly. An
irrproper tasking may result in an irrproper execution.
Decentralized execution runs the risk that one cr
rrore aspects of the deception may go wrong and ruin the
entire effort. There must be a systeT of checks to insure
that the deception story has rerrained true to the ulan.
C. SUMMARY
Fl* 90-2, Tactical Pecept icn
,
provides an excellent cut-
line to be used for deception guidance as long as it is
understood that a deception outline is not a deception plan.
The gaps in the outline must be filled in according to the
situation. One unit's plan might require a complete scriot
with the who, what, when, where, and how totally spelled out
for ecch player. Another unit's plan rright include a certain
arrount of flexibility in execution. Sorre thi ngs work in one
situation but do not work in the next and that makes de-
ception a very hard subject to teach.
reception cannot re taught as well as it can ce learred
in the f i eld. It rrust be learned in peacetime training, rut
that is not always being accomplished. Exercises a-e
scenario-oriented and asset-lirrited. y any good deception
plans are never executed because o ^ lack of assets. v ^st
units cnly get one change to learn how to execute a suc-
cessful deception and that is usually provided once the unit
has ear e to war. re-;ep + ion rrust net be ignored in peacetime
if it is to be used 1- tires of war.
<±o
Barton Whaley, in his toofc, Stratagem! Decept io n and
Surprise In War, concluded that:
"The deceiver is alrrost always successful regardless of
the sophistication of his victim in the sarre art. On the
face of it, this seems to be an intolerable conclusion, one
offending common sense. Yet^ it is the irrefutable conclu-
sion of historical evidence." [Hef. 40j
D. TFI NI-ZD FOR ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL DECEPTION
Historical examples and written observations can go far
in explaining a complex process such as deception. Far Tore
information on deception is available than the casual ob-
server is aware of, this is due in part to the recent de-
classification of n-any of the operations of World 5,; a r II.
Tet, it is difficult to accept the impressive conclusions
that analysts such as "Barton Whaley have provided. Further,
it is difficult to project these conclusions fror the strate-
gic level to the tactical level.
Much of what is '<nown about deception is fror the British
experience. Obviously there are more recent examples that
remain classifier,'. Many changes in technology have
transformed the battlefield and it is tempting to assume that
the deception practices of 'Vorld War II and earlier no longer
apply to modern war. The dummy soldiers and vehicles of that
ere would not be effective against the sophisticated sur-
veillance systems available today. Nevertheless, technology
on the battlefield is a^ evolutionary process. Fach new
system fielded on one side can be rapidly countered by the
the ether. reception techniques ere usea in
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hardware such as jammers and decoys against hardware such a s
radars and electro-optic and infrared sensors. The Fissions
for coirnmni cat ions jamming teams still include irritative
communications deception, f«"uch of what can be learned from
earlier experience can still be usefully applied to today's
battlefield.
The optimization of tactical deception must include not
merely dpceiving rvchin.es but ultimately deceiving the men
who rely on Their. Therefore, the need in analyzing tactical
deception is to discover the full role that it can play in
future battle.
There are several ways to systematically analyze de-
ception to gain an understanding of means to optimize and
integrate the future practice of tactical deception. ?ne
method is tc co a comparative analysis of case histories to
determine common factors and the cause and effect relation-
ships. A second rethod would oe f> analyze tactical de-
ception 'rcf a multi disciplinary approach to aevelop a ccrrcn
viev* of d er:ept ion's primary elements a"d their relationships.
Both rrethods will be used in this thesis so that conclusions
can be drawn from each.
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V. THEORETICAL APPROACHES
The theoretical approach was employed at the Naval Post-
graduate School in a joint investigation of deception which
began in early 1979. Four studies oy William Reese, Ronald
G. Sherwin, and Paul H. Moose specifically focused on appli-
cation of game, corr.irunica tion, organization, and systems
theories. The remaining three studies were by Donald C.
Taniel and Katharine L. Ferbig, Richards J. Eeuer, and
Theodore R. Sorbin. They were rrore eclectic, drawing from
historical cases and documents arid concept? and principles
derived fror many academic sources. The three eclectic
studies focused on decision-raking and perceptual and cogni-
tive processes [Ref. 41] . This section will summarizize seme
of those rrultidisciplinary concepts as they can be anolieri to
tactical military deception.
A, COMMUNICATIONS TFEORY
Communications theory focuses on the problems of trans-
mitting information between a sender and a receiver. The
^lassie model is a linear progression of inforration frorr a
source through an encoder, channel, and decoder, to a desti-
nation. Noise enters the mcdel to affect all but the source
and destination [Ref. 42]. This model can be applied to
both the tactical deception planning process and the
deception execution pro c ess.
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1. Communications Model of the Planning Process
The planning process focuses on the deception story
which must "be cornrunicdted frorr the source to the destina-
tion. The source is the commander who authorizes the de-
ception. The receiver is the opposing commander who is the
prirre target of the deception. The source determines the
overall objectives that he wants the deception to accomplish.
The receiver has the ability to cause the desired action to
take place. The deception plan is successful if the false
information that is transmitted biases the target's decision-
making process at the destination and causes the target to
act in a manner that is advantageous to the deceiver.
An encoder is the person or organization which
assists the deceiver by planning the deception. It is possi-
ble that the commander might perform this fi notion by him-
self, but usually the planning is done by the staff. In the
case o^ strategic operations the deception planners are nor-
mally a separate body of planners who are specifically chosen
for their special abilities in this function. The tactical
level is much more restricted in personnel and the deception
planning function at division level is often relegated to
an additional duty of the Future Flans Section of the Opera-
tions Staff. That stcticn coordinates the preparation of the
division operations orders and is in a position to call upon
the functional expertise of the rest of the division. staff.
The encoding of the deception plan is done in much the same
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way as the real operations plan is encoded for the commander.
The difficulty is that the encoders are normally chosen "or
their ability to encode tactics in a Fanner that will be
communicated within the organization and that will be re-
ceived by personnel with sirrilcir training in those tactics.
Planning the deception requires that the encoder work
the communications problem backwards. The encoder must pre-
dict the information that must be received at the destination
to produce the desired results. The encoder must anticipate
the effects that transmission of the signals will have on
their amplitude and their fidelity and make allowances for
the changes that may result after the signals are sent. The
encoder must, recognize the channels that are cvailable to
send information to the enemy. He must convert the source
message into an indicator set that is suitable for trans-
mission over the available channels and that will be received
in the desired form at the destination.
The role of the encoder of deception is mad e diffi-
cult ir that he has no control over the signals after they
have been sent. There is no assurrance that they will be
received or that they will be processed in the anticipated
rranner. The effects of noise and the effects of chance may
never be known unless there is sorre feedback to the deceiver.
The channels that ray be used to send tactical sig-
nals include all aspects of the environment that are moni-
tored ty the enemy. Tactical deception channels are visual,
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sonic, olfactory, or electromagnet ic in nature. lach channel
is characterized by its physical form, the tire associated
with transmission, and the random events that modulate the
signal during its transmission from the deceiver forces to
the target forces.
The channels that can be used to transmit information
for a tactical deception are somewhat different Than those
fcr a strategic deception. Titre produces the biggest differ-
ence. The tactical arena of modern war ^ay oe very fast-
paced especially if the mechanized forces predominate. It is
possible that battle areas might move up to 72 kilometers a
ddy. In such an environment, botn forces would depend heavi-
ly on electromagnetic reconnaissance, intelligence summaries
frorr higher headquarters, ard tactical reports from front
line units.
Tactical situations where tattle lines are rore
static would present the capability to transmit information
through additional channels. lach force would use patrols
and raids to gai r information. Residue r'ro.T recently--vaca cec
eneiry territory would be sifted for intelligence data. Pri-
soners of war, line-crossers , and personnel from The
indigenous population would be interrogated for collateral
information. The tactical units would report any information
of what is heard, seen, or srrelled by individual soldiers.
Specialized intelligence units would oe given the time ic
practice their professions.
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All of the information would be processed through a
series of intelligence analysts and officers until the ove-
rall picture of what the enemy is doing or intends to do
becomes recognizable. Given time, even the spy networks
which are so applicaole to strategic deception would begin to
filter information through to the intelligence system. The
tire is usually available even at the tactical level because
there must be a lull in battle to reconstitute and resupply
forces. There must be time to plan the battle and prepare
for it. There must be time to clarify the situation so that
the force with the initiative can avoid the costly ambush.
The role of the decoder in the deception planning
analogy is to convert the signal from the form in which it is
received at the chcnnel output to the forrr usable in the
decision-making process. lecoding involves the processing of
infcrration into the intelligence that arrives dt the desti-
nation.
The information that is collected throughout the
battlefield is of many types and qualities. O'ce it is
collected it must te forwarded in a timely manner to the
person who has requested it. For example, the infantry
soldier who observes an enomcly or specific ene^y weapon
reports it through his chain of command. At company level,
the report is sent to the bdttalion intelligence officer over
d dedicated intelligence net. If the information is of
sufficent importance, it is sent to higher headquarters,
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if not, it mdy be held to be combined with other inf ormation
and eventually becorre part of a periodic intelligence report
or periodic intelligence summary. [Ref. 43j . The in :"ormat ion
that is of value only to a particular level is not trans-
fritted higher. If the intelligence value is perishaole, than
it dies when its designated time is up [Ref. 44]
.
Intelligence personnel are trained to recognize what
is important. They are also trained in the manner in which
different categories of intelligence should be handled. Sore
of the information remains intact through many different
handlings of it. Other information rapidly loses its form tut
may net lose its content.
There is specialized information such as that which
j
is received by radars, radio intercept, eiectro-optif de-
vices, radar intercept devices, photographic, or imaging
devices that enter the intelligence system directly [Ref,
45J . This direct information flews through parallel communi-
cations lines to the analysis nodes.
The decoding by the different nodes is a critical
point that must be considered oy the deception planner.
Channels that are unreliable or unsuitable lead to nodes
where that information will De neglected or ignored. Decod-
ing paths that are not timely may result in the information
being lost or arriving too late to have any effect. The
framing of the information at the decoding node pay result in
the wrong meaning being attriDuted to it.
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Each decoding node may be viewed as a gate which
manipulates the information into the intelligence that is
its end product. Some nodes process only collateral informa-
tion and sorre process only specialized intelligence or
i nf orrrat ion . Some nodes process all-source information =ind
these nodes necorre more prevalent <*s they near the ultimate
destination. [Pef. 46]
illl nodes are important because the deception story
was encoded into an indicator set that may be meaningful only
if the majority of the indicators arrive at the destination
intact. The indicators must present enough of a challenge to
the enemy analysts or else they will oe suspect. Too meny
duplicate indicators, sent to allow for attrition, nay also
reveal the deception. Yet, the absence of corroborating
information at any node may result in inattention. The enemy
analyst decoding the indicator set does not have the hi?
picture until all of the important information has nee.n
decoded . [!?ef . 47]
The indicator ^et of the deception story is communi-
cated in the presence of noise which includes all random
occurrances that interfere with the signals. Noise may cause
the encoder tc generate indicators that are not appropriate
for the message simply Because of a mi spercept ion of the
desires of the source or a faulty understanding of the
channels, the decoders, or the mindset of the enemy jemmnncer
who is the deception target.
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The encoder may choose the wrong or the inappropriate
channels. Noise rray corrupt the indicators once they have
"been t ransrritted or it may block a channel entirely. Noise
rray enter the decoding process resulting in critical indica-
tors reing ignored or misinterpreted. The effect of noise is
unpredictable. [Pef . 48]
?. Communications £odel of the Execution process
The execution process is concerned with the specific
communication of the signals which support the indicator set
and the elimination of unwanted signals. Each indicator may
involve many different signals which show up in physical
events, reverent on the battlefield, cemmunications , or ether
activities. Each signal must oe controlled so that it
supports the desired indicator and does not interfere with
other desired indicators. All of the signals whether they
are hiding the real or displaying the false should he inte-
grated to te mutually supportive.
The communications theory model may ue applied to tne
actual signals which are transmitted in the execution o ^ the
deception. A typical illustration is that of a radio trans-
mission. The source is the radio operator who sends the
deception message. The destination is the enemy radio inter-
cept operator who is listening to the message. The encoder
is the radio transmitter and the decoder is the rddic inter-
cept receiver set. The channel is that portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum used in tne transmission and the
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physical propagation of the electromagnetic wave from the
transmitter to the receiver. The noise is the intentional or
unintentional interference of other el ectrorrcgnet ic waves in
the environment at that frequency or it could be noise inter-
nally generated by the transmitter or receiver. [Hef. 49]
Technology is more applicable to the communication
model at this level. The deceiver must know the technical
parameters of the situation. Electronic deception is useless
if tre enemy does not hdve compatdble equipment, if the
transmitted signal is blocked by terrain, or if the range is
such thdt the signal is attenuate! telcw the noise level.
Visual deception cannot be used to transmit signals if the
enemy's iraping or photographic reconnaissance effort is
designed for a lesse" range. Similarly, camouflage against
vlsu« ? observation will not protect dgainst detection ty
sensors using a different part of the electromagnetic soec-
trurr. The transmission or the protection of deception sig-
nals trust be designee according to the target's capability to
detect tho^e signals. [Vet. 50]
3 • IlLP2i caiicms. of Comrrun icct ions Theory
It might seerr that there would be only a small proba-
bility that the deception story intenaed at the source would
be correctly received at the destination. In fact, the
opposite is true if the deception planner correctly under-
stands the process. The enerry situation can be understood
sufficiently to predict the mindset cf the enemy commander,
54
hi? decoders, and his collectors. The key personalities and
their working models can be understood in light of their
training and experience.
The effect of enemy doctrine and goals on perform-
ance can "be researched and all available information car. be
used to predict, with a fair degree of accuracy, The
decoding function that will be used by the target's intelli-
gence systerr. Thus, the key is to match the encoding process
used by the deceiver to the decoding process used by the
target. Once that is done the indicators can be transmitted
with calculated redundency over channels where the r.cise
level can be predicted in terms of accuracy and reliability.
It is possible that a direct feedback loop may be
established so that the effects of the noise can be rreasurdd.
This feedback could core from many different information
sources, but perhaps the rest applicable is tne feedback
coming frorr the intercept of the target's radio communi na-
tions. Although modern armies ha^e gone far tc wards tne
securing of k»?y communications nets with encryption devices,
many vulnerabilities still exist. [Kef. 51
J
A feedback channel allows the deception planner to
modify the indicator set to optimize the effect of the de-
ception story. Feedback can indicate the level cf mis-
direction or ambigvity that has been generated in the target
systpp and can highlight, changes in those levels as tne
enemy's perception o ^ the deception story evolves.
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The level of ambiguity must remain high enough to
protect the secret of the actual operation. If indicators of
the real situation or plan are received by the enemy they
create contrary evidence. The existence of contrary evidence
could he used to indicate inadequate deception effectiveness.
Feedback ca^ also indicate the time differential that
exists between informatioa collection and analysis. That
may be a direct reflection of the effectiveness o? the de-
ception as it takes longer for the target syster to function
in the presence of the deception ambiguities. [Ref. 52]
Cther functions of feedback are to determine whether the
target believes the information being received at the channel
outputs and whether he attributes The meaning to the indi-
cators that the deceiver intended. The key measure of
effectiveness is whether the target acts on the deceptive
information in ways contrary to his true interest. [Ref. 5jSJ
3. ORGANIZATION THIORY
Tactical military deception is restricted to individual
tattles or limited campaigns, but even at the U.S. Army
division level the forces involved ore numerous and complex.
Organization theory employs the notion that large organiza-
tions are involved a s targets of deception. Tnese organiza-
tions can be viewed as intelligence or in formation -proce ssing
organizations whose function is to attend to, process, and
transmit information to the decision rra'-^er who is the ulti-
mate target of the deception.
There are many sensors on the battlefield. The sensors
range frorr the individual soldiers in contact with the enemy
to complex systems of specialized equipment and men collect-
ing signals emanating frorr all areas of the battlefield.
These signals characterize the operations of the forces that
generate therr. There is little activity that exists in a
division area of operations that is not subject to bem^
sensed "by the enemy. The problem is not one of collecting
signals generated by the enerry, it is to collect only the
important signals and to produce the intelligence from them
that is essential for rational decision-making. The process-
ing crnd reporting of intelligence requires a specialized
organization that can be analyzed and understood fron the
organization theory perspective.
Analyzing tlie tactical deception process may be enhanced
through viewing the deception target from the organizational
perspective, since it allows deception to oe more uniformly
applied. The target is no longer an unknown or little known
entity but is an organization which has discrete properties
that remain relatively constant regardless of the personnel
who belong tc the organization. Once the factors that effect
the intelligence organization's relationship to decision-
making are understood, it may be possible to manipulate those
factors to perpetrate a deception.
The '"actors of the organization which must re understood
are of two types. The first type involves information of how
b?
the parts of the organization function in relation to each
other. An understanding of the men and machines at the
functional level is necessary and the command and control
process typifies the relationship. The second type of in-
formation is that which provides the framework for the
setting of group goals and objectives. Obviously, an under-
standing of the military doctrine which applies to the enery
as a whole would be a source of information on the guidelines
or rules of thumb being used by the specific organization
that is being targeted for deception. The data base of the
general attributes of the organ izat ion is the starting ooint
upon which more specific information is built.
The physical organization of tactical units is fairly
veil documented for all potential deception targets. The
documentation includes line and block cnarts which reflect
the command authority. Fach blocK can be understood in terrs
of function and in terms of equipment and men associated with
that function. Each line can De understood in terrs of the
communication* paths ^nd means that will be used to provide
Interface networks. The general information arplies to all
like units and standardization of units is necessary for all
iai"ge m:derr armies. The specific deception target ma y have
portions of the organization which are not standard and the
identification of those anomalies would oe a regular intelli-
gence collection task. It is very important to understand
the target organization within the framework o ." the enemv
t>8
system and not simply generate functional attrioutes based on
analogy to the U.S. system.
A significant difference between the two systerrs is the
Soviet's ninth principle of war which goes beyond requiring
commanders to be determined and decisive in carrying out the
assigned mission. Subordinate commanders rrust carry out the
spirit and letter of the plan. Soviet initiative is exer-
cised in finding unique ways to execute the plan but does not
allow commanders to revise the plan based on changed circum-
stances. The plan is expected to proceed according to the
milestones and times dictated. [Ref. 54]
There are other features cf military art which typify the
organization which are very important to the deception
process. Soviet command and control requires efficient staff
work which in the interpretation has resulted in The use cf
working and decision aids that are becoming more and more
automated. The decision aids are designed to speed the
command and control process. Such an aid might predict the
size and composition of forces that would re required to
insure success against an objective in a situation in which
the parameters can be codified. ether aids might yield
rptimum timetables for an operation cr the movement of
forces. Planning aids might aiiow the rapid coordination of
staff Inputs and might output the alternatives available for
the solution of the military problem. The planning aid might
also rank the alternatives by success probability. [Ref. i:Sj
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One factor of the organization that can be analyzed is
the interaction structure of the intelligence processing
systerr. Knowing the patterns of interaction can help deter-
mine to what extent the deception target is structured hier-
archically and can identify communications bottlenecks.
A second factor of the organization which can be observed
is the degree of responsiveness to changes in the environ-
ment. Even though a Soviet combined arms army, for example,
has vast resources for the collection and processing of
information, that information might not be used in the
decision-making process in certain situations. The decisions
may not he the prerogative of the army commander but might be
dictated by the front or higher level commander. In such a
situation, the organization which is the combined arms army
would be operating in a totally closed fashion and would not
re responsive to external signals.
Another attribute of the organization is how it assigns
meaning to intelligence information. An understanding of
this factor can he obtained by researching the information
processing system o f an opponent and applying the paradigms
cf psychology which help predict human performance . The
frampwork of the organization allows the general application
of cognitive biases and perceptual biases which yield an
understanding of what information will be attended to, how
that information will be interpreted, and how it will affect
the decision-making process. [Ref.
~6J
60
The effect of stress on information processing and
decision-making is also an attribute of the organization that
can he analyzed. An organization under no stress can be
equated to an army that is not involved in battle. The
situation is arrbiguous but the analysts feel that they have
sufficient time to collect more information a.nd make a more
precise evaluation of the situation. There is mere time tc
generate and evaluate alternatives. Preconceptions about
the enemy will have a large impact on the generation of the
initial hypothesis set. If the situation involves a moderate
degree of stress such as that which is generated when battle
is imminent, the org c ni zat ion actually performs better.
Information flows faster and is less subject to being biased.
The need for decisiois is great, but there is a perception of
sufficient time to evaluate the situation and make the
decision based on information that will be sufficient.
High stress situations such as actual battle conditions
introduce the perception that the decisions will have to oe
rade before sufficient information is available. [Kef. E7J
The compander has a tendency tc make his decisions based on
his cwn preconceptions of the situation rather than on the
rerits of the available information. An organization's re-
liance on preconceptions can be equated tc specific tine
periods related to the start point of the battle. [Pef. 58]
Thus, the negative impact on hypothesis-generation and
decision-mrikin^ can De anticipated.
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Organization theory can did in the understanding of the
enemy. The battlefield application is irost efficient when
information on the organization's key people and their per-
formance records is available? however, the organization
framework fills in some of the data which may be missing from
the intelligence data base.
C. SYSTEMS THEORY
A major weakness of much of the operational planning that
is done is that it is based solely on the quantifiable prin-
ciples of war without consideration of any cybernetic pro-
cesses. The enemy is taken into account in the planning rut
usually in terms of location, disposition, cornrat power,
possible courses of action and probable intentions. These
and similar factors are based on the intelligence informa-
tion that is present at the time of the course of action
brief. That situation is used to generate the different
hypotheses for the projection of the enemy situation to the
time when the plan or operation will be placed in motion.
Cnce the planners have decided what they think the enemy will
do, that decision is very hard to change [T>ef . 59] .
The enemy situation serves as input to the development o
f
the courses of action. Three to five possible ..-curses of
action are proposed to the commander. At this point, the
limitations of the human mind take over. The human mind can
assimilate only limited amounts of data and can maintain only
three to five hypotheses at time [Ref. 60j . The enemy
situation is simplified by the mind so that only the most
probable and rrost salient situations are used. [Ref. 61] .
Again, when the commander irakes his decision on the friendly
courses of action, that decision is hard to change. In fact.
It is hard to determine exactly what data was pertinent to
the decision. There is a tendency to stick to the decision
even if some of the information that was presented during
the course of action brief is later proven to be faulty.
[Ref. 62] The point is that the enemy should net be viewed
as being a passive part of the systerr. The logic of military
operations is such that the terrain, the weather, logistics,
and the relative forces often dicate the optimal tactics for
a plan. Yet, if the logicol option is equally obvious to the
enemy, the advantages for those tactics ran b< 'set by the
his ccunterpreparati ons. [Ref. 63j
reception can he viewed in light of systems theory as the
interaction of two organizations and their environments.
Each military force is an organization with properties that
will be known fairly correctly by its opponent. The two
organizations are capable of communicating through their
intelligence functions. The conditioning of that information
as it passes through the respective organizations can oe
i nderstood in light of the goals and biases of the opposing
organizations. Thus, there is a certain amount of predict-
ability which can be assigned to the system by judicious
application of communications and organization theory.
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Systerrs theory takes into account the role of feedback
and the role of the environment. The environment is a third
part of the syste<r which introduces stimuli into sensing
capabilities of of the two opposing organizations. The
environment can he changed by the actions of either organiza-
tion or by factors which are out of human control. The
environment can modulate the stimuli that are inputs and the
responses that are outputs of either organization. Unpre-
dictable behavior of the system may be generated by random or
unaccountable events caused by the environment or by imper-
fect knowledge of the predictable events. The unpredictable
behavior must be adjusted for in order to optimize deception
because deception requires the ability to predict future
I
behavior of the system and influ nee it.
The responses or actions of e a ch organi zat ion become
stimuli which establish a new situation. The proper choice
of stimuli by the deceiver can establish control over the
future stream of events by sending information to an adver-
sary with the purpose of predetermining his decision. Once
initial control is gained, the deceiver can set in motion
additional actions which capitalize on the advantage he has
gained.
The Soviet organization was used as the primary example
in the proceeding analysis of organization theory. The same
examnle will be used to see if the Soviets have adopted a
similar systems view and it seems as I* they have. The
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Soviets began research in cybernetics much earlier than did
the United States. Soviet thought developed into a theory
for reflexive control which was expressed by Le^evre and
Srrolyan in the 1968 hook, Algebra of Conflict. They wrote:
"Control of an opponent's decision, which in the end
is a forming of a certain behavior strategy on him
through reflexive interaction, is not achieved directly,
not by a blatant force, but by means of providing him
with the ground? by which he is able to logically de-
rive his own decision, but one that is preaet errined by
the other side. . . . The process of transferring grounds
for making decisions from one opponent to other we call
reflexive control, any 'deceitful movements' (provoca-
tions and intrigues, disguises and feints, construction
of false objects, and deceit in general in any context) are
achievements of reflexive control." [Kef. 64]
The application of the systems model to military de-
ception was based on the fact that military organizations are
complex systems. The Soviets already had a model for complex
systems and observed that military organisms corresponded to
the objects of the research in the theory of systems. Since
the formal attributes were the same, military organizations
were complex systems in the broadest sense of the word. The
theory evolved to where Tarakanov, in 1974, concluded that
"any combat operation from the stancpolnt of its formaliza-
tion can be considered a system." |Ref. 65]
It was determined that the systems view fit very closely
to the application of military science. The concept could be
used as a model governed by rules that could be quantified.
Tn fact, it is necessary to understand the Soviet concept of
systems and the Soviet concept of cybernetics before one can
understand vbat the Soviets mean by "troop-control." Soviet
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"troop-control" is sirrilar to "command and control" but it is
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^he same ideas that show up in the Soviet view of coirmand
and control in the context of their principles of military
art are apparent in their cybernetic rrodel. The level to
which they have been able to realize mathematical models and
computer applications is questiona Die? however, the applica-
tions have teen postulated. This theory is part of the
Soviet organization and shorld be considered for deception.
C. GAM TF*CPY AS PART OF EECISION TFIOPY
The possible use of mathematical mocels to assist in
Soviet, decislcn-making d t the operational and tactical levels
ee
leads into decision theory with emphasis on gane theory as
one approach. The application of game theory to the decision
process is a rodel which is distinct frcrr war gaming. It
would seem that games based on probabilities eind expected
values fit into simple algorithms that might be used in the
Soviet command and control of operat iondl forces.
The objective of decision theory is providing decision-
makers a basis for making an intelligent choice as to which
alternative is best. The nethods are quantitative, usin^ the
techniques of mathematics tc deal witn the quantifiable as-
pects of the problem. [Fef. 67] The advantage of providing a
quantitative basis to a decision-maker is that he is able tc
approach the decision with a better understanding of the
c onsen ences .
Decisions must be made with varying degrees of Knowledge
about the conditions under which an operation or action will
take place. The book, Naval Operations Analysis., separates
conditions according to the degree of risk that is involved
in predicting the state of nature that will occur. The
amount of risk involved in picking the single best course of
action is determined by the uncertainty. Decision theory
addresses four possible cases of interest. [Eef. 68]
The first and simplist case arises when it is fcnown with
certainty the stdte of nature which will occur. The decision
matrix is simply one payoff for each possible course of
action. The criterion that snou]d be used ^'or comparing
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alternatives in the case of decision-making under certainty
is the best payoff. [Ref. 69]
The second case arises when it is not known which state
of nature will occur, but where the chance that each will
occur is known. This situation is known as decisi on-rraking
under risk and the expected payoff for each course of action
would be the value of the weighted average using the proba-
bilities assigned to the different states of nature. Ir.
decision-rraking under risk, the corrrr ander would be advised to
choose the strategy which optimizes the expected value of the
rreasure of effectiveness. [Ref. 70]
The third case arises when tne deci si on-rraker does not
know the probabilities cf occurrence for the various states
of nature. This situation is called decision-rraking under
uncertainty. This thesis will address four criteria that
rright be used in this situation tc choose a best course of
action. These four are the rraximin or pessirrisr, the opti-
misrr, the least regret, and tne rationality criteria.
[Pef. ?l]
The three cases of decision-rraking under certainty, under
risk, and under uncertainty apply to situations where the
state? of nature occur without regard to their effect or the
payoff for the decision-raker. The techniques of rratheratics
end statistics applied in such cases are called statistical
decision theory. A fourth case of deci si cn-ir c king arises
when the states of nature are controlled by a rational
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opponent, who may be expected to act in a rranner which
frustrates the goals of the decision-maker. A decision
situation which is against an active opponent is known as a
game of strategy and is subject to a part of T<at hematics
called theory of games. [Ref. 72]
A theory of games wcs established in 1944 by the publica-
tion of the book, Theory of Game_s and Economic Behavior, by
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgen stern. The authors of the
theory hoped that it Tight form the basis of decislon-nakir.g
in ail situations where multiple decision-makers car effect
an outcome [Hef. 73j . The theory uses the payoff matrix i
-
the same way that it is used in statistical decision theory.
The payoff matrix can be used tn represent various conflict
situations. In planning, the estimate of the situation is
essentially a formulation of a matrix game in rfhich the
commander arrays his own courses of action against the capa-
bilities of the enemy [Ref. 74].
It is necessary to consider all four of the situations
found in the military as games of strategy and games against
nature. It is necessary becaus*e the commander must ne able to
recognize the type of situation that he faces. Fe may or ray
not be ir contact with the enemy and so h e may not be in the
direct conflict game situation. All of hi s decisions will be
made under uncertainty, risk, or certainty and the difference
is H^i^ii! d function of hew well his intelligence service
performs .
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Certainty, risk, and uncertainty situations differ in the
degree of knowledge available about the state of nature that
will occur. The first and rare case is when the state can be
known in advance. That case would correspond to ccrrplete
success at G2 operations. There is no risk involved in
knowing enerry intentions and so the criterion used for
comparing alternatives is the best payoff. P. risk situation
is that in which the commander does not Know for sure what
will happen but can predict the probabilities for each state
of nature regardless of whether a choice is possible 'or the
opposing commander. The commander chooses the strifes which
optimizes the expected value after- the weighted averages for
each alternative are calculated. Deci si on-Taking i^er
uncertainty arises when a comrrander does not know e^ov^.h
about probabilities of occurrence for any of the various
states of nature to predict their influence on his choice of
action. In milit<;ry operations, decision-Flaking under uncer-
tainty is primarily of interest as an indication that G-2 is
net doing its job properly. [Sef. 7hJ
!• 2l!-Y.ironrrents an^ Criteria
The four main uncertainty criteria fcr decision-
making in the military are pessimism, optimism, regret, and
rationality .
The criterion of pessimism minimizes the risV in-
volved in making a decision. It is also referred to as tee
rraximin criterion since the minimum payoff for e G ch course cf
Tl
action is first found and then the alternative is chosen that
yields the maximum guaranteed payoffs. [Kef. 75]
The criterion of optimism may be implemented by de-
gree of optimism. The complete optimist uses a maxirndx
strategy assuming that the state of nature will occur which
is best for the optimist. The optimist will choose the
action which provides the test payoffs. [Pef . 77j
The third criterion is based on minimizing regret,
It applies the pessimism criterion to a regret matrix to
identify the course of action which yields the least amount
of regret. A commander who would use this crite-io n is the
one who looks tack on his decisions after the action is ever
to see how much better he could iis^e done by predicting the
correct state. [Pef. 7SJ
The criterion of rationality accepts that complete
uncertainty acout the probcble state cf nature is equivalent
to assuming that each state is equally probaole. The expect-
ed payoff for each course of action is computed by v;eightin^
each state of nature equally.
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2 • Game Theo ry and the Co nf li c_t Sit uat ion
Game theory is a mathematical theory of decision-
making in conflict situations between two opponents with
opposing goals. The game theory payoff matrix provides a
method by which each participant can make a decision as to
which alternative should be chosen [Hef. 80], The decision
depends on the criterion used. The proper criterion depends
on the situation and the degree of speculation allowed by the
corrmander. In general, a military commander Takes conserva-
tive decisions. He desires to gain as much as possible,
safely, in the face of a skillful opponent whose objective is
diametrically opposed. This is essentially the maxirnin
criterion, which is the reasonable criterion to use in a
conflict situation involving a rational opponent. [Hef1 . 81]
The maxirnin criterion is a pessiri sti c strategy con-
ducted urder uncertainty to insure that the greatest expected
value will be attained against an enemy who makes the wisest
choice. Once the criterion has been established, the con-
flict situation ^.an be placed in a rratrix forrr ;<nown as the
two-person, zero-sum" matrix. An example o^ this type of
matrix is shown in T^ble 4.
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The case shown in Table 4 is in the standard forrr
which has all payoffs frorr the point of view of the clue
corrrrander. A payoff which is a blue failure is also a
success for red. Red wants to minimize the payoff for blue.
Red will rationally choose either option 51 or option P3.
Blue, knowing that red will never choose R2, rust ri sa either
31 or 33. Those options have an equal chance of failing or
succeeding. Blue rrlght want to be Cautious and choose B2,
hut choosing 12 will result in a draw every time.
The military estimate of the situation is
similar to the two-person, zero-surr garre [Ref.. s i-
intelligence staff predicts the red options and the opera-
tions staff develops the blue options. The commander works
with the entire staff to determine which blue option will
have the highest payoff in light of what rer can do. The
situation might be shown as a game matrix in which the matrix
values represent the postulated values of the outcomes of the
battle. An example would be:
TABLE 5
cori^ITER 'S ESTIMATE n AME r.A TV IX
RED nor ! S
3LUE OPTIONS
LOWEST
Rl R2 Q 3 P A
Bl 1 6 A1 (>
12 2 2 3 3 2
33 1 9 u 3 1
HIGHEST 2 9 o o 2=2
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The rational blue commander would assure that red
would pick PI to achieve the minimum of the maximum paycffs
for blue. Elue would then decide on option 332 which guaran-
tees a payoff of at least 2. This discussion has assured that
the payoff matrix is the Same for both commanders, but in
this situation the blue commander can do at least as veil
under a different enerry p ayoff matrix. This example is a
saddle point game. There are other other examples of ga^es
with dominance and games requiring rrixed strategy, A com-
mander's use of a single course of action for all plays of
the game is d pure strategy. A mixed
.
strategy is a way of
using two or more courses of action on different plays of the
game. The optimal strategy called 'or in the solution to a
game is the optimal pure strategy in a game with a saddle-
point, and is an optimal mixed strategy otherwise. nhe
commander of the inferior force may not have an optimal
strategy because he may not he able to use game theory at
all. Ilememtary game theory and further example^ are ex-
plained very well in the book, Naval Ojeratiqns Analysis.
There are two observations on use of games in
conflict situations. The first is that military conflict may
be a series of one time plays of the game. The expected
pay^f which is near certainty with a large number p* repeti-
tions of the game is not realized for one time plays of a
fare calling for mixed strategy. For ar.y one play of the
game, the commander may realize rrore or less than the value
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of the game [Ref. 83]. The second observation is that in-
telligence has a great impact on the value of the garre.
Established doctrine dictates the selection of that
course of action which promises to be most successful in the
accomplishment of the mission, regardless of what the enemy
chooses to do in opposition [Ref. 84]. Knowledge of the
enemy's plan, in part, can eliminate seme enemy options in
the game matrix. This intelligence allows a commander to
maximize against fewer enemy courses cf action rather than
against his whole spectrum of capabilities. It may be rare
to have perfect intelligence, hut it is common for intelli-
gence to he able to eliminate many of the enemy's strategies.
The strategies eliminated by intelligence may be iiscarded
from the matrix. The use of intelligence i c equivalent to
eliminating some enemy capabilities. The value of intelli-
gence is the difference in the value o p the game a ''ten the
enerry options <±re eliminated. [Ref. 35]
3« Inception Impact on the Same Matrix
Theoretically, it should oe possible to use deception
to influence the game matrix used by the enemy. reception
used to eliminate the best enerry course of action deletes it
from the matrix. The best time to use deception is before
the enemy's matrix is produced during planning. reception
Fight be used to convince the enemy that the blue force is
not able to execute a certain option. That option would
never be entered into his matrix, reception mi^ht be used to
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change the enemy understanding of the payoffs for several
combinations of dlt ernat ives . The matrix changes produce
changes in his expected value of the game. The use of decep-
tion by the inferior force commander, for example, is neces-
sary to counter the enemy proper course of action so that he
does not use it. The commander of the superior force might
use deception to enhance payoffs, increase gains, reduce
casualties, or exploit the situation. The deception may
produce courses of action which are not otherwise possible,
or not worth the risk.
4 • Soviet Views on Game Theory
There is much of interest in game theory in Russia.
Indications are that the Soviet commanders will use the
l
cautious criterion o" choosing the oes*' of the worst possible
outcomes (mmximin). There are indications that- the Russians
will attempt to reduce game choices through the use of intel-
ligence, intimidation, a:id reflexive control; thereby in-
creasing the Soviet payoff. [Ref. 86]
Soviet literature yields sore indications that the
Soviet hierarchy believes that game theory has sore applica-
tion to the execution of deception. In 1971, Icnov wrote.
'Considering on the whole that tactics of deception
should always run one step ahead oi what the opponent knows
about these tactics. . . . Control of a n opponent's actions
should be viewed as the fine art of applying son-repeating
techniques, keeping one step ahead of the same stratagem
being en-ployed by the opponent." [Ref. 8?j
Such thinking proposes that random action generated
by choices determined by the flip of a coin, for example,
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rright be applicable to military conflict. Such techniques
for random action could he incorporated into antedated
decision aids.
The Soviet view of game theory should he discussed
in relation to their concept of reflexive control. In such a
view, reflexive control would be used to predetermine the
actions of an opponent. K.V. Tarakanov wrote the following
in the 1974 book, Mathematics and Arrred Conflict:
"The garring theory rrethods in combination with reflex
control methods are an effective instrument in selecting
the optimal plans for combat operations and implementation
in the course of armed confrontation by sides. Fere,
displaying military art, the commander knows ahead of time
the costs of his risK and its possible results." [Ret, 88]
One of the basic rules for the use of deception is
that the plan must te based on how the enemy perceives the
situation. The same necessity to understand the enemy is at
important factor when using game theory. This idea was
stated in 1972 by a Soviet writer, Sclnyshkov. He wrote;
"Vhen analyzing a situation it is very important to
know the psychological features of one's opponent. If he
is cautious, then his selection will evidently be based on
the principle of maximum [sic. Kinimar?]. In this situa-
tion one can hardly count on success by selecting un action
variant with the existing arrangement of manpower and
means, for the enemy is already basing his decision on
our most powerful variant. Perhaps it is better to
create a preponderance of forces in the projected area of
action by weakening forces in other sectors, since the
cautious opponent will scarcely take advantage of this."
[Ref. 89]
5- Implications of Game Theory
The strategies used ty the two opponents determine
their choices. It is the strategies which are important and
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which are susceptible to analysis. Strategy can be defined
as a plan for choosing individual moves which is complete in
that all possible events rrust have been anticipated in the
plan. It is possible using past experience, then, to
analyze whether the opponent's game solution involves a
Fixed strategy and to analyze whether he bases his strategy
on randcrrness or on the elimination of chance. Analysis can
show if the opponent has a dominant choice. If so, there is
no reason for him to deviate frcrr. that choice whether he is
deceived or not.
Game theory provides a model which can be used to
test whether an opponent's pest behavior has been rational.
This helps establish patterns of behavior that ray re random
and unpredictable, may be rational and predictable, or ray be
rational but unpredictable. The last would seem the most
advantageous to the professional military as it incorporates
the effective use of intelligence and applies the tactical
rules of war. The unpredictable pattern may be introduced
through the use cf deception.
When deception is available as a choice, each situa-
tion becomes one of high uncertainty where an opponent t.-i
never be sure whether deception is being used or not. The
uncertainty has two main effects on the payoff matrix. One
effect is that the opponent must double the size of rhe
payoff matrix to account for each choice involving deception
or not. In such a case, the matrix nay be too complicated to
7a
use as a model and the game becomes of little use in simpli-
fying the decision. The second effect is that all intelli-
gence is placed in doubt when it is not clear if The
information collected was deception or not.
The possible use of deception compensates for imper
feet security as the opponent must decide whether his intel-
ligence is based on information which is real or deceptive.
This also tends to keep the situation ambiguous while
the intelligence forces collect additional information to
reduce the ambiguity. The advantage goes to the attacker in
situations of uncertainty, but again, the fe«r of a t~ap
reduces that advantage. The defender sometimes will delay
commitment until the uncertainty is resolved did hope to
i
eliminate th< attacker's advantage totally. The penalty for
waitirg too long for clarification is that svrpri c e is
guaranteed
.
Game theory is one way of looking at the system and
it is applicable to a deception process i p the battlefield
interaction can be viewed as a direct conflict between the
opposing sides. A battle may be considered to be a two-
person, zero-snm game.
Game theory is of little use in analyzing the p^st
use of deception, but it does prDvide a strong theoretical
argument for the occasional or even the continuous use of
deception at the U.S. Army operational level. The Soviet's
will need evidence of the probable use of deception by the
?9
U.S. Arrry. The Soviet's perception of probable American use
of operational deception will make their intelligence task
considerably rrore difficult.
E. PERCEPTUAL ANT COGNITIVE PROCESSES
The target of a tactical deception is the energy com-
rrander. The corrrrander may he directly targeted with decep-
tive information if his behavior pattern is predictable. '"he
Chinese intervention in the Korean tfar may have beer such a
situdtion. General MacArthur w a s personally and completely
surprised by that action even though there had been indica-
tors of the possibility. The fact that General r"a o Arthur
had rarely been incorrect in his past assessment of the enemy
coulc) have led hir to disregard many of the indications
that the Chinese ^ight intervene. He might have influenced
the intelligence collection requirements, and that rould
have been the prime factor which allowed the U.N. forces to
be in positions of disadvantage when the surprise attack
tegan.
The commander may be indirectly targeted i" the deceiver
focuses on the organization which provides the information
upon which the commander bases his decisions. Knowledge of
the enemy organization dnd the way that it functions would
predict which means of deception would have the greatest
probability of success.
The chance of success for d deception is enhanced by
correct understanding of the thought processes of the target
Bi
and the key personnel he has working for hir. Individual
thought processes are biased by such things as role require-
ments, environment, culture, and training. Group or organi-
zational thought processes are biased by such things as goal
setting, doctrine, and experience. The result is that each
key player has a pattern of biased perception and judgment
that is detectable, consistent, and predictable. These
biases can be understood in terms of perceptual and cogni-
tive processes. Perceptual biases result fron- the way the
world is perceived and they limit the accuracy of percep-
tions. Cognitive biases result from the way the trine" works
and they influence the way that a person treats evidence,
attributes causality, and estimates probabilities.
1 • Cognitive Jiases
Perhaps the most pertinent factor of how the mind
works is that working memory is very limited. Tne complete
knowledge of how the mind works is not yet known, but it is
recognized that there is an immense capacity for retention of
data in long term memory. It is also recognized that the
initial stirruli presented to the rind can he very conplex.
Case histories of trauma or hypnotic induce! recollection
have shown that memory of past events with exceptional detail
can exist in long term memory without any recollection at ell
by the conscious mind. Memory that cannot be recalled,
however, is of no use to the decision-maker or the intelli-
gence analyst. The memory that is of use is that which is
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placed in working rrerrory from stimuli that are received or
from data which can be recalled frorr long terrr memory. [Ref.
90]
Working rremory can handle only a small amount of
data. It can not handle, for example, the amount of informa-
tion that is presented by eyes, ears, or other senses. The
stimuli from those senses are available in great detail fcr
only a short period of time such as the few seconds after one
closes his eyes that one can still see a picture before it
quickly fades. The mind rrust simplify the stimuli that it
wants to retain and chunk it into data that can be usee! by
working Fernery. The chunked data is not the sa^e as the
stimuli. It is only a model of it. [P.ef . 91]
Working memory can manipulate chunked data in a
[Tanner that is similar to the way a computer dees it, v ut
working memory can only process a few chunks at a time. An
upper limit would be around five chunks [Hef. 92}. Some of
those chunks are discarded and the rest must be memorized.
They have to be put in long terrr memory so that none data can
enter working memory. Cne -result is that the human mind can
only handle three to five hypotheses at a tire. Tr ar
ambiguous situation where many hypotheses are possible there
is an overload and the mind filters out all rut the rest
salient hypotheses. [P.ef. 93]
Once e hypothesis is drepped it is almost never
picked up again. Further, when time stress is present, the
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rrind develops cognitive tunnel vision using simplifying
heuristics such as representativeness and avai lability rFef.
94]. There is a Mas in estimating the probability of the
different hypotheses which is related to ho* easily the
hypothesis can he imagined or how easily sirilar cases can be
recalled from long term memory [Ref. 95j . The humor, mini is
not very good at aggregating tne information. Humans make
probability judgments in loose terrrs such a s likely, prob-
ably, or possibly [Ref. 96]. The c e terms are not mathema-
tically precise enough for applications lifce game theory
where a srall difference in probability can result in large
differences in expected value. The ability to place numeri-
cal ranges on probabilities can be forced, but it is ques-
tionable whether the mind generates a number that is any more
accurate than the word. There are seme -cnown tendencies such
as a regression towards the mean in which rare events are
overestimated. [Ref. 97J
Anchoring is a cognitive bias which results in
analysis being anchored around the initial estimate. Addi-
tional information or analysis may not have the impact of the
initial information because the bias will only allow a small
variance from the initial estimate. [Ref. 98].
The overconfidence lias is that people tena tc Le
overconfident about what they know and how well they know it.
This bias is important in that in telliger ~e analysts at cry
level are regarded as experts. Their private feelings ran
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effect the intelligence that is produced. That can have a
large effect on the decision-maker. [Bef. 59]
There are cognitive biases that effect the way that
evidence is evaluated. One bias is an oversensit ivity tc
consistency. A few indicators that all support the same
hypothesis are considered to be strong evidence, while a lot
of corrrron indicators that are accompanied by a few ccntra-
dictory ones would be considered weaker evidence [?ef. 100"].
The number of data points that are used should be signifi-
cant, but the human mind does not use internal confidence
intervals. This bias can help the deception if the deceiver
has control ever the channels by which the information is
transmitted. If contrary indicators are kept from being
transmitted, then the number of deception indicators needed
can be kept small.
The absence of data is not of vary great importance
because the intelligence analyst wotks with the data he
has. He may request additional data routinely, out will -ever
expect to get all the information he wants before he has tc
make his analysis. There are too many reasons why ail the
pertinent information is not avdlntle and many of * h (-
reasons are the result of inadequacies in his own intelli-
gence organization. Too close a look at gaps of evidence
Right highlight failings in his own operation.
The human mind is much better et following the pcth
frorr cause to effect than it is at working backwards from
to-t
effect to cause. This bias works in the favor of the de-
ceiver because the deceiver begins with the big picture and
can use cause-to-effect relationships in breaking the big
picture into the desired indicator set. The intelligence
analysts working for the target of the deception must work
with the indicator set that they receive and trace those
indicators back to the events that caused then. They have a
rruch harder job in that the effects fray lead back to causes
that are real or deceptive. In essence, the target of the
deception rrust do diagnosis rather than analysis. [Hef. 1Z1]
2 • Perceptual Biases
Perception constructs rather than records reality. It
irrplies understanding as well as awareness. Knowledge of
what is perceived anc the meaning that is attributed tc it is
essential to the planning of a deception. The perceptual
biases should be considered as one means of better under-
standing the enemy.
One perceptual bias is that information obtained by
an observer depends on the observer's own expectations.
This bias is applicable throughout the target organization.
The collector at the channel output has some control over the
signals that are received. The signals that are expected ere
accepted correctly, but signals that are not expected may be
misinterpret ed . The wrong meaning may be attached to the
unexpected signal because it is different from signals that
he expects to receive. The first analyst may re sifting
8h
through the volumes of intercepted signals and. understanding
only those that support the pattern that he is expecting to
develop. The remaining signals rray he rejected as being
worthless sirrply because they do not fit into the pattern
that exists in the analyst's mind.
There are rrany signals that are worthless or that
contain information that is so ambiguous that they could be
used to support several possibilities. The expectations of
the analyst can bias the information that is contained in the
signals so that important information iray be lost and
unimportant information may be understood as bein^' highly
salient to the situation. [F.ef. 102J
The expectations that bias the signals may be
individual expectations or group expectations. A group
expectation could be generated Dy such things as the daily
intelligence summary prepared by higher headquarters. Such a
document would summarize the perception of the enemy situa-
tion and project how that, situation is expected tr change.
Each intelligence officer or analyst who receives that
summary would be tempted to assume that the higher head-
quarter's assessment of the situation, based on all of the
inforraticn available to the organization, should be accepted
as being most correct. If accepted. the summary might pro-
vide a group expectation that establishes a common bias- in
the processing of the next day's intelligence. Each person
who handles the information as it is processed through the
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organization rray distort it only slightly, but the finished
product rray have a totally different meaning than it should.
The signals entering an intelligence syster are
biased by the initial hypothesis generated by that system.
Those signals that support the hypothesis are welcome because
they prove that the initial hypothesis work was good, and
everyone wants his work to be perceived as good. The signals
that are contradictory to the idea of the initial hypothesis
are not welcomed for the same reason. The professional
intelligence system should not allow those inconsistent sig-
nals to be ignored but it will taKe a lot cf them to generate
a hypothesis reversal. The implication is that it is e.-sier
to deceive a target by reinforcing an existing preconception
than it is to change that preconception.
A second perceptual bias is that 1 formation that is
different from normal is hard to recognize. A logical way of
understanding this bias is to use the situation in which
enerry units are massing in the typical pattern associated
with a regimental assembly area. The actions required to
manipulate forces into that stereotyped pattern result in
signals available to the intelligence collectors. The
analyst receives the normal indicators and understands them
correctly because they indicate activity that fits a pattern
that he has learned and the pattern may oe consistent with
the overall situation. The enemy is erpertej tc attack
norrrally avd that typically would require the second echelon
8?
forces to rrass in preparation for the attack. If the enerry
chose to break the stereotype and attack from battalion
assembly areas, it would he much harder for the analyst to
foresee what was about to happen. The signals would not "be
clear because they would not fit the expected pattern. The
implication for deception is that normal activity .should be
associated with the indicators of the deception story and
atypical activity should be associated with the real
operations .
A third perceptual bias is that once an observer has
formed an opinion of the phenomena being observed. "uture
perceptions will be conditioned by the first perception. The
observer is biased towards continuing to perceive the situa-
tion in the same way. The implication fcr deception is that
the bias of the target organization will benefit the decep-
tion as long as the deception is designed to tai^e advantage
of the preconceptions of the target. If the enemy expects
that ycu are going to continue to delay, for example, ther he
is vulnerable to a deception which would have him believe
that ycu are willing to trade space ;or time. The deceptive
signals portraying an orderly dei^y could be sent vhile
actual preparations "or a mcich different operation ace placed
in motion.
The enemy woalc not require overwhelming signals to
convince him of the delay. He would only require enough
indications to reinforce his existing belief. The bias would
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assist the deception to cause the enemy to assure that the
conclusive evidence exists and could be obtained if
necessary. The enemy would attribute missing ddta to the
efforts of friendly camouflage or to imperfect functioning of
his own intelligence collection. The Mas might further
assist the deception t>y causing indications of activity not
associated with the delay to be discounted as possible recep-
tion. The implication for deception is that this bias will
reduce the impact of security leaks, uncontrolled channels,
and poorly executed deception measures as long as one does
not actually do what the enemy expects. A second implica-
tion for deception is that this bias mokes it very difficult
to succeed at a deception which will require the enemy to
change his rind about what he expects.
A fourth perceptual bias is that gradual evolutionary
changes often go unnoticed. Transportation o^ military
supplies might be used as an example. The requirement rright
he that the tonnage of supplies being moved by the iivisior
support command be doubled in preparation for a planned
offensive. The movement Oi" large convoys in the divisi *r
rear area cannot he hidden and any sudden increase ir
the number of convoys would be a key indicator fnr enemy
intelligence analysts. A gradual increase to the number of
trucks in each convoy, however, might not be of sufficient
interest to be reported even if it was noticed. The impli-
cation cf this bias is that if you want the enemy to take
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notice of an event you should change patterns quickly. If
you want an event to regain hidden, the patterns should re
changed slowly.
The last "bias in perception that will be looked at
is the idea that a picture that is slurp and deer ca*\ be
perceived correctly and. quickly. but a picture that is
blurred or out of focus takes longer to perceive en' is
subject to erroneous perception. An ambiguous picture which
has been presented for a longer time will require a sharper
focus and a longer perception tire for correct recognition
than the same picture presented for a shorter tire. The
initial exposure to arrbiguous or blurred stirruli interferes
with accurate perception even after the subsequent clear
information becomes available. There are three obvious
implications for deception.
First, a very strong and clear indicator set sent at.
the start of a deception can Insure that the desired hypothe-
sis is perceived correctly by the enemy. The need to have
the deception story considered by the enerry before he cheeses
his initial set of hypotheses may require that very salient
indicators he front-leaded into the deception plan. The
clarity of the indicators may later seer suspicious to the
enerry hut once the nypo thesis has been accepted for consid-
eration, even proof that some of the indicators were false
may not be sufficient evidence to cause the hypothesis to oe
disregarded .
9/
A second implication of this bias is that an
ambiguous initial situation can be used to hide key signals.
The initial picture presented to the enemy rray be made so
confusing that a key signal such as the movement of a special
unit is lost in the noise of other signals that are presented
at the same time. The initial blurred picture is such that
the enemy information system may De Saturated or the ambig-
uity is such that the enemy has not yet determined what the
key signals will be. The timing of the signals can be criti-
cal as well. The movement of an artillery unit necessary for
the real operation can he obscured by the subsequent decep-
tive movemert of an armored unit which captures the complete
attention of enemy intelligence.
The third implication of this bias of perception is
that an ambiguous picture might be presented to the enemy and
maintained for no other reason than just to delay er emy
decision-making. The time that it takes for the enemy to
clarify an ambiguous situation may ce sufficient to provide
the necessary tactical advantcge.
3* lE£li^§tlons of Psychology for reception
The implication c^ the perceptual and cognitive
biases is that if the deception is designed correctly, the
target will do much of the work for you. There are really
only two choices for a deception, although each deception ray
have rrany different attributes. The two choices h?ve already
been identified as having tc do with enemy preconceptions.
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The first choice is to deceive a target with signals
that reinforce the target's existing belief's while you
really are doing something else. This deception is -<ided by'
the target's preconception. The target is searching for
information which supports his fdvored hypothesis ctnd the
intelligence profession is such that it will >e IcoKing
first in the places that the signals would be if the favored
hypothesis was correct. The target tends to ignore contrary
evidence as deceptive, incorrect, or resulting fror mi stakes
in his own system. In fact, the target may not even perceive
the contrary signals or may attach meaning tc the signals
that is incorrect but supports his hypothesis.
Once the target has decided that his hypcthesis is
correct, it is very difficult for nim to charge that
hypothesis. The deception that capitalizes on the target's
preconception has a better change for success because it
leads the target to action which he is predisposed tc
take. The advantage in neiping insure that ne takes that
action is that the deceiver can prepare the battlefield to
maxiri ze his gain
.
The second choice for a deception requires the target
to do something that he is not predisposed to ao . This type
of deception should be avoided but, if it mart be atterpted
then it is necessary to insure that the neception story is at
least one of the initial hypotheses that is considered by the
target. The chance of total success of this deception tvoe
9*
is less than for the other type because it depends on the
changing of the target's mind. This type of deception would
be ill-advised in situations that will be very dangerous if
the deception fails. It would be better to attempt this
deception in situations where advantages can re gained by
introducing ambiguities in the target organization so that
tirrely decisions cannot be rrade.
I. DECISION MAKING
The tactical deception target is the opposing coirra.ider.
All of the communication of the deception story must be
designed tc establish the deception story as the Dig picture
that the eremy commander sees just prior to hi 5 making the
decisions that result in the success or failure of th<
decept ion.
The deceiver's knowledge of the enemy organization ^ni.
the system interaction is important only for the ability to
predict or predetermine the desired action of the deception
target which places his forces at a disadvantage on th<
battlefield. Knowledge of game theory or other decision aids
are important only for understanding the enemy and for
identifying vulnerabilities that result ^roT predictability.
Applying knowledge of perceptual and cognitive processes
provides ^u^ther understanding and predictability, but again,
that information is of importance only as i T can he used
against the deception target. Knowing how the target makes
his decisions makes raninulation of his decision? uossible.
9'6
The corrrrander is the key not only because he makes the
decisions that result in tne action which determines the
success of the deception, but also because he provides guid-
ance to the intelligence system regarding salience and inter-
pretation. The commander sets most of the goals for the
organization. His policy for deception influences how trie
organization treats deception. A commander who avoids using
deception will probably be less attentive to the possibility
of deception being used against him. On the other hand, a
commander who uses deception in his own plans may not be any
better at detecting its use by others. The problems cf
counterdeception are not solved by attention.
The commander is the key to the organisation. Even
though the general staff system generated a division :f labor
throughout the staff, tne commander remains responsible.
The information from staff sections is presented to the
commander so that he can appprove or disapprove the actions
and decisions made in his name by the staff.
The entire system interaction, the organizational
functioning, and the communications flow for tne deception
operation end with the commander's decision. That decision
is biased by perceptual acid cognitive processes and is based
on probabilities and expected values that the commander may
not even be able to put into words.
Tep ending on the payoff for a correct or incorrect de-
cision, the comranier may change his decision criteria.
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There is a tendency for risk aversion behavior associated
with gain situations and for risk seeking behavior associated
with loss situations.
!• Approaches to decision Making
The U.S. Army approach to making decision? is that
the decision belongs to the commander on the spot as long as
it is within reason. The commanders are trained to recognize
when a decision is necessary and are trained on how to make
that decision. U.S. Army commanders love to m a :re decisions.
In fact, everyone in the U.S. Army loves to make 'ecisio n s
and many make tactical decisions whether they are duthcr-
i zed to do so or not. This decision-making at the lowest
level possible results in a large amount of unpredictability
which is good for avoiding deception.
The enemy can never have total certainty a rout what
a decision will be or what the magnitude of the friendly
response might be. The man, not the machine, is paramount
in the U.S. approach to decision-making. A descriptive
phrase might re that "it is better to be roughly right on
time than totally ri<-*ht after it is too late."
The Soviet approach to decision-making is far
different from the American approach. The difference that 1^
important in the context of this tnesis is the degree to
which automation can or should be included in tne Soviet A. <™my
operational level decision. The basic instruction for Soviet
commanders and their staffs or the sv.b ; e>-t d f automation vas
a-
published over twelve years ago in a monograph, Idea A Algo-
riihlTj Pecjiion, which is pdrt of the Soviet "Officer's
Library." That monograph was translated by the U.S. Air
Force and is relevant in that it proposes the further de-
velopment of the theory for decision-making through the use
of the concept of automating military operational control and
management processes [Pef. 103].
The monograph "begins with a Justification of the use
of cybernetics to solve military command and control proolerrs
and ends with a description of computer systems and s-wre
related mathematics, the display and retrieval of informa-
tion, and a work study of possible sequences of operations
carried out by the commanders and tneir staffs at the various
function levels using automated systems. Included in the
material are statistical statements of strategies, forroli.7 ^-
tion of categories through the use of algorithmic largrage,
and operational analvsis which applies mathematical models tc
the Soviet decision-making process.
The Soviets placed that monograph in their "Officer's
Library over ten years ago. It is quite ess y to assume that
the Soviet army did not have anj large amount of computer
assets at that time. The sophi c tiua ted computers necessary
to accomplish the goals mentioned ir the monograph would nave
been rare iters in the military system.
Colonel J. Hemsley, Research Fellow o r the Te~
oartment of Tefense Studies, University of Fdinburgh . in
1980, published a paper titled "Voennaya Sis t emotcknika • An
Algorithmic Approach to Decision-making" in the Journal of
the "Royal United Services Institute for Eefense Studies.
Colonel Herrsley rrade the following observation:
"The foreword to the Russian edition of the monograph
is written fcy General of the Arrry S.M. Shtemenko. . . . Fe
starts by outlining the inter-relationships between mathe-
matics, social sciences and the humanities en one hand and
the irpact of the new sciences and modern technology on
the other. . . . The introduction goes o n. to explain that
automation neither replaces nor supplants rental
creativity but rather gives the human mind the opportunity
to extend its range of intellect. There is 10 implication
of a substitution of machine for man? rather the t * :
become complementary in that ma- is relieved of certain
formal (technological) functions which uan be mathemati-
cally defined and automatically executed." [Ref . 1#4]
The man-rraohine decision model at the Soviet Arrry opera-
tional level needs to be understood. A problem ir under-
standing exists because it is difficult tc project how well
Soviet technology will be able to cevelop the hardware and
software necessary for the tactical problems of ground com-
bat. Reliable systems that are rugged, mobile, aid inte-
grated are necessary for the tyoes j n applications postulated
in Soviet literature. The question is if and when such
systems will be available to the Soviet Army. The suopert
^or such systems exists at the highes' 'els i :i the Soviet
^rmy and should be sufficient to drive the reqruired
technology.
The form of the man-machine interface in the Soviet Army
is a combination of logic and mathematics. Logic is intro-
duced by the subordinate commanders and staff officers who
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codify the essential parameters of the battlefield into
symbols which can be used in mathemati cal models. Much of
the information requires simple transformation. This inform-
ation would be such things as weather conditions, terrain,
roads, light, time, or vegetation as well as measurable
parameters of the force such as men, weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, or supplies. Other information such as morale or
determination might be harder to codify.
Information on the enemy would require a certain amount
of guesswork in evaluating the present situation a-d probabi-
listic conjecture in projecting the future situation.
Certainly, the commander *ould need to understand the mathe-
matical model that would be used by the computer to know
which factors o ^ the situation are rot used i ^ the -n o d e 1 s "
that the influence of those factors could be taken irto
account in the final decision. [F.ef. 135]
Once the environment is entered into the computer, it
must be combined with the instructions that have been re-
ceived by higher head oua rters . Those instructions establish
limits on tne possible output of the model. Tee machine
^unction does the rapid information processing %hich analyzes
and synthesizes the data. One conjecture of possible it-
puts might include force ratios, required forces, critical
path mo v em en* tables, time milestones, and legisti s.
Sophisticated models should be able tc provide alternative
solutions with advantages cui disadvantages. !°ef, 1/6.!
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Logic is required by the commander in evaluating the
machine produced alternatives and choosing the optimal ore.
The commander is still the decision-maker in the Soviet
approach, yet a scientifically derived Soviet decision c^not
be made without calculations and quantitative substantiation.
Dr. Sberheirdt Rechtin, past Chdirran cf the \! cVal Studies
3oard of the National A cad amies of Science 3nd Engineering,
would view the Soviet approach to ieci si on -making with
certain amount of distrust as indicated in his recent article
in the Naval Van Collgge Review. In that article, 'The
Technology of Command," Pr. Rechtin wrote:
"A difficulty inherent in decision theory is that
real-world decisions all too often are mace under condi-
tions never before considered, rruch less characterized
and quantised. . . . Another inherent difficulty in
using computers in decision making is that, in a sense,
computers are too perfect, too precise. F^r better or
worse, whether computers are operating on simple data cr
complex algorithms, they will always produce precisely the
same answers fro*1 the same inputs. I: the inputs are
incomplete or if unprogrammed events occur, the computers
crash. If the context changes, what was the right answer
before may be wrong-precisely wrong-in the n ev ccrtert.
[Pef. 107 J
The approach to decision-making that i c usen in the
opponent organization is important to the deception process.
An organization which allows decentralized decisions m.i^ht be
vulnerable to deception if certain :ommanders are isolated :>n
the battlefield. Communications jamming cr destruction cf
selected communications nodes ;ould remove -1 si.bordir.ate
force from its command and control headquarters. A +, else
situatiir oovld be presented to the isolated force which
oc
would require decisions to be made without the intelligence
support available to percieve the situation correctly. That
same isolation could support a deception against an organiza-
tion which makes decisions oniy at the highest level
possible. Once isolated, the force would continue the mis-
sion per the last guidance received. The deception would
require changing the situation afte r the force was isola-
ted so that the subordinate contender could not receive the
guidance that [right keep hirr from the trap.
reception rright attach the vulnerabilities cf ar. organiz-
ation that uses automated decision aids. One vulnerability
is that which occurs when the use cf the automated a i .J is
denied. The commur. i cat ions or the electronics of the auto-
mated aid co^ld be degraded, disrupted, or destroyed. The
impact would probaoly be considered as a more significant
information loss than if the aid hci never been aVailcble.
The organization world have develooed a certain arrount of
dependence on the machine system and Dacjr-up manual systems
right net be available. Tne loss of information would i e
-~aie the deci sion-making process. A more elegant attdj 1 :
against a u terra tea decision aics would require knowledge of
the algorithms in use. Manipulation of the environment to
predetermine the input parameters would also predetermine the
output variants. The target's use of the automated aic
would benefit the deceiver by assisting in the nenipula-
tion of the targeted commander's optimal course of actio 1".
i e
There will always "be interaction between the opposing
sides on the battlefield. The resulting communications flow
establishes an irrpact on the decisions made oy the comna.no-
ers. The payoff matrix a nd tne hypotheses available for
choice ray all be manipulated by the deceiver. The ceceiver
gains an advantage if the target cheeses tc act in tne rr a nner
that was desired by the deceiver.
The communications, the organization, the system, tne
mathematical models, the thought processes, and the decision
process can be viewer as sirpie models that can De appliec to
understand the battlefield.
The overall deception process is rr.ore complex than tne
sin-pie models used in this theoretical analysis. The decep-
tion rec^uires a thorough understanding of all of trie
processes involved so that the necessary signals reach the
ene^y commander to result in the correct interpretation aia
the desired action.
G. TRANSITION
The theoretical approach to analyzing the deception
process was introduces by overviews of tne application of
comnunications , organization, systems, and ga^e theory as
well as the principles of the cognitive ana perceptual
processes and decision malting. The theoretical models
suggest that deception can re understood ~ nd can oe applied
on tne battlefield to gain a tactical advantage. Tne models
are not perfect in their application to deception, out tnere
i. l
is a great deal more information available in literature. Tne
problem is that while the multidisciplinary theoretical
approach provides insight into the deception process, it does
not lend itself to an analysis of past use of deception.
reception has been used on the battlefield throughout
history. Many of great commanders used deception exceedingly
well. Whether they used deception because they were great or
whether they were great because tney used deception is a root
point. The point is that deception has often been linked
with success and analyzing how they did it ray help provide
future success. The travesty is that deception practices
that work are kept classified after the enc oz each war. 3y
the time that the next war comes alon^ they have been
forgotten. The deception art is learned cy trial and errcr.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to ever attempt
tc analyze the total impact of deception in military history,
but fortunately a lot of work has already been done by
historians sunh as Barton '7 ha ley. Barton Whale;/ has col-
lected descriptive data from the important battles o *" this
century and has assembled the cc^e histories into a ieception
data base. The problem with the analysis of case histories
is that the lata is net perfect and is act always complete.
The level of quantification that car be usee en such data is
limited .
-A comparative analysis of case Histories can provide a
ule^rer understand! n f of the deception pre cess by indicating
common factors and general cause and effect relationships.
The data analysis can show limited measures of effectiveness
and can support the choice of optimal deception practices to
a better degree than that provided by theoretical analysis
alone.
The value to he obtained from the comparative analysis of
case histories that follows will be in the combining the case
study da*a with knowledge gained from the theoretical au-
proach. The two approaches will comDine in a manner which
suggests how tactical deception can be better appliec. in the
U .S . Army .
I'l'S
VI. CASE HISTORY ANALYSIS
Empirical analysis of case histories from Barton Whaley's
deception data base can be performec in an effort to deter-
mine what the data suggests about tactical ueception. One
part of the analysis is to verify that there are no major
differences between the results of deception as tne scope
changes from strategic to tactical. A second part of tne
analysis is to verify that there are significant differences
in the results of battle that correspond to tne presence or
absence of deception. The data analysis is intended to snow
measures of deception effectiveness in: (1) producing sur-
prise, (?) producing victory, (3) reducing casualties, (4)
increasing force effectiveness, and (b) increasing territory
exchanged. The data analysis will also support the choice of
optimal deception practices by indicating general trends
comrron to successful deceptions.
A. 1^7 A
Tne copyrighted <iata used in this analysis is from 3arton
Whaley's 1S6£ study, Stratagem! Cec.ept.ion and Sur^Mse in
War, which included 169 case histories. Cf that number, 68
were strategic and 47 were tactical examples of surprise
and/or deception. The additional -4 examples could ue con-
sidered a co'itr^l Odta set in tnat tnere is no evedence that
either surprise or deception played a part in those battles.
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The cases are frorr 16 wars luring the period 1914 to 1966,
dnd are based on Barton Whaley's survey of 509 published
sources as weilas his own professional study of history.
The reader is referred to Appendix A of this tnesis for
the lists of the battles included in barton Whaley's 1969
deception data base. List A is an inventory of cases of
strategic surprise and/or deception. List 3 contains exam-
ples of tactical surprise and/or deception. List C includes
examples of battles involving neither surprise nor deception.
The cases are identified by a da te-sequencel list number that
corresponds to the time, location and code name for tne
battle or operation.
The assumption is made tnat the lata from the 169 cases
are representative o f modern war. Obviously, lists i and C
cover only a small proportion of the total exanples tnat
could fit. tne categories. Lists 3 and C are example sets
selected by tfbaley from large populations and are not ranccm
samples in the normal statistical sense. Tests of statisti-
cal significance would not oe appropriate for use with such
data. It is proper, nowever, tc analyze this aata in a
quantitative way even thougn the data set is not random;. The
data can be inventoried to determine characteristics that c<i n.
be compared by their presence, absence, or relative values in
each of the three subsets of data. 'ifre average values of
cats characteristics in each of the three lists can oe
compared as long as the lists are typical of tne populations
1,'b
they represent. This can be done as long as the assumption
of representativeness is made.
The data set from the 169 case histories was categorized
by Whaley in a simple coded form which provides information
on up to 41 characteristics for each case. This allowed a
fairly rapid enumeration of frequencies of any given char-
acteristic. Summarizing data in frequencies, percentages, or
ratios does allow a comparison to he made. The tactical data
set, list 3, can be compared to the control cata set, list C,
and to the strategic data set, list A.
The strategic data set was considered in 1969 to be all-
inclusive. The three criteria that Whaley used to identify
cases of strategic operations were that they had to: (1) De
the first stroke of a war; (2) open operations on a new
front or theater of war J or (3] be a new attack or offen-
sive en an existing but dormant front [Ref. 108j
.
The 68 cases in list A nave been augmented with 2b addi-
tional cases from four more wars lhat extended the survey to
1973. The analysis of the total 93 cases has been published
in the article by Ronald C. Sherwin and £arton tfhaiey,
"Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93
Cases,' which was included in Section II of the dpox,
Strategic Military reception.
J. CKITIRIA
The result that rust be optimized is the outcorre of the
fission. There are two missions involved in each oat tie, and
106
for the most part they can be identified as belonging to
either the attacker or the defender. Deception can be used
in each operation by the attacker, the defender, or Doth.
The analysis rrust differentiate between the missions of tne
deceiver.
There are many different ways to categorize the outcome
of the deceiver's mission. One criterion is tne overall
result of the battle which could be victory, defeat, or
degrees of each. A second criterion is the relative result.
An overwhelming force that achieves only a modest victory
might be considered to ha^e suffered a relative defeat. Tne
relative casualty ratio, for example, is very important when
there is a numerical advantage on one side. Tne relative
casualty ratio can be used as a measure of effectiveness
Relative force effectiveness is a good criterion for
evaluating different units with the same mission. Training,
leadership, interoperability, and experience can result in
one army having a force advantage that can oe quantified.
Adding one more factor such as deception to a battle adds to
the force effectiveness result, but that factor should' net
claim all of the credit for the victory or defeat. A final
criterion for effectiveness is cost.
These criteria must be measurable in sone way so that
probabilities, conditional pre ba til i ties , or mathematical
expectations can be used. The criteria must be sirple e Tiou,-,*n
to be understood and must be directly related to tne mission.
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All of the criteria rrust be used to determine the overall
effectiveness.
The criteria of effectiveness for the outcome of the
deceiver's mission will use some but not all of the data
characteristics. Such criteria indicate the effectiveness of
deception but do not indicate how deception can be opti-
mized. The data which support the choice of optirral decep-
tion practices is applicaDle to different criteria. Those
criteria are not related to the outcome of the deceiver's
mission. They are related to the outcome of the deception.
The result that must be optimized for these criteria is the
achievement of surprise. That criterion will identify the
preferred deception measures and practices.
C. ANALYSIS OJ DECEPTION EFFECTIVENESS
1 • Reception's If_f_ get £n frodusing Surprise.
Barton Whaley produced the following table as a
cross-correlation to show tnat surprise can be achieved with-
out employing deception. It also reveals tnat using decep-
tion effectively seems to guarantee that surprise will be
achieved at the strategic level.
TABU 6












The 44 cases of tactical deception or surprise
yielded the following:
TABLE 7
TACTICAL DECEPTION AND SURPRISE
SURPRISE NO SURPRISE
NO DECEPTION 19 (p=.40) N/A
DECEPTION 25 (P=.53) 3
p(S/D)=.89
It is seen in both cases that surprise anc deception
are commonly associated. That is particularly true for stra-
tegic operations out still more often than not at tne tacti-
cal level. The correlation between the strategic case and
tactical case is not really strong enough to support any firm
conclusions. The conditional probability of tactical sur-
prise given deception does remain high. Very little can oe
deterrined frorr the no deception cdtegory as all cases in
list E involve surprise if they aid not involve deception.
It is possible to separate the data frorr the tactical cases
by mission.
TAME 8
TACTICAL MISSION EFFECTS ON SURPRISE AND TECEITICN
(S/D) (S/NO D) (NO S/ D)
OFFENSE 18 (p=.474) 18 (p=.474) 2 (p*.053)
DEFENSE 7 (p=.77d) 1 (p=.143) 1 (p=.143)'
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The significant result of the cross-correlation is
that it indicates that in tne tactical environment , the
defense has a rruch greater need for deception to produce
surprise. The offense can partially rely on the initiative
to produce surprise. The unfortunate situation of nistory is
that the recorded examples of deception used by the defense
are few in number. It is unknown whether the use of decep-
tion by the defense was a rare occurraace or whether the
records were lost.
The irrpact on this thesis is that the large majority
of data applies to the offensive ase of deception. There is
little data available to determine the overall benefits of
using deception when en the defensive.
One rrore view of the data is necessary Decause the
data covers a range of w a rs over a changing period war, 54
years. It is necessary to insure that the data set is rot
biased. Sarton Whaley produced the following taole to show
the frequencies of surprise and deception through tire,
decade by decade:
TA3LE 9
LIST A STRATEGIC SURPRISE AM DECEPTION OVER TIME [Ref. 110]
pie io
r
SURPFI OX. TEC LP rI ION dOTE TOTAL
1914-1919 1 <5 9 10
1920-1929 1 1 2
1930-1939 3 c c-
1940-1949 5 5 30 40
1950-1959 1 2 5 8
196^-1967 3 3
TOTALS 11 ? 50 cd
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The author of this thesis made the sarre cross-corre-
lation for the tactical, list B, data to produce Taole 10.
TABLE 10
LIST B TACTICAL SURPRISE ANE DECEPTION CASES OVER TIME
PERIOD SURPRISE DECEPTION DOTE TOTAL
1914-1919 10 9 19
1920-1929 1 1
193^-1939 2 2
1940-1949 e 3 16 25 .
1950-1959
1960-1967
TOTALS 19 3 25 47
The tactical data shows rr.uch of the same dispersion
over the tire period that the strategic aata did. Table 10
shows that the tactical data is rrainly from the two world
wars. It takes a large conflict to field armies that onera te
in the tactical sense. Minor wars rray involve a large mili-
tary conflict but they are mainly fought for political
reasons, thus they are more appropriate for inclusion in tne
strategic category. The cases fror lists A and £ are com-
bined to show the overall dispersion of cases.
TABLE 11
SURPRISE AND DECEPTION OVER TIME
PERIOD SURPRISE DECEPTION BOTB TOTAL
1914-1919 11 18 20
1920-1929 2 1 3
1930-1939 t, 2 7
1940-1949 11 8 46 6o
1950-1959 1 2 K 8
1960-1967 3 <
TOTALS 30 10 7b 115
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Whaley concluded that frorr a rough impressionistic
grasp of the magnitudes involved, there were several trends
that rright be shown. First, the proportion of military opera-
tions involving surprise unaided by deception is sharply
declining. Second, the proportion of military operations
involving deception tnat failed to yield surprise has re-
mained at a rather constant low level. Third, the proportion
of military operations involving both surprise and deception
has sharply increased. [Ref. Ill J
Tables 145 and 11 roughly support the aoove con-
clusions. In support of the first conclusion, it should oe
noted that intelligence support to the battlefield has vastly
improved since 1914. It is possible to collect data from
events happening deep in enemy territory. Computers can oe
used in the analysis of that data. becure communications can
pass the resulting intelligence in a timely manner.
V/nile intelligence support is still separated into
tactical and strategic intelligence, it is recognized tnat it
must be passed to the commander who neecs it regardless of
the source. Thus, the tactical commander at division level
rray nave near real-time access to strategic intelligence
products that pertain to his area of operations.
Passive camouflage and concealment measures have not
improved at the sa^re rate. Camouflage against infrared de-
tection devices, for example, na s received little attention
or emphasis. The result is tnat a headquarters that is
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perfectly concealed to protect against visual surveillance
rray nave no concealment at all frorr infrared surveillance
which detects hot objects such as the diesel generators that
power the headquarters equipment. The infrared devices can
detect vehicle engines or even soldiers and can image a
picture of the battlefield that in some cases is even better
than a visual image. [Ref. 112]
3arton Whaley's second conclusion, that deception
usually results in surprise, is understandable in that
counter-deception is even less understood than deception.
While deception may remain peopl e-ori entec, it may require a
machine solution to unmask a deception.
The thira conclusion, that operations involving both
i
surprise and decepti n are increasing, is a result of tech-
nology. The weapons on the battlefield are so lethal ana so
effective that the direct frontal approach is disasterous.
Victory can still be achieved by overpowering the enemy or
pressing the attack until ne runs cut of ammunition, but the
price is excessive for both siaes. The increase in surprise
and deception stems from the effort to win ty evading the
direct approach. The unexpected, alternate approach nust
even be considered a form of deception.
2* £&cejplion Ff feet on Producing Victory
The first category to be IcoKei at is tne offense.
The case studies are categorized by whether the outcome was
favorable to the initiator. The battles are coaed sucn tnat a
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V+ stands for an overwhelming , unexpectedly successful
victory. A "v" is in reference to a clear victory. A "V-"
stands for a victory that is less than expected and a "l"
stands for defeat. The only one of these that ray need
explanation is the "V-". A "V-" might result when an attack
was only partly successful. The Battle of the Alamo is a
clear example of victory that did not go according to plan
for the Mexicans. For the purposes of this analysis, a "v-"
will be considered an undesirable outcome. A battle will be
considered a victory only if it was coded "V+" or "V". Tni
s
should alleviate the effects of coding errors where the two
middle cases meet on the continuous line.
The list C cases are included in the comparison shown
on the next table. The list C cases do not meet the criteria
for list £ in that neither surprise nor deception was in-
volved in the battle. List C can be considered a control
data set for list A cases.
Taken together, lists E and C torn- a tactical set wni^n,
again, can be thougnt of as being representative of tactical
operations only by assumption. The assumption may be valid
because the entire set, all three lists, seems to cover tne
battles that had the primary impact on history. The
assumption, however, con not be defended sufficiently enough
to allow the use of confidence levels. It is necessary to be
very cautious in the analysis of the deception data so that
the evidence of history is not biased by improper methods.
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TABLE 12
EFFECT OF DECEPTION USE! 3Y THE OFFENSE
LIST TYPE NO. "v+" "v" "V-" "e" VICTORIOUS
A DECEPTION 52 16 21 9 6 71 %
A NO DECEPTION 8 2 1 62.5 £
8 INCEPTION 21 5 7 e 3 *7.1 %
B NO EEC5PTION 18 2 8 ? 1 Z> o . /"fo
C NC IECiPTION 54 1 12 12 2b 24 %
Table 12 Indicates several interesting trends. It
shows that the probability of achieving at least a clear
victory is only slightly fetter when deception is present
than it is when deception is absent. The reason that this is
true fcr the 52 type A cases is that only five of the type A
cases did not involve surprise. In fact, all eight of the
strategic cases that dia not involve deception on the part of
the initiator resulted in surprise anyway. All type 3 cases
are categorized by the presence of deception and 'or surprise.
The t;/ue 3 cases without deception on the part of the
offense, by definition, included actions which surprised tne
defense and achieved The relatively high percentage of clear
victories that would be expected. Tne type C cases, by
definition, did not involve deception on the part of the
offense and did not result in surprising the defense.
Table 12 strongly indicates that one or Doth of the
parameters of surprise and deception has a strong effect on
lis
producing victory for the offense. It would appear that
surprise has the predominant effect because of the large
difference between type C cases and the rest of tne cases
without deception.
Table 12 is interesting in that it shows the freq-
uency of occurrance of oattles that ended in the "V + " ever-
whelming, unexpectedly successful victories. That is the
kind of victory that is desired at every level. The trenas
for this occurrence warrant special attention in tne form of
conditional probability of the type of victory given that at
least a clear victory, "v", result w a s obtained.
PROBABILITY OF OFFEN&IVE OVERWHELMING VICTORY
LEVEL TYPE "V +
"
"(V+ c V)" p" (V+/( V+6.V )
"
STRATEGIC INCEPTION 16 37 43.3 %
STRATEGIC NO DECEPTION 5 %
STRATEGIC TCTAL 16 42 38 %
TACTICAL riCEPTION £ 12 41.7 1
TACTICAL NC DECEPTION 3 23 13 %
TACTICAL TOTAL 8 3b 22.8 %
The trend shown in Table 13 is that deception may
figure prominently in achieving an overwhelming victory. It
also shows that the probability of achieving that over-
whelming victory is small if deception is not attempted.
11;
Most of the case histories in the data base that
involved deception also involved surprise. Whether that
surprise resulted from the deception or resulted from other
factors is not clear. The enemy may have formed the wrong
preconception without any outside help and in doing so set
himself up for being surprised. On the ether hand, tne fact
that surprise was not achieved in some cases may not have had
anything to do with the way the deception was planned or
carried out. The deception may nave been perfect but chance
may have intervened on the side of the target. A simplifying
assumption must te rrade that deception fails when surprise
does not occur. Using that assumption, it is possible to
look at the results of deceptions that failed.
TABLE 14
RESULTS OF DECEPTION FAILURE
LEVEL V+ V V- D
STRATEGIC 1 2 2
TACTICAL 2 1
p( v+ ) p("v")
20 %
The sample size for the cross-correlation usee in
Table 14 is quite small. The cross-correlations are gener-
ally large enough so that the averaging effect allows sore
degree of confidence in the trends that are shown. That is
not the case for Table 14, but the difference in those
results and the results that *ere shown in Taoie 11 is so
large that the obvious indication is that if deception fails,
11?
the results of battle will not be as favorable. In fact,
attempting deception is probably counterproductive if it
fails to surprise the enerry.
Table 14 included one case of failed deception tnat
was attempted by the defense. That was the case of the
Germans attempting to deceive the British and Americans
during the Anzio counterattack . It w a s a tactical deception
and the battle resulted in a defeat for the Germans. The
deception failed because of one channel of contradictory
information. That was a direct channel from a German traitor
inside Field iVarshall Albert Kesselring's headquarters. Tne
channel was through an OSS agent in Rome to the Allied Fifth
£rmy Headquarters [Hef. 113J . Tne explanation of that point
is included for three reasons. First, it slightly biases the
data. Second, it is only one case and did not apply tc any
other Table. Third, it points out the need to iceep a criti-
cal eye on the data-coding by referring to the actual histor-
ical records or summaries. Important issues rra y ce lost if
the cases are treated without examination in detail.
The main reason why deception is usually none by the
force that is on the offense is that the offense generally
maintains the initiative. The defense is only aDle to seize
the initiative through such actions as the counterattack.
The question is, can deception be very effective *?or use by
the defense? The initial impression is that it cannot. rut
that is based en the extreme paucity of tne historical
113
examples. The cross-correlation of those examples is shown
below. The sample sizes are small but the results are sur-
prising. The particular result that is of interest is the
percentage of defensive operations that resulted in over-
whelming victory. Six of the seventeen defensive operations
resulted in overwhelming victory for the type A or 5 battles.
TABLE 15
EFFECT OF DECEPTION ON TEE DEFENSE
TYPE DESCRIPTION NO,
A DECEPTION 5
A NO DECEPTION 3
B DECEPTION 8
8 NO DECEPTION 1
C NO S/NO D 3
v + V V- r VICTORIOUS
2 3 1 2 40 *
c 1 100 %
1 5 1 1 ?t %
1 100 %
3 f « -"S6- 4,
Table 15 shows that 70 % of the type A and £ de-
fensive operations resulted in at least clear victory. That
was because the operations that did not include deception
were still of a type that gereratea surprise in the eremy.
The contrast is with the type C cases. Those three cases
were counterattacks out they were totally predictable. They
were not dor.e in a manner that surprised the enerry. The
result was that they ended in defeat.
Cofrpon battle tactics for the offense derand that
once the attackers seize the objective by driving the enemy
away, the force must prepare for a counterattack. The
11^
offense sets up the defense line along the axis of the
attack. Defensive tactics are to immediately regroup and
counterattack before that perimeter is established. A
counterattack that is done in the predictable manner may fall
into the count er-counterattack trap. If the counterattack is
done at the unexpected time or executed in an unanticipated
manner, it performs as a deceptive maneuver.
3. Reception Effect on Reducing Casuallies
A technological advantage on one side is a prime
factor in the production of casualties. Consider the intro-
duction of the armor piercing longbow as a Eritisn technology
advantage over the French armored Knignts in the Battle of
Agincourt in the year 1415. The Eritisn were outnumbered by
as much as ten to one, althou 6h the Sritisn were better-
organized. The British lost less thdn 300 men while the
French lost at least 5 ,£00 men. The French Knignts were
expecting to tattle other Knights and had no idea tnat war-
fare had changed overnignt. [Ref. 114]
The introduction of a new technology must he done at
the right tire or else the surprise effect is wasted. If the
enerry finds out about a new weapon during peacetime or during
a Finer preliminary battle the effectiveness decreases. Tne
enemy can develop similar technology or tactics tnat return
balance to the battlefield.
World War II provides many examples of the tech-
nology battle of measure and count errr ea sure . German use of
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the "lorenz" navigational aid was the first step in tneir
effort to conduct highly directed precision bombing to force
the British to sue for peace. The British realized what was
happening and instituted "Meaconing" to draw the German
bombers off course. The Germans switched to a new tone-Dased
system codenamed "Headache", but the British found out about
it ahead of time and countered with a deception jamming
system appropriately codenamed "Aspirin". The Germans came
up with another scheme to navigate to selected targets called
"Ruffian" and the British developed a deception repeater,
"Bromide", to counter it. The frustrated Germans put all of
their navigational aids in a target-marking squadron, Kampf
Gruppe 100. The British could not beat that so they switcnea
to decoy fires called "starfish". As long as the British
kept one step ahead of the Germans tney could direct a lot of
German bombs onto empty fields. [Ref. 115J
The Eritish became experts at passive and active
camouflage during the "Battle of the 3ombs". That expertise
in fake lighting schemes, dummy installations, and aeccys vas
used on the tactical battlefield. The need for sucn uicks
developed in the North Africa campaigns wnere visual observa-
tion was excellent. The British recognizee tne opportunity
because of their recent reliance on sucn tricKs to protect
their homeland. Other nations soon followed tne British
lead and dummy men and equipment were produced and usee by
many of the nations fighting in the w d r. LRef. 116
J
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Once a counter-measure is used, its effectiveness
greatly decreases as the new measure becomes a target for
count er-countermeasures. The Germans relied heavily on their
"Wurzburg" radar to counter Allied bombing raids. That radar
was so effective that the British sent in a commando raid to
steal the transmitter. This did not Keep the radar off the
air, but it allowed the British to develop primitive chaff,
codenamed "Window", as an effective cour.termeasure . iariy
chaff was nothing more than aluminum foil cut by hand to tne
desired radar frequency, but it was effective.
The British did not use their discovery for several
difficult years because they were afraia the Gernans wcula
find the pieces of aluminum, discover tne principle them-
selves, and use it against the British [Ref. 117]. The
rritish finally began using chaff in combination with
effective jamming. It was so effective that the Gerrans
dedicated roughly 4,000 engineers, 90 percent of their total
in that category, to solve the anti-jamming anc "Window"
problerr plaguing the Luftwaffe radars. In tneir rush to
develop a countermeasure, the Germans were distracted frorr
the development of microwave radar which was already bein^
exploited by the Allies. [?ef. 118]
This analysis now returns to Barton ttnaiey's decep-
tion data base in order to be more specific on tne effects of
deception on battlefield casualties. The criterion used to
select the tactical battles of interest is that the new
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technology was used for the first tine as a deception measure
to support the battle.
The Gerrran introduction of a new tear gas in the
Winter Battle of Masuria in 1915 diverted Russian attention
while the Germans conducted a major movement of forces which
was key to the tattle. The battle resulted in only a few
German casualties compared to 210,000 Russian casualties.
The Germans certainly would have lost more men if the
Russians had detected the build up of forces. LP.ef. 119J
324 tanks were used by the British at Cambrai in
1917. The 10,000 yard advance in one day captured rrcre
ground than !:1 Eritlsh divisions nad at 3rd Ypres during tne
preceeding four months at a cost of a quarter of a trillion
casualties en each sice. Using large tan* forces may not
have saved a naif million casualties as they may have been
lost in future battles of attrition. still they were saved
for that battle. The Eritisn suffered only 4,000 total
casualties at Cambrai. The exact count of German casualties
is not available, but the German loss due just in soldiers
taken prisoner was 8,000. [Ref. 120J
The combination of armor and aircraft advantages
decided the outcome of tne Eritish oattle against tne >*xis
forces at Sidi Rezegh in 1941. The British won the battle
largely due to tbe fact that Rommel was deceived as to tne
location, direction, ana time of the attack. British losses
were only 17,700 compared to 38,300 Germans and Italians.
12c"
One portion of the operation was a capture of an entire fort
during which 14,000 Axis prisoners were taKen at a oost of
less than 500 British casualties. [F.ef. 121]
Operation Bustard at Kerch in the Crimea in 1242
demonstrated that a wide range of ruses: radio deception,
"Quaker Guns", and false deployments, were effective in con-
firming false perceptions. The Germans soundly defeated the
Russians in this battle. For relatively light German casual-
ties, 100,000 Russians were taKen prisoner (.Ref. 122] . The
Russians shculd have been very happy to receive tnese
prisoners back after tne war was over, for there were 20
million Russians who died as a result of that war.
The American attack on the Japanese-neld island of
Tinian in 1£44 was conducted under difficult circumstances.
The island was only 12 rriles long and four miles wide. It
was defended t>ir over 8,000 well armed soldiers who were
willing to die to the last man in order to hole tne island
against the American attacK. The Japanese were fully alert
and knew that tne island would be invaded that day. Tne
final problem was that the island had only tnree beaches, one
of which was not negotiable by existing amphibious equipment.
It should have been impossible for the Americans to estaMisn
an unopposed beachhead with 5,000 troops on a clear day, Dut
that was what happened.
The solution to the Tinian invasion problem was a
technical modification to smaller landing craft which allowed
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their to negotiate the treacherous coral shallows of the beach
that was " irrpossi ble." A simultaneous feint at one of the
proper teaches drew rrost of the Japanese reserves to the far
end of the island. The result was that only 16 Americans
were killed in the first 16 hours of the landing. In fact,
on the eighth day, the Americans secured the island at a
total cost of only S89 lives. 8,000 Japanese soldiers died
defending Tinian. [Bef. 123J
The American attack on the island of Iwo Jima in 1945
is a case very similar to Tinian. The relative forces were
larger but the real difference is that the deception did not
result in surprise. The cost was not oily high in absolute
numbers of casualties, but the battle was one o 4? the rare
cases in which American casualties exceeded those of the
Japanese. The lack of surprise was one of several contribu-
tory causes. [Ref. 124]
Complete tactical and strategic surprise was achieved
by the first use of a nuclear weapon at Hiroshima on 6
August, 1945. While the civilian casualties were horrible,
the inescapable conclusion is that the act saved millions
lives. The ultimate casualty reduction was due t c tne
Japanese surrender without the need for an actual invasion of
Japan itself.
The atomic tombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would
not have had « large effect on the tactical situation cf such
an invasion because the Japanese would have realized that the
12:
bombs were not available in quantity. The point is, thai a
major innovation in technology may pay large dividends only
if it is introduced at the right place and at the right tire.
Deception reduces casualties because it avoids the
frontal assault. The main reduction in casualties on the
deceiver side results from not having to fight the forces
that are captured intact or surrender in mass. The nain
advantage on the deceived side is thai the casualties who
become prisoners of war may be returned after the war is
over
.
-• reception Jffect on Force If f ecti veness
There are general rules for the conduct of battle
that are used to generate force planning, battlefield tail-
oring of forces, and operations planning. One of these
rules of thumb is that the defense has a three-to-cne
advantage over the o f fense. The number three is a legacy of
the rachine gun and the artillery dominated western Front o^
World War I. That front required a large local superiority
in zone in order to successfully attack.
The three-to-cne advantage rule i c still accepted as
a generalization. A force that is outnumbered ten-to-cne
would need to take advantage cf the defense and still reed a
three-to-cne advantage in force effectiveness in crier to
achieve parity.
It is possible to train and equip a :" A rce to De very
effective. The German armies that attacked the- Russians
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early in World War II, for example, were as truch as four
tiires rrore effective, men for man, than their opponents.
That was a function of many factors, tut in that situation,
the Germans could attack a larger force and still maintain a
three-to-ore 'orce advantage. Whaley prepared tne following
Table to corrpare the relationship of surprise to the relative
numbers of soldiers:
TABLE 15
JORCE USEE TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AFTER 7'Y I [Ref. 125.1
ACHIEVEMENT
VICTCPY 18


















Whdley concluded that for operations not involving
any surprise a substantial superiority of force is -^crec,,
although the ratio of about two tc one wos suggested rctner
than the traditional three to one. Ke also concluded that
there was a fairly direct relationship between force and
degree of success, the Fore the forue the greater the
success. Barton Vhaley's rrore surprising conclusion was that
surprise intervenes to shatter the direct a id simle
relationship between force and success. Thus, surprl c e must
alter force effectiveness. [Ref. 12cJ
12'
Excluding the strategic cases in the data set, it is
possihle to cross-correlate between the results of battle,
the input force ratios, and the output casualty ratios.
Force ratios and. casualty ratios should be directly related
as long as the force is applied efficiently. The analysis
for Table 1? below and the Tables in this section that follow
it are all from the point of view of the offense nni include
the type C data set.
TABLE 1?
ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS FORCES AN! CASUALTIES
ACHIEVEMENT NO. FORCE RATIO CASUAI-TY PATIO
OVERWHELMING VICTORY 8 1 : .69 1 • 7 c +
CLEAR VICTORY 24 1 : .82 1 : 2.2S
BELOW EXPECTATIONS 25 1 : .6 1 r 1 . 54
EEFEAT 32 1 : .71 1 • .76
TCTALS 89 1 : .71 1 • c . (? ?
The first observation that can be taken from Table 1?
is that, in general, the offense was favored by only a 1.4 to
1 force advantage. This agrees with 3a r ton .-'ha lev's con-
clusion. A tnree-to-one advantage ray aave been e^rinserel
at the point of attack, but the clear advantage did not exist
overall. A second observation is that there i c no direct
correlation between force ratio and achievement in the
battle. There is no direct correlation between frrue ratios
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and casualty ratios. There is a direct link between achieve-
ment and casualty ratios. That is explained in the cases of
overwhelming victory by mass surrender. The defense typical-
ly suffers more casualties than does the offense sirrly
because of the forces that become cut off And "raptured.
TA£LE 13













18 1 : .83 1 : 4.75
18 1 : .51 1 : 2.08
2 1 : . 55 1 . 8 <6
£1 1 : .70 1 : 1.17
Table 18 breaks out the tactical cases by the situa-
tion at the start of the battle. Of the ??j case? that in-
volved deception, only two did rot result in surprise. k set
of two does not generate much confidence in a conclusion, = ; J
both cases resulted in victory below expectations. It is
evident that although the defenders in these cases were
outnumbered 1.8 to 1, they did inflict Tore casualties than
they received. This is different from the expectatior
Tdble 17 and may indicate that a deception that fails is
w^rse that no deception at all. Rather than drawing a con-
clusion that is based on insufficient d*ta, it is better to
check the two cases in more detail.
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The first case was the Battle of Sangro, 28 November
to 2 Eecember 1943. The British Eighth Army under General
Montgomery w a s to open the 15th Army Group offensive by
striking across the Sangro Fiver. Montgomery used an elab-
orate and comprehensive deception plan. There seem to oe
three rrain factors that resulted in lack of surprise. First,
the attack Wds postponed twice due to rain swollen rivers.
It then went in one day early as the weather cleared. Field
Marshall Kesselring evidently tooK warning of the immediate
offensive as he used the time to reinforce that pert of the
line. Second, Kesselring was using a low risk strategy. The
terrain precluded any ma*or shift in British forces ana the
Germans had heater lateral reads. There was no st-ong threat
to induce Kesselring to chcr.^e his strategy. Third,
Montgomery had really no choice but to attack along t ;
obvious road.
The deception was to delay the committing of the
German reserves by demonstrating along tne entire Eighth Amy
front. This was an inherently implausible alternative. Tne
conclusion was that this deception ^aiied because it was r c r
plausible enough or serious enough to succeed anyway. [Kef.
127]
The second case was "Operation Jjetachment " which wa c
the American invasion of Ivo Jima. long before the actual
operation, the Japanese ^cirrison had amnle and accurate fore-
knowledge o* the assault, and had correctly calculated an
expected time. They even knew the three specific t t .£ . Serine
divisions assigned to the Fission. Two postponements -eve
the Japanese an extra month to dig the most formidable
defenses the Americans would faue in the Pacific. The
channel for the Japanese intelligence coup was never identi-
fied, hut there was a major security breach involving the
Hawaiian press that may have made disclosure of the operation
certain. ("Ref. 128] In any event, speculation ry soldiers
and civilains in Fonolulu provided many rumors.
Returning to Table IB, it is interesting to note th«t
the 18 cases of deception that produced surprise were
attempted with an average force ratio much worse than that of
the 69 battles that did not involve deception, yet the re-
sults of battle ard the casualty ratios were much Ketter.
overall trend is shown in the next Table:
TA3LE 19
DECEPTION VERSUS FORCES ANT CAS'TAITIfb
ENVIPONNENT NO. FORCE RATIO
DECEPTION 20 1 : .85
NO DECEPTION 69 1 : .68
CASUAITY RATIO
1 : a . 53
1 : 1.3f
Table 19 suggests that vhen the force rcit 4 <~, is worse
than normal, the attacker may feel a need to resort, to decep-
tion in order to obtain the generalized three to-one V-rca
advantage. There is a difficulty in accepting the foroe
ratios at face value \^ that thev ere direct number -olios
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and dc not reflect the force effectiveness rrerit. It is hrf rd
to nail that figure down.
One way to generate a force effectiveness ratio is to
do a corrputer simulation using all of the realitive parame-
ters. A U.S. tank, for example, could be compared to other
tanks in a one on one, one on many, or many on many battle.
The effectiveness is a function of dead tanks at the end cf
the battle. The result may be that tank X is the equivalent
of five I tanks, but it depends on the situation especidlly
in multiple engagement cases.
Another way to obtain a force effectiveness ratio is
to count casualties at the end of sa actual battle. Again,
the casualty count must be related to the initial f-? roe
ratios Just a s they would in a simulation. The author of
this thesis postulates that a rough force effectiveness ratio
can be obtained by multiplying the force ratic by the casual-
ty ratio. Performing this translation. Table IS is changed
as shown below:
TABLE 20












Table 20 is an oversimplification, of course. Yet it
fray be defended by the ragic nurroer three. If three-tc-one
is the force advantage needed to produce victory, the nurrters
in the table clearly support the outcorre of the battles. The
force effectiveness ddvantcge that w a s iruch higher thdn three
produced overwhelming victory. The force effectiveness ad-
vantage that WoS close tc three produced cledr vic r cry. The
force effectiveness advantage lower than three produced
victory below ejpectat ions . Force effectiveness parity pro-
duced defeat for the attacking force.
Usually there is little control over ? orce ratios.
The force effectiveness ratio postulate is of litle use
unless there is a .Teans of controlling the casualty ri r io.
The prerrise is that surprise can produce d rrore fa Tr :rd^le
casualty ratio. It is also expected that surprise aided or
caused by deceDtion will be even rrore favorable.
The diverse outcomes that are included in Tables
18 ard 19 preclude therr from detailed analysis. Table It-
needs tc be separated into four different Tables cover" -ig
each "utcor^e ^cr the attacker so that the trends are see".
TABLE 21
EORCES ANT CASUALTY PATIOS (OVERWHELMING VICTORY)




NO SURPRISE, NO TECEPTICN
TOTALS /AVERAGES
c 1 : .76 1 : 1 2 -•
2 1 ; .65 : 4.65
K N /A N 'A
1 1 : .4 1 : 1.5
c 11 : .69 1 : 7.5- 1
The five cases in Table 21 that had the worst average
force ratios for the attacker were associated, with deception.
Whether the surprise with deception produced the highly-
favorable casualty ratios or whether that casualty ratio was
fixed by other factors is net known. Testing the postulate
for the three environment cases yields ^orce effectiveness
ratios of 13.16, 7.15, and 3.75 respectively. All three
agree with the actual averaged outcomes of the different
categories of battle.
TABLE 22
J0RC1S ANT CASUALTY RATIOS 'CLEAR VICTORY
ENVIRONMENT NO.
SURPRISE ANT INCEPTION 7
SURPRISE WITHOUT RECEPTION S
RECEPTION WITHOUT SURPRISE
NO SURPRISE, NO DECEPTION 9
TOTAL/AVERAGE 24













Table 22 should reflect oattles where the attacker
had a three-to-one force advantage. Using the force
effectiveness postulate, multiplying the force ratio ad-
vantage by the casualty ratio advantage, yields figures of
2.92, 2.56, and 3.09. The figures support the postulate and
deception and surprise ray have increased the casualty
ratios, but the evidence is much weaker.
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TABLE 23





NO SURPRISE, NO DECEPTION
TOTAL/AVERAGE
NO. EORCE RATIO CASUALTY RATIO
4 1 • .475 1 : 1 .97
7 1 : • .4 1 : 1 .5
2 1 : . 55 1 : .8
12 1 : .77 1 : 1 .5
25 1 : .€ 1 1.54
The force effectiveness postulate begins to creak
down in Table 23. While the overall force effectiveness
ratio for tne data set is 2.56 to 1, the first two categories
of the Table yield ratios of 4.14 and 3.75 to one. A poss-
ible explanation is that there is a limiting factor vnich is
set by the magnitude of the force ratio. The first two
categories had force ratios cf 2.1 and 2.5 to one respect-
ively. The other two categories hai. ratios of 1..S and 1.3 to
one. 1.4 to one was the average force ratio for oil 89
cases. It rray be that as the actual force ratio rears the
three to ore advantage, the possible contribution of surprise
and/or deception weakens.
TAB LI 24





NO SURPRISE, NO EECEPTION
TOTAL /AVERAGE
NO EORCE RATIO CAS r7ALT v RATIO
2 1X : . 45 i : .35
1 1 : .4 ^ : .1
V N /A N/A
2y 1 r .74 1 : .83
w •- 1 : .71 1 : .76
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Using the postulate yields force ef fect iveness
numbers of .?P, .25, and 1.12 to one. Ail three categories
would have predicted the result which was defeat.
It is necessary to increase force effectiveness when
adequate force advantage does not exist. It would seem that
it is easy enough to determine the ratio in advance of the
battle. The commander knows the relative forces pretty hell.
The casualty ratios for the last few battles should be avail-
able. The force effectiveness postulate, if correct, should
easily show whether a i; or bat power multiplier such as
deception is required.
TABLE 25
PR0 3A3ILITY OF rECEPTION GIVEN FORCE RATIOS
EORCE RATIO PROBABILITY OF ATTEMPTING PECEPTION
10 : 1 TO 2.5 : 1
2 : 1 TO 1.25 : 1
1.1 : 1 TO .9 : 1
WORSE THAN .9:1
OVERALL PROBABILITY
The question of when d force will resort to deception
is partially answered by Table 25. A force that is attacking
a superior defensive force is much more prone to use decep-
tion than any other force. The vastly superior attacking
force may use deception a thira o f the time. That ^c im-
probably has the initiative and can predict the enemy dcticn.
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(9 OF 27)
.156 (5 OF 32)
.07 (1 OF 14;
. 5 (5 OF 10}
.24 (20 OF 83
The vastly superior force may embrace deception
simply to reduce casualties. The fact that the other two
categories are rarely associated with deception nay only be
explained hy a general misunderstanding of the deception
process.
5. deception Effect on Increasing Territory Exchanged
The attacking force which achieves an overwhelming
victory is in a position to exploit that victory by driving
deep into the enemy rear area. The exploitation force- would
have destroyed or bypassed the enemy reserve or counterattack
forces and would he able tc acquire control over vast areas
of territory previously held ty the enemy. The iefensive
forces on either side of the penetration would either oe
captured after being cut off cr would have to be withdraw, in
order tc estatlish a new line of defense.
The battles in which the attacking force is r>.o 1 able
to achieve a penetration of the defense would result in
smaller territory exchange. A clear victory might ip. stereo-
typed as one that achieves a large salient into the enemy
lines hut is stopped short of the exploitation. A victory
that is less than expected rright be one in which the attack-
ing -^orce becomes decisively engaged prior to achieving the
planned objectives.
An attack that ends in defeat right gain or lose
ground. The typical situation for that tyoe of battle would
he that the deci^i T'e engagement begins at the m<-an line cf
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defense. The attack might not make any progress at all or
the progress being made might not justify the cost. Contin-
uing the costly battle might decimate the attacking for-je
such that it would have to withdraw from the battlefield.
That would account for territory lost by an attacking force.
It must be established from the data that territory
exchange is a valid criterion for measuring the outcome of
battle. Again, the analysis is done from the point of view
of the attacking force. The strategic cases are excluded.
There are &2 cases for which 3arton Whaley assigned territory
exchange figures, but there ere severdl cases which bias the
analysis and which can not oe averaged out. It is necessary
to restrict the data set to exclude the cases whi ;h extreme-
ly bias the cross-correlation.
Ore case, the Italian East Africa Campaign in 1941.
was responsible for conquering more territory than all the
other cases combined [Ref. 129]. Another case, the World Vac
I attack on the forces of Austria, Germany, an? Bulgaria by
the forces of Rumania, resulted in a defeat of the Rumanian
forces and a territory loss of 54,702 square rile? [Ref.
130] . These cases are not typical. They snould ie
deleted if the averaged outcomes are to oe analyzed, yet it
is not proper to delete any cases from the cross-correlation
without first considering them. The following IVMe vis




TERRITORY EXCHANGE VERSUS OUTCOME OF 3ATTLE
EXCLUDING TERRITORY EXCHANGEE (SCUARE MIES
CASES WITH
EXCHANGES : NO. 7 + V V- r
NC EXCLUSION 8? 82 ,680 5 ,580 552 -1 ,955
OVER 50,000 79 6 ,205 2 ,743 340 - 161
OVER 4,000 71 2S8 463.5 340 104
OVER 2,000 67 288 246 197 12.4
OVER 1,000 64 288 110 128 12.4
OVER 300 56 80 66 65.7 12.4
SQUARE MILES
Table 26 indicates that deleting rrore and Fore data
reduces the effect o^ extreme cases to the point that the
ddtd is no longer representative of the s^rple sets. Th-e
range of deletion for the final category was five "v~" oases,
eleven "v" cases, seven "V-" o-ases, and three r" cases.
There is a radical change in the outcome as extrerrf cases ore
deleted, but 32 percent of the ddtd is lost. Eliminating
cases in an effort to ma'-ce the averaged data settle d w:
results in less confidence in the analysis. The different
data sets are affected differently at ea^-h setting.
The requirement is to set the threshold for deletion
at the point where the ddta is rost representative of the
entire 82 cases. There is no obvious point "or the thres-
hold. The author of this thesis chose to set the threshold
to exclude cases where territory exchange exceeded 1,500
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square rriles. The reasoning for that choice was threefold.
First, that area is roughly the area that a rodem errry would
cover ir a two day exploitation. Second, that threshold
rerroves the strongly biasing cases. Third, that threshold
retains 82 percent of the data.
TABLE 27
TERRITORY EXCHANGE THRESHOLD CASE REEUCTICN EFFECT
THRESHOLD NO. "v+" "v" "V-" "d"
NONE 82 8 23 22 29
50,000 79 7 22 22 28
4,000 71 5 18 21 2 7
1,500 67 K 16 20 26
1,000 64 5 14 19 26
300 56 3 12 15 26
The data that is left after considering only those
cases with territory exchange less than 1,500 square riles is
assumed to te representative. The threshold irpncts rrore on
the "V+" and "V" sets as it deletes a higher proportion of
cases from these categories. It world se^rr tn.-it any induced
I
error would be on the side of caution.
The data at the threshold of 1,500 soiare Tiles is:
TABLE 28





NO SURPRISE, NO RECEPTION
TOTAL
TOTAL









42 1 7 11 23
67 5 16 20 26
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Table 27 displays the sa me trends as shown previously
dS far as the relationship between environment and the out-
come of the battle is concerned. The cross -correlation of
territorial exchange and the outcome was shown in table VI-
21. The cases of Table 26 for "v+", "v", and "r" displayed
average territorial exchanges of 288, 246, 197, end 12.4
square miles respectively. The trend was sufficiently strong
to support the idea that territory exchange is a measure of
the effectiveness of the attacking force in the battle. I:
would also be reasonable to say tnat it would be a measure of
effectiveness for the defense as well.
The point in question is, whether forces that
errployed deception can be judged as heinr more effective
based on the criterion of territory exchanged. Fifteen of the
cases shown in Table 28 involved deception and only two of
them were defeats. Those two were the only deception cases
that achieved a territory exchange of ten square riles or
less. The remaining 52 cases did rot involve deception. 24
of those cases, almost half, ended in defeat. Of the remain-
ing 28, there were 25 that did n ot gain at least ten square
miles o*1 territory. Alorg a division frontage of ZV kilo-
meters that equates to c gain cf only 8rh meters. That is
still in direct fire range of where the battle began.
The r d ses that did rot involve ce cepti c^ did include
ten cases where surprise wes achieved ar.yvey. Of those, only
one battle ended in defeat. Even including tnose cases, tr.e
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attacks that utilized deception produced a clear advantage in
territory gained over the attacks that did rot utilize decep-
tion. The fifteen deception cases averaged a 26c square rile
gain. The 52 cases not using deception averaged only 1^9
sauare miles, a gain that was less than half as much.
T. ANALYSIS OE OPTICAL DECEPTION PRACTICES
One desired deception outcome is surprise because the
cases that involved "both surprise and deception were the h<=st
in terms of optimizing the operational mission. Optimizing
the deception mission, then, may require actions which pro-
duce surprise. The analysis shows that it is not just a
case in which the deception target is surprised or is not
surprised. Surprise has several psychological dimensions.
The first dimension of surprise is its extent or variety
of different forms. The different forrrs that surprise can
tdke were classified bv Vhaley as the various erodes of sur-
prise. The five modes are intention, time, place, strength,
and style. The mode^ will he addressed in this thesis dS
they are slightly rrore descriptive than the traditional use
of who, what, where, when, and how. Style should re the only
rode that reouires an exulanation in the military sense.
Lefensive style, for example, could vary Prom "defend to she
death" to a mere moderate "defend tc trade space for tire".
Style also includes Dattle tactics whether normal or uncon-
ventional, technical innovations, and new weapons. Style is
a measure of how the whole operatior is conducted. [Hef. 1 51]
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The second dimension of surprise is its intensity.
Intensity is a measure of degree of effect. Certainly, an
attack that was unexpected in terms of all five modes of
surprise would generate a more intense surprise than one that
was predictable in all modes but one. The number of rode? in
which surprise is attained defines the intensity as being en
a scale cf zero to five.
A second measure of intensity of surprise is the degree
of surprise achieved for any one rode. Tr.at degree is rich
harder to research or even define. For the purposes of this
thesis it will be limited to being either "very surprised" cr
just "surprised". An example of being surprised in the mode
of place would be the surprise generated when the attack was
made at point P when it was expected at point k. An example
of being very surprised would be the surprise that right De
generated when the attack was made at point when it was
preconceived that such an attack would have been impossible.
[Pef. 132]
The cross-correlation method will oe i sed to identify the
optimal deception practices used in the historical ddta set.
The analysis is limited to the list <i cases in which sur-
prise was present .
1
. f^odes of Surprise
Overall there were 44 cases cf tactical dates in which
surprise was present. Only nine of these cases included
surprise in only one mode. Tne nine cases included one ccse
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of surprise of intent, two of place, and three of style.
Each of the three cases where surprise was due to style
resulted in at least a clear victory. The same statement can
not be made for the ether modes. This is of interest because
style is not the predominant mode of surprise. The most
common mode is place. The least common mode is intention.
The frequency order of the five modes i s as shewn:
TABLE 29




















The next step is to determine whether the modes of
surprise were generated by a deception operation or not.
Surprise can ce optimized by olsn if deception is most
efficient in generating surprise in the proper mode. The 44
cases of tactical surorise are reduced to 25 cases of decep-
tion and surprise for this analysis.
TA3LF 30





















Table 30 indicates that deception has not played a
large part in generating surprise in the modes of style and
intention. It is difficult to conceal intention at the
tactical level and that is probably why that rode is
neglected. The style of battle is difficult to change. The
weapons mix Terrains fairly constant. The tactics are rarely
changed especially if they have been successful. There are
only so many technological advantages that are kept secret
until they can be used on the battlefield. Place, tire, a n I
strength are more readily changed and are the most corrci
elerrents of a deception plan.
Place includes such factors as the poir.t of the
attack, the area or width of the attack, and the direction or
axis of operations. The U.S. Army rses what is known as,
"intelligence preparation of the battlefield" (IPS). IFI
takes into account the known factors of the envi ronment in
both the enemy and friendly areas. Natural obstacles such as
mcurtain range?, rivers, heavy vegetation, e.n<i precipita-
tion often restrict the reverent of forces. Pan-Fade
features such as roads, Dridge-s, railroad s, levees, and towns
fan either restrict or assist operations.
The objective of IP2 is to identify possible avenues
of approach and determine the throughput capability for each
approach. Tne throughput capability is n n-eosu^e of the
rraximurr size of the force that can maneuver alo-y a
particular avenue and the speed with wnich the fo^ce can
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move. IPB is an analytic tool used to predict place, tire,
and strength. reception, however, ray oe based on attacking
over impassible terrain, durirg impossible weather, or ct
unprecedented speed.
The U.S. Army has a long tradition of doing the near
impossible. That is not an attribute of every arry. Ameri-
cans have developed a capability to think and do for them-
selves. This trait was needed in the early year:- simply in
order to survive. The problems of forcing the wilderness to
grant passage to the West developed engineering skills end
unique solutions. An Army of soldiers who grew up or. flat
land might never think to move across broken terrain.
IPS matches enemy doctrine and organization stereo-
types to the physical environment. The end result of I? F is
a perception. It is a strong perception because it 1? based
on detailed analysis and current intelligence. The defense
would use IPB to position combat forces and allocate ccmtat
support forces. The result could be that tne combat power is
raxirrized to block the expected main avenue of approach by
minimizing the force 'available elsewhere. In fact, large
areas in the defensive line may oe loosely defended or only
covered by aircraft uatrois. This style of dpfer.se i c highly
efficient if the enemy attacks according to the preconception
of his attack.
IPB is a formal method of performing a historical
intelligence task. Similar effort existed in many of tne
1 ?
data set cases. Barton Whaiey recorded, that in 20 of the 44
tactical surprise cases, the defender had forced a preconcep-
tion regarding where the attack was likely to occur. The
rrode frequencies for this data set which includes cases of
surprise without deception are shown in Table 31.
TABLE 31



















The data "set can be further restricted tc the If
cases where deception was -jonducted against an enemy who had
f erred d preconception. The assumption is made tnat the
deceiver rray have had knowledge of the preconception and may
have teen able to incorporate that Knowledge in the deception
plan. There is a requirement for a feedback channel as well
as a requirement for sufficient intelligence on the eremy
forces if the deception is to be based on preconcert ions .
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Corrparing Table? 29 and 32, it can be seen that there
is a general increase in the percentage of successful sur-
prise rrodes when deception is attempted against an enemy who
has forrred d preconception. The exception is the mode cf
style. This rray result from the inattention tc style when
planning a deception, frorr Q n inability to change style, or
frorr the fact that the defender did not form a preconception
as to style.
The next step is to look at the cases in which the
deceiver was aole to successfully reinforce the victim's
preconception. The data is split into two groups depending
on whether fthaley was able to determine successful rei~fort;e~
Trent of preconceptions or whether it just appeared to oe
successful. The difference between the two groups is net
obvious from the data. An assumption was made by the author
of this thesis that the difference in the way that the deia
was coded was based on an lack: cf direct evidence in sore of
the historical files. The difference Goes not seer tc ce
very important and no conclusions will oe based on it.
TJ.ELE 32






PLACE 8 88. y
TIME b bo.b









A tentative conclusion from Table 33 is that the
style and intention irodes of surprise should not be neglected
in deception planning. Tnese rrodes can be used successfully
to reinforce a target's preconception.
2- IlLterijity of Surprise 3ased 03 Numbers of Modes
Analysis of the intensity of surprise is required to
indicate the number of modes that should be combined and
which modes are optimum. These indications are necessary at
the tactical level because tirre and assets are lirrited. The
tactical level requires deception to optimize surprise in the
rrost efficient and cost effective manner.
It has already been shown that surprise is iirectly
related to the outcome of battle. The results of the 44
cdses of tdctical surorise can be correlated with the inten-
sity of surpri c e. The intensity used is that whicb is e
reflection of the number of moles in which the defender was
surorised .
TAELE 34
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As expected, surprise usually appears with multiple
modes. This is because surprise as to the place usually
coincides with surprise as to tire, strength, or roth. Sur-
prise of intensity ^our or five did exist but it was rare.
Almost half of the cases were of intensity two but there vds
no clear reason why. It would seem that it would require
more planning and execution resources to conduct deceptions
designed to induce surprise in multiple modes. The costs
would become very expensive because the effort is not linedr
in nature. lach item on the deception indicator set would
have to make sense in all five modes. .The payoffs for the
higher intensity deceptions would have to increase at T he
same rate in order to be cost effective.
Equating surprise intensity to the rattle payoff
reauires a quantitative method. The method used to assign
numerical values to the outcomes is a weighted system in
which the payoffs "V + ", "V", "V-", and "e" are assigned
values of 5, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. This is based on a
creak-even point of 2.b, but tne standard achievement hcped
*>or would be at least a 3.0.
The outcomes of ea^h battle are sorted by intensity
categories and then divided by the number of battles in the
category. The normalized values of the battle outcomes .en
be corrpared to tne achievement nun 1 hers as a direct reflection
of the expected value for that level of intensity. The next
Table was designed to include the probability o^ achieving an
1£0
overwhelming victory as that value may be xore irrporta.it in
sorre situations.
T A3L E 3
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Intensity level 2 exhibits the highest average
payoff. Applying this historical trend to future battle
would suggest that only two mcdts cf surprise are needed to
optimize the intensity. The penalty tor etteroting
additional modes of surprise is a more complex planning and
execution requirement.
Cases not involving deception are removed to produce:
TABLE 35
INTENSITY CF SURPRISE (DECEPTICN CASES
OUTCOME CF BATTLE




















It is seen that two thirds of the intensity one cases
were not the result of a forral deception operation. It i s
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clear that intensity two cases predominate with over fifty
percent of the total set. It is interesting that the cases
which produced an overwhelming, unexpected victory were
limited to tbe first three intensity levels. Intensity leveL
three appears to be good in that it contains no coses cf
defeat but the number of cases is small. The low number of
deceptions of intensity three or higher may al c o indicate the
increased difficulty of properly executing an elaborate
deception. The normalized value of the outcome? are:
TABLE 3?
F7PFCTEL VALUES CF DECEPTION CASES







Again, the surprise seems optimized at the second
level. Vhile the p i r>st three intensities have r.he historical
result of clear victory, intensity three has a l^ver prob-
ability of achieving overwhelming victory.
The probability of "v+" would be important to a
commander willing to accept a higher risk: to have ~ higher
protability of achieving an overwiielmi ig victor/. TV Tri
from Tables 35 and 37 could also oe looked at frcm trie view-
point o *" a commander who can not afford a decisive defeat.
U- 2
Risk aversion behavior would lead such a corrrcinder 10 plan
for achieving intensity level three. On an average, battles
of intensity three would produce a clear victory.
Following the sere trend that was used to evaluate
individual modes, the data set is reduced to the sixteen
cases of deception based on preconceptions naze by the e Gerry.
TABLE 38















As soon as The data was restricted to cases of decep-
tion based on the preconceptions of the enerry, all of tin
cases wnicn ended in defeat dropped out.
TABLE 39












Sufficient knowledge about the enemy produces a large
advantage. Expected value increased or stayed the same for
all levels of intensity. The probability of achieving
overwhelming victory increased or stayed the same. The
average expected value for a deception based on preconcep-
tions cf the enemy is 3.^-4. That seems significantly higher
than a clear victory value, 3.0.
3
- Inlenjity of Surprise EdSjd on Mode Grouping
Knowledge, of enemy preconceptions will provide the
key to be used in the determination of which modes of sur-
prise, should be attempted. The necessity to understand the
enemy before trying to deceive him remains valid. This
analysis of rode pdirs looks «t the results of historical
surprise and deception. Mode pairing rray have been by
design of the historical deception r.lainers. Mode pairing
may also indicate which rodes snould be combined.
This analysis is to investigate the effectiveness of
different pairs of surprise rodes. Each case cf intensity
two has a mode pa i r which was issigne? the value of the
outccrre of the battle. The 21 intensity two cases produce:
TA3LE 4tf
MOPE PAIR ANALYSIS AT INTENSITY TWO








The most common pairings were as expected . Place was
associated with either strength or time. The numbers in
Table 40 are not large enough to insure that averaging
resulted in a representative number for the battle outcome.
Averaging requires more numbers. More numbers are obtained
by adding the battle values for each case in which a noie
pair was included in a larger mode set. The results are
shown in Ta ble 41
:
T Ab I E ^ 1
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/ 1 1 ten possible pairings fcr the five moaes of
surprise are induced in Table 41. Trie rai£ ordering in
terms of expected value is surprising. There are refinements
that rust be rrade before opt imur mode pairs can be selectee1 .
i u i-.
The key di scrirri r.a tor used to select the desired data
set is the existence of preconceptions. There ore seven
intensity level two cases involving deception based on ore-
conceptions of the enerry. Place-strength is the dominant
rrode pair with four of the seven cases having that rroce pair.
Corrpdring the place-strength rrode pair using Tables 41 a nc 41
shows that the pair's expected value was suds tantially
different .
Pestricting the data set to the cases of deception
based or the preconceptions of the enemy will provide the set
from which the optirr'un- rode pair can be selected. The re-
sults of the analysis of that set are shown in the next
Table:
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Table 42 lists the mode pairs in order of decreasing
expected value. The table indicates that deception planning
in the past may have been based en what measures could be
done rather than on what should De done in order to optimize
surprise. The expected values and the frequencies of pairing
are not associated correctly. Still, the analysis shows that
the cases, where deception was based, on preconceptions, were
associated with battle outcomes that were better then those
shewn in Table 40. The conclusion is that the optimized
deception is the one that is based primarily on the precon-
ceptions of the enemy. If those preconceptions alio* a
choice, the mode pairs should be chosen oy expected value in
the order shown in Table 41. The pairs should not be chosen
by their ease of execution because an easy deception is not
necessarily an effective one.
4- Inteniiiy $f Surprise i.e.s ed on Tggree of ^ode
Surprise
The second measure cf intensity is the degree of
surprise achieved for any one mode. It would be reasonable
to expect that the rore the deception target is surprised,
the greater would be the effects of the 5urprise. There is
very little data, however, which differentiates between
"very surprised" and "surprised".
The first task in addressing this measure of
intensity of surprise was to see if tnere was a quantifiable
advantage associated with intensity levels. The net hod to do
this was to equate the battle outcomes using the previously
II:?
established number scheire . The rating of "very surprised"
was found in 25 battles. The average outcome o ? those
battles was 3.16. Those 25 battles were ta^en from the
larger tactical data set which had ar average outcome of 3.0.
The difference is not large enough to indicate an advantage.
The data set was restricted to the cases which in-
volved tactical deception based on enemy preconceptions. The
number of cases from that set that had the "very surprised"
rating was ten. Those ten cases had ar average outcome of
3.1. That outcore was slightly better than that of the cases
that were not based on preconceptions, but t.ne difference
between 2.8 and 3.1 does net appear significant.
The tactical data set oC cases which had the very
surprised" rating included nine cases that did not involve a
deception operation, though the enemy had formed a precon-
ception. These nine cases had an average outcome of 3.44.
There was no apparent difference between the data sets other
than those already noted. Cases where t.ne enemy was "very
surprised" in two or three mode c did not have a higher value
then tnose of only one mode.
TALLE 43





















Table 43 snows that the eneiry is more often "very
surprised" by unexpected strength than ty any ether rede.
The observation is of no practical interest, however, since
that knowledge cdtinot be put to use. The analysis indicates
that there is no apparent advantage in pursuing a high degree
of surprise in any mode. The deception plan should be diver-
sified to induce surprise in several rrodes rather than
focused on one mode only.
5 « Zlfict of Security on Surprise
This analysis verified that if the victim's intelli-
gence branch warned, the victim of impending attack, such
warning had an adverse effect on surprise. The tactical cose
required both 3 and C lists of battles to be considered as
shown below:
TA3LI 44
EFFECT OF WARNING ON TACTICAL SURPRISE
LIST TYPE NO
E WARNING GIVE!* ^5
B NO EARNING 22
C WARNING GIVEN 4 6









Table 44 inricates that the three cases of deception
that did not produce surprise were due tc efficiency of eneny
intelligence in providing warning. The Table also shows that
the effect of warning produced a disadvantage whether sur-
prise was ultimately achieved or not. That disadvantage is
more obvious wher the tactical data of Table 44 is combined.
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TABLE 45
OVERALL EFFECT OF WARNING
CASE TYPE NUMBER OUTCOME
WARNING GIVEN 71 2.0
NO WARNING 30 2.77
6. Effect of Schedule Changes on Surprise
False alerts sorretirres produce a " Cry ivoif" effect.
The "Cry Wolf" effect is a desensitizing of a force that
occurs when it repeatedly responds to a threat that does not
materialize. This effect has bee-" associated with strategic
deception in rrany sources including Whaley's 1969 study e.r.d
the 1962 book edited by Daniel ana Herbig, Strategic Military
2§ii§Ption. Frofessor
t
Jiri Valenta of tiie Naval Postgraduate
School made the follow. ng point in his 1962 article, "Soviet
Use of Surprise and reception". He wrote;
"The rrost effective form of Soviet irilitary decep-
tion during the Czechoslovak crisis was pr^baDly the
continuing series of military exercises. Although they
were probably intended by the Soviet Union tc threaten
Czechoslovakia with an invasion, paradoxically they ray
have desensitized the Czechoslovak and Western leaders ar.
a
analysts to the very possibility of invasion." [Pef. 132J
The author of this thesis totally agrees that the
"Cry Wolf effect does cccur in peacetime and in w c r . Mili-
tary training exercises near the tense borders associated
with the Federal Republic of Germany and with the Republic of
Korea fit the "Cry Wolf" pattern. The "cry Wolf" effect does
occur at the operational level as well as the strategic
lt"0
level, but the "Cry Wolf effect is less often associated
with schedule changes at the tactical level. The reason f'or
this is probafcly associated with time.
Strategic operations might be delayed for long
periods of tinre as it is often necessary to have long periods
of favorable weather to mount such an operation. The long
periods between threats provide sufficient time recover from
the initial anxiety of the threat. The emotion that is
remembered is the feeling of relief when the threat passed.
Repeated false alerts for the sane threat might generate
"wish*\;l thinking" that the next alert will be false as well.
relays of tactical operations are usually short in duration.
Tactical delay? might resrit from planning that did not allow
sufficient lag time for chance events that upset the tire-
table -Tor the operation. The tactical plan may he delayed
for three days, for ex c mple, if the ammunition for the opera-
tion arrived three days late.
The deception data base includes irany examples of
battles that were postponed one or more times due to a ryriac
of factors. There were examples o * enemy false alerts caused
by anticipating the original schedule. The "Cry tfolf" effect
has teen observed in relation to the operational level, but
usually the delays were not long erough t ~> reduce the enemy's
anxiety level caused by the initial threat. It is necessary
to analyse whether the schedule changes reliably produce the
desensitizing effect.
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Changing the timing of an attach produces a risk of
disclosure that is due to the posturing of units or to the
comrunica tions used to implement the corcrrand and control.
Increased corrrruni cat ions would be necessary whether the
change was a delay or whether the change was an advance. The
risk to the operation should he less for the advanced
schedule as the new schedule provides less tirre for the
enerry to react .
The analysis of the effect of schedule charges was
designed to verify if the historical data support the
intuitive conclusion above. The following Table addresses
the effect of schedule changes on the outccre of hattle.
TABLE 4fc
EFEEC1 OF SCHEDULE CHANGES ON EXPECTED V*L T ?E
LIST TiPE NUMBER
B ENEMY WARNED 14
B NO WARNING 9
C ENEMY WARNED id







The overall probability that the enerry received
warning was 71.4 percent for the cases that involved schedule
':ha^ges. The average outcome of battle was r^uch higher for
the cases where no warning was t ive~\. The 32 cases where
warning was present included only 14 cases whe-e surprise was
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still achieved. Nine of those cases involved deception which
may have beer able to reduce the effects of the warning.
The 42 cases included seven where the schedule of the
attack was advanced. The average outcome of those cases was
2.43. The 25 cases of delayed schedules had an average
outcome of 1.97. The difference in outcome is sufficient to
support the idea that a schedule advance is less risky than a
schedule delay.
relaying an operation is usually no more tn c n a date
change. A projected start time of I-day, H-hour, is charged
and the people who need to know are informed of the change.
There are certain events such as the arrival of supplies sod
ammunition which result in rumors, tut for the most part the
specific dates for an operation are not releasee. £n opera-
tion is plctnned bo-sed on time relative to D-day, F-hour.
The^e are two reasons why this tiding is used. The *n i'St
reason is that coordination and training can oe done without
reference to a specific ddte. If tne date changes, there
will be no change in relative time so there is no con fusion
generated by the nate change. The second reason is to
protect the security of the projected date.
The point is, that the delaying of an operation is
not necessarily the seme as "Crying Wolf". Tne "Cry Wolf"
situation seems applicable only ?or these cperatio-s in whi :h
a country or an army is repeatedly placed on alert for an
attack which never comes. The alerts tecorre routine and tne
16.3
soldiers fail to respond properly when the attack does
happen. That type of situation is rore appropriate for the
strategic level where repeated demonstrations at a border ^ay
"be done in the forrr of a peacetime training exercise.
The peacetime training exercises produce a ^reat deal
of threat, cut there is a return to a perioi of reduced
anxiety cnce the exercise is over. It is questionable
whether the same reduction in anxiety occurs in military
forces on the battlefield during war. There are periods
between battles that can be associated with reduced threat.
There may not be any periods of reduced anxiety.
The "Cry Volf" situation should generate the effect
that after repeated false alerts, the expected value of the
outcome from the point of view of the attacking force should
increase. This does not happen at the tactical level for the
cases which were the result of delayed schedules.
TAEII 47

























?• II.f.££t of Individual Deception Measures
The measures which can be used for deception 9re
countless. "Fach depends on the situation and the only lirrit
would seem to be the imagination of the deception planner.
FM 90-2, Tactical reception, provides twelve examples of
deception techniques which mainly apply to the o^ense ar.i
sixteen which mainly apply to the defense. The manual disc
provides ten deception ideas designed to trigger the imagina-
tion cf the deception planner. The three ideas proposed in
the manual are: (1) that each situation is different anc
requires different deception indicators, (?) tfadt each lecep-
Tion plan must execute the measures that support tne decep-
tion story, and (3) that there is no rar.*c ordering of
deception measures that applies to all situations.
The author of this thesis agrees with t.ne above ideas
with one exception. Tne exception is that the demonstration
or diversionary attack should be avoided. The demonstration
is the only ruse which by definition uses combat forces.
This ruse ray require a reduction in forces available to
conduct the main operation and tne forces *ay oe lost once
they rake contact wi T h the enemy. The ruse r<=>y create
diversions which allow a n overall victory but it may not maKe
up for weakening the main force. The demonstration force may
suffer excessive casualties.
There were eleven cases in the tactical data set
where deception included at least one case of demonstration.
ie:
The average outcome for those tattles was 2.54. The average
result for the rest of the battles utilizing deception was
3.44. The difference is significant. The difference indi-
cates that utilizing combat forces in a diversionary attack
is less effective than using ruses of other form. A compari-















Table 48 suggests that the feint produces the sare
deception effect without requiring combat forces to become
engaged with the enemy. The combat -orces can be usea tc
tetter advantage with less risk if they are used for the
feint. "For that matter, combat forces are not required.
The feint ray be tasked to combat support or combat service
support units.
The analysis also shews that using both a feint end a
demonstration in the same deception may be counterpr court ive.
The attempt to introduce a higher level of ambiguity in the
place mode of surprise, may tip the enemy to the fact that
deception is being employe'-.
Ice
Barton Whaley recorded the number and types of decep-
tion treasures that were employed in or prior to each tactical
operation. The data set of interest includes the 47 cases of
tactical surprise and /or deception. The relative freq-
uencies of each major type of ruse are shown in the next
Table.
TABLE 49




















As many as six different types o v ruses were found in
some tactical battles in the data set. Tne analysis was
surprising in that the more elaocrate deceptions did not
produce a higher proportion of surprise. T he number of ruses
was compared to battle outcome in the following tacle.
TAIL? b'd
NUMBER OF RUSES VERSUS OUTCOME
NUM3FP OF RUSES NUM3EH OF CA.[ ;zs AVI[RAGE OUTCOME
14 2.f7
1 9 3.22
2 8 3 .375
3 11 3 .27
4 3 2.33
p 1 1 .0
e 1 2 • k!
TOTAL 47 2.93
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Table 50 indicates that the number of rrajcr ruses
used in a deception should be between one and tnree. That
nurrber could easily relate to the number of modes of surprise
that the deception is designed to generate. There may be any
number of individual deception measures that support o^e
ruse
.
There are deception neasures which are usea to
display false indicators or ambiguity for the deception
story. The case histories orovided examples of the following
tyues of measures:
TAELF 51
INCEPTION MEASURES TO LIS PLAY TEE FALSE
Edlse radio traffic, timing, sounds, or movement.
Fake lighting schemes, dummy personnel and equipment.
Controlled agents, political negotiations, press reports
Simulations, displays, command visits, false roads.
Set up a false pattern that has logic the enemy expects.
Present peaceful scene at the FIGT until the last rri~ute
False training which focuses on alternate operation.
T4 3LE 52
DECEPTION MEASURES TO CREATE AMBIGUITY
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The deception measures can be anything at all. The
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!• ^iiJci fp.inis developed Through Case History Analysis
Surprise an? deception are commonly associate!,
although surprise can he achieved without employing decep-
tion. The data analysis revealed that usin-3 deception
effectively seems to almost guarantee that surprise will h e
achieved at the strategic level. further, tne conditional
ie
probability of tactical surprise given deception was .89.
The offense can partially rely on the initiative to
produce surprise. The defense has a rruch greater need, for
deception to produce surprise.
Surprise unaided by deception is in decline. Decep-
tion usually produces surprise. The probability of achieving
at least a clear victory is highest when both surprise and
deception are present.
Uncontrolled channels can cause even the most
elaborate deception to fail.
Operations conducted in a predictable manner commonly
end j n d ef eat
.
Any technological surprise rapildly loses its
effectiveness once it is used.
The use of deception results in a casualty reduction.
Surprise enhances force ef f ec ti venees . The af orerentioned
enhancement in combat power due to surprise and/or deception
diminishes as the actual force ratio nears and then exceeds a
three to one advantage ^or the attacker.
The force effectiveness ratio obtained oy multiplying
the force ratio and the casualty ratio experienced, in o-ior
battles may be used to uredict whether an addition c c m t' a t
power rultipiier such as deception is needed for success in a
future operation.
Territory exchange is a valid criterion for reasuring
the outcome of battle. The attack that utilized deception
1?0
produced a clear advantage in territorial gain over the
attack that did not utilize deception.
Surprise has two dimensions: variety and intensity.
Intensity is a rreasure of degree of effect. Increasing
intensity by number of modes is rrore beneficial than
increasing a single rrode intensity. The style and attention
modes of surprise should not ce neglected in ceception
planning. Only two modes of surprise are necessary to opti-
mize the surprise intensity.
Feints should be used in preference to demonstrations
and the twc should never be used together.
Ceception is best when it is based on preconceptions
forrrer1 ry the enemy.
Allowing the enemy to oe warned of an impending
operation produces disadvantages, regardless of surprise.
A failure to deceive the enemy rarely results in a
penalty to the deceiver. The enemy gains aiT^st nothing from
the identification of deception signals as deception.
Knowing what is false does not necessarily indicate anything
about what is true. The deception effort T a y re wasted, but
that small cost nepd not nave any effect en the real opera-
tion. The e/ception is if essential forces are used in a
feint or a demonstration. £ penalty would result if those
forces were una hie tc gain a required objective that w a s
essential to success. A penalty would also result if those
force? were attrited during the battle.
1?1
Schedule changes often result in the enemy being
warned, thus they should be avoided. relaying an operation
is worse than advancing a schedule. Multiple deferments do
not necessarily produce the "Cry Volf" effect; however the
possibility does exist.
The nurrber of major ruses used in a deception should
be between one and tbree. The actual number woulr tepe^rj on
the situation. The trey is keeping the plan cost effective.
? « Confidence Evaluation
The case history data set required the assumption of
representativeness and the data set is limited to cases that
are rot classified. The recorded data nay be biase' at
least two ways. Cne bias may be due to inaccuracy in the
historical records used by tfhaley as sources of information.
A second bias right erist in the way that Whaley coded the
data. These biases must be checked os they may have intro-
duced bad data into the data base. The total effect of 03c
data in the data set is not clear. The data set was accepted.
by the Central Intelligence Agency, however, and does con-
tain much excellent information.
There are two thing? that can be done to increase
confidence in the data and the analysis of this thesis. The
first approach is to make a comparison of the data and the
analysis results with the data and analysis results o f an
established research group. The comparison will be ra&e with
the worir done vy the Fistoricnl Evaluation and Fesearch
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Organization (E5B0) in support of their Quantified Judgment
Method of Analysis of Fistorical Combat Lata (QJPA). The
second approach will be to do a sensitivity- analysis or the
nurrerical weighting scheme used in this thesis to represent
the expected values of battle outcomes.
Colonel T.N. Dupuy's book, Numbers^ Predictors & War,
included a list of selected battle statistics [?ef. 134]
which included 22 battles from the sarre tine period covered
by Whaley's deception data base? 15 of those battles were
analyzed in the 1969 study by Whaley. In all tut one case,
there was agreement between lupuy and Whaley as to which c i,e
was the victor end which side was the defeated. The case
that was different was the Battle of the Ardennes in 1944.
Dupuy classed the battle as a German victory, .vndey classed
the battle a c a German defeat. The difference was one of
scope. Whaley's case analysis w d s only on the German
counterattack wnich eventually did end in German defeat. ^he
difference in methods of historical research used by Whcley
and T-jpuy does not seem significantly large.
Colonel Dupuy die not classify battle outcomes to the
same degree that Whaley did. luuuy's closest comparison tc
the "v + ", "v", "V-" f and "e" outcomes recorded by Whaley .-/as
a short listing of "Quick Wins", "Almost Quick A'ins," end
"Stalemates." [Vef . 135] Using a rating scheme which equates
"v + " ar.c "Quick Win" to 5.0, "V and "Almost Quick win" to
3.7, and th° "v-" ai d "stalemate" to 2.?; this Table emerges:
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TABLE £4
COMPARISON CI VICTORY CRITERIA
DUPUY 'S NO. AVE WEALIT 's NO . AVE
CRITIPIA CASES VALUE CRITERIA CAS7S VALUE
QIICK WINS 4 5.0 "v^" 4 4.0
ALMOST CUICK WINS 3 3.0 "v" 3 3.67
STALEMATES 3 2.0 "V-" 7 ^.43
The comparison would remain valid regardless c f the
weighting scheme used "because Wha ley's "V-" ratings were only
found in the cases that correspondec to "stalemates."
Whdley's "V + " ratings were found, associated with "Quick vins"
in all but. one case which was an
"
Alrrost Quick Win." The
comparison w d s made to show that Whdley's datd wd s net
significantly biased oy his coding uriteria. The lack A f a
significant bids is shown by the Table as long as there vds
not an equal tias in Tupuy's work.
Colonel Dupuy published his book. NurnfcerSj. Predictors
S. War, in order to describe the andlytical model, QJMA. The
"booK is detailed in regdrds to the model but does not include
very rrany details for his examples from history. Tunuy 5?.*
the PERO group developed their model from the motherra ti cal
interaction numbers that were calculated from historical
battles, but the book really only included detdiled
statistics from one battle. Tne details of the Sorixe
Offensive [He"1 . 13P] in Dupuy 's dook: can oe compared to
174
similar details presented by ^'haley [Kef, 137] as shown in
the fallowing Table.
TABLE 55
SOMMF OFFENSIVE TATA COMPARISON
CRITERIA LtJPUY DATA WfiALEY DATA
FORCES 600,000 GERMAN TO 71 DIVISIONS TO
250,000 ALLIES 29 DIVISIONS
FORCE RATIO 2.4 TO 1.0 2.45 TC 1.0
CASUAITIFS 200,000 TO 240,000 343,000 TO 330,000
CAS. RATIO .83 TC 1.0 1.05 TO 1.0
TERRITORY PEASF 1: 30 KM 1200 SOUARE MILES
EXCHANGE PEASE 2: 12 K^ (PER 60 MILE FRONT)
TOTAL = 42 KM EQUATES TO 40 KM
SURPRISE GERMAN SURPRISE GERMAN SURPRISE
FACTCH (SLIGHT) (NO PRECONCEPTIONS)
I
OUTCOME SLIGFT GERMAN VICTORY "V-" FOR JFI 1ANS
ARTILIERY 6,473 TUBES 6,000 TUBES
r'ORTAPS 3,532 TUBES 3,000 TU1ES
^able ^^: shews that Whaley and Pvjpvy recorded almost
exactly the sare data for the So Fire Offensive. There was a
slight difference in scope and Dupvy di a brea'-r the battle
into two phases; however, tne Soffc example indicates that
Whaley 's research and ceding was at least as accurate as that
done hy Lupuy. In fact, Eupuy adrrits thdt he use-: only tnree
secondary sources [Pef. 133] while Whaley cites 16 references
and provides 11 direct quotes to sucport his analysis of the
case (Ref. 13S] .
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Colonel lupuy and his HERO associates decided as
military historians that tne outccrre of the buttle should oe
assessed on the oasis of three outcomes: (1) accomplishment
of the opposing missions, (2) effectiveness in relation to
ground gained or lost, and (3) casualty effectiveness [Hef.
142]. The OJMA model compares relative comDat effectiveness
using up to 73 separate variables in an algorithm which
determines the influence of environmental and operational
variables upon the force strengths of the two opponents. If
the algorithm result is different from that predicted by the
combat power ratio, further analysis is dene to explain the
discrepancy. The discrepancy is usually due to behavior
considerations [Ref. 141]. The model is important because it
is the only known model that reliably rep L esents real-life
combat over the course of history. The nedJl WDr v s so veil,
that Lupuy wrote,
"in 1S7S it was the only model that orovides a t?asis
for confidence that it can extrapolate realistically tc the
future, permitting reliable proces within ranges of future
possibilities." [Hef. 142]
Lupuy's model dees not de«l with deception, but it
does deal with surprise as perhaps the most important opera-
tional effect that is not quantifiable in the combat power
ratio. The calculations for Dupuy's model account "or three
major effects of surprise. The first effect is or. the
mobility o f the surprising feroe. Mobility is enhanceo oy
permitting optimum disposition of troous oefore tne attack.
The second effect is to increase the vulnerability of the
1VC
surprised force. The vulnerability is increased by the
surpriser's ability to place fire unexpectedly and accurate-
ly. The third effect is to decrease the vulnerability of the
surprising force. That vulnerability is decreased through
pre-planning and pre-posit ioning of forces. [Ref. 143] The
values that are used in the QJMA calculations are as follows.
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The total surprise using the ujma algorithm takes
into account the interaction of n"any factors. The influence
of surprise is different for each battle. The QJ^A data base
includes 52 rattles in which the surprise effect was calcu-
lated. The results are shown in the next Table.
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There are two observations that can be made in rela-
tion to Table 57. The first is that Eupuy's calculations
indicate that surprise has a significant effect on the
battlefield. That observation is not surprising in itself,
but the degree of effect is surprising. The average case of
battlefield surprise between 1940 and 196? resulted in d two
thirds Increase in combat, power. That large effect provic.es
support for the observations made in this thesis and suggest
that Vhaley's data is, at least, roughly accurate. The
second observation is that the surprise effect in the lb?3
War wns 134 percent cf that of the earlier set of w c rs. The
increased technology or the battiefielc in 1973 did not
reduce the effect o* surprise. The trend shewn by Dupuy's
data is that surprise is now even more important now than it
was for earlier wars. Dupuy n'aie the following observation:
"in the last century there has not been a single change
in weapon s technology with as great statistically
measurable irpact on war as the transition to
rifled small arms in the 1840s and 1850s. The reasor.
for this is that the principle weapon of w a r is, and
always has been, ^ar hi m self. Thus the nature o" warfare
has changed only in its details .sometimes dramatically,
but always relatively slowly) as man adapts himself and his
thinking to new weapons and new technology." (Kef. 145j
Tupuy's QJ^i rrodei is applicable to morer~ war with
modern weapons. It has reproduced the results of the 1973
October War, even though no other -^odel available in 1979
for use by or in service to the Department of Tefer.se cculd
do so. [Kef. 146]
l?d
The QJMA model provides the ability to extend the
application of this thesis to include nod em war. If man is
the principal weapon of war, then the ability tc predict the
human decision criteria regains an essential military
requirement. The ability to manipulate that decision to
provide a combat advantage remains Valid. Modern sensors on
the battlefield do net necessarily make deception rrore diffi-
cult. Modern sensors allow mere channels that can be used
to send information to the enerv in order to iranipulate the
eneny 's decisions .
Comparison of Whaley's data and results tc Eupuy's
data and results has showr that the two sets are very
sirrilar. That produces a fair amount of confidence in
l
Whaley's data. This thesis has kept very clcsp to the data
provided by Vhaley with only one exception. That exception
is the use o^ numbers to represent the value of the battle
outcomes recorded "by Vhaley.
It is necessary to examine whether the selective
choice of values to represent the results o j" battle biases
the average expected values presented in sere ef the Tories
in this thesis. The valve scheme used in Tables 3b to 52 was
used in order to provide a quick reference number. That
value scheme could be shifted along the nvmber line and still
represent the relative values of "V 4-", "v", V-" , and "T" .
The relative weighting of the values can ce changed by





THESIS SCHEME A 5
OPTION 1 3 5
OPTION 2 C 5
OPTION 3 TJ 5













The different options include both linear and non-
linear shifts in the weighting of outcomes. Selective
analysis using the different weighting scherres will indicate
whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the
weighting) scheme. Table 11 was chosen for the analysis as it
was the ..able with the largest number of factors fcr wnich
the expected values were calculated. A comparison was Te: 2
among the five weighting schemes.
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7 3.14 2.71 7.71
19 •7 rxK 2.68 2.6b
4 3.0 2. 5 2.6
13 2.92 2.54 2.54
e 2.83 2.33
18 2.72 2.11 2 .0
7 2.71 2.14 2.14
2 2.e 2./ 2.0













Table 59 can be used to show that, the analysis re-
sults are not sensitive to changes in the weighted values.
Sensitivity is demonstrated by the relative ordering of the
rrode pairs. That ordering Terrains essentially unchanged ever
the five sets of weighting options. The rrode pair "TiTe-
Place" does have a tendency to drop slightly below the rrode
pair "strength-Style" as emphasis is placed on the "r" out-
come. The difference is not signif leant . Code pairs "Ti^e-
Strength" and "Time-Style" change places wnen weighting
schemes B and C are used. The difference is only 0.04 arc
that cannot be considered significant. The rest of the
relative rankings remained unchanged as follows:
TAiLE 60
"OIE PAlP RANKING 3Y WEIGHTING OPTION
RANKING FRO!" FIGEEST VALUE TO LOWEST (BY OPTION)






























Sensitivity analysis will re applied to one more
Table in order to confirir that the choice of value systerr
does not bias the analysis. Table 58 was used tc calculate
the following results for the options:
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TABLE 61













2.84 2.28 2. If
2.125 1.25 1 .0
1.54 0.56
The three weighting options shewn in Tdtle 61 all hod
the sarre value associated with "V+" ant "v". This is
irrportHnt because the intent cf the original tafcle was to
show the effect of warning and surprise en the achievement cf
the "Clear Victory" outcoire with its value being 3.0.
Options B dnd C retain the Sdme order of decreasing value for
the four different situations. This supports the idea that
the results are not sensitive to the choice of weighting
scherre.
It is possible, of course. to devise a weighting
scherre that changes the order of the outcorres. It is oc T
possible to do it without introducing a bias that accentuates
the effect of defeat in a totally obvious rr anner.
Different options do change the scale o ? the mnbers
that are represented. This r&y rr iu: some trends rore
visible, but tnere are only two important issues shown in the
Table. Trp first is that warning given to the e^ery has a
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negative irrpact. The second is that the surprise that is
associated with list B cases has a positive impact. Tne
expected valve should oe viewed as a means of easily repre-
senting these trends rather than as an accurate means of
anticipating future outcomes.
There was much rrcre good data than was expected. The
data was looked at ^ro^ numerous points of analysis and the
results were consistent. Analysis of tne data was dene in «
cautious manner that should have reduced the effects of bias.
The magnitude o+* the differences in the analysis results and
the consistency of the differences establish the author's
confidence that the data is representative.
The consistency between the results of the -ase
history analysis and tne theoretical analysis is hi.--h. The





The theoretical analysis and the case history analysis
support three train conclusions. The first conclusion is that
deception has played a dominant role in the tattles of this
century. The second conclusion is that deception will
continue to play an important part in future wars. The third
conclusion is that optimal deception practices can be identi-
fied cased en the theoretical analysis and the empirical
analysis .
A. I*PCETANC? OF PAST USF OF DECEPTION
The case history analysis section of this thesis indi-
cated the positive effect that deception has had cr. the
following evaluation criteria: producing victory, reducing
casualties, increasing force effectiveness, end increasing
territory exchanged. The primary element that produced r ne
operational advantages was the elerent of surprise. Surprise
is a byproduct of a successful deception, but it i c- not the
goal. The goal for deception is the operations! advantage.
Operational deception has oee^ important throughout the
period covered by the case history analysis. 'J h.e advantages
have beer summarized earlier and do not ^eed tc oe repeated
in detail. In general, the advantages of operational mili-
tary deception that were shown in this thesis are similar to
the strategic deception advantages shown by Barton V ha ley.
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The operational advantages of deception were cevelcped
through analysis of each evaluation criterion. The four cri-
teria are measures of effectiveness. Three of the criteria,
producing victory, reducing casualties, and increasing the
ability to gain or hold ground are the same as the measures
of effectiveness used by Colonel Eupuy and EIRO associates in
the quantifying of battle outcomes [?.ef. 147]. The fourtn
criterion, increasing force effectiveness, is comparable to
the surprise variable factors used by Dupuy to modify tne
combat power ratio in the OJMA model [Ref. 1 48 J . Tne CJm*A
data base included 34 cases between 1943 and 1967 for which
the surprise effect was calculated. The average result shewn
in Table 57 was a two-thirds increase in combat yc^er . That
number verifies the importance of past use a* deception by
the offense.
It is not possible to conclude that deception done by the
defense is as important as deception done for the offense.
There are indications that it may be even more important, but
there are not enough historical examples to support any
conclusion .
3. FUTURE IMPORTANCE 01 OPERATIONAL II'CSPTION
Modern war was not covered in tne case history analysis.
This thesis projects the importance af deception ir future
wars using tne postulate that human nature ice^ not change.
War is fought by men who control and direct machines not only
by machines .
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It has already teen pointed out that the QJ^A analysis of
the surprise effect in the 1973 war was 134 percent larger
than the same effect for the Tupuy set of wars between 1940
and 1967. The relationship betwen surprise and deception at
the operational level has been established. The conclusion
is that deception should be even more important in rr.od.ern war
than it has been in the past.
C. OFTIMAL riCIPTTON PFACTICFS
Chapter II listed +'ive categories which could be
associated with successful deception operations: (1)
secrecy, organization, and coordination; (2) plausibility
and confirmation; (3) adaptability; (4) predispositions of
the target; and (5) initiative.
1 • Sfc.recy^ CrgdnizaXicrij. sHi iOoMindti on
The first conclusion is that a successful deception
does not happen by accident. Deception requires detailed
planning and precise execution .
The case history analysis confirmed that secrecy must
he rramtained. Allowing the enemy to become warned produces
a disadvantage whether surprise is achievea or not. There
are two levels o p secrecy that trust tie maintained. It is
necessary to protect the security of the operations plan and
it is necessary to protect the security of the deception.
There is no general r v le at tne operational level that Says
one is rare important than the other, but perhaDS there
should be. The operations plan is the critical one.
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Organization is necessary if the deception is to be
executed as it was planned. Organization reauires trained
personnel with sufficient knowledge about the tasking to
portray the false. When deception tasks are assigned io
several units there is a requirement to provide detailed
execution guidance. The best forr of execution guidance i c
probably the deception implementation schedule because it can
be detailed enough tc answer the who, what, when, where, and
how the deception task is to be accompllsne The lrrrle-
rrentation schedule can also be used to coordinate the decep-
tion plan with the operation plan.
There is one excellent example which provides strong
support for the conclusion that deception needs secrecy,
organization, and coordination. The example is provided fcy
the unit history of the 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops
during World War II. That unit was the only U.S. Army unit
activated, trained, and equipped specifically for the pur-
poses of tactical deception. [Ref . 14SJ The unit conducted
21 deception operations in the European Theatre from June
1944 tc June 194£ using raoic deception, iecoys, scnic recep-
tion, and impersonation of other units [Ref. 150]. The
conclusion for the need for organization, coordination, and
secrecy can be evaiuatea against the lessons learned from the
operations cf the 23rd Headquarters.
The Tactical Operations Analysis Office, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, published Interir Note Number -11 which rede
18?
the following summary as an evaluation of that unit:
"There were three principle lessens which the 23rd
Headquarters learned regarding their employment of
tactical deception. First, there was a need for close
coordination "between the 23rd Headquarters and all real
troops involved in a deception operation. Second, c
deception operation must be thoroughly planned to the
last detail. Third, it is* necessary to insure authenticity
in a deception operation. The false picture that presented
to enemy intelligence must appear completely authentic and
plausible in every aspect. Lack- of close coordination ^s
responsible for
i%
the failure of the 23rd Headquarters
earlier missions." [Hef. 151]
The conclusion of the report stated that, "Even
though there were instances where the 23rd Headquarters
failed to accomplish their mission, due to poor intelligence.
or incomplete security measures, there is not one occasion of
such a failure leading to a military defeat friendly
forces [Pef. 152]. That is a fairly interesting conclusion,
not just because it supports the need for secrecv and organi-
zation, but because it addresses what happens if the decep-
tion fails. If the deception fails, it does not necessarily
tell the enerry anything that helps him The enemy rev ow
what is not real, but he still does not enev what to do cbout
it.
There is one further point that can oe made about
coordination which provides an example of what can happen if
the deception plan is not compared to the operations plan.
23rd Fecdquarters provided three forces in 3 deception to
assist the U.S. Ill Corps' attccK on the port of Ire-:,
France, 'roir 21 through 2V August 1944. Force "X" simulated
the 15th I a n K Patt.alion in the crEa of the 9th Infantry
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Pegiment, 2Sth Infantry n vision. Force "x" did a good job
of deception in that the S-2 of the 9th Regiment reported
that the enemy installed from 2<Z to 52" more anti-tank guns
after the "X" operation. Unfortunately, "x" deceived the
enemy into "believing that the tanks were going to attack from
exactly where they did. Company C, 709th Tank Eatlaien,
attacked directly in the face of the reinforced German anti-
tank defenses. [Ref. 153]
2 « Plausibility and Confirmation
The operation plan and the deception plan must be
different enough so that the essential forces of the opera-
tion are protected, but they must re similar enough tc
support enemy collection of the deception signals. The enemy
sensors will he searching for indications of the real plan.
The sensors do not search blindly. They are directed by the
collection requirements which are basea on whet the enemy
thinks the real plan will be.
The enemy wilL De able to eliminate many of the
options that are not prcbahle. The enemy would rot seriously
consider that untrained troops would be used in a massive
airmobile operation. The enemy would also hesitate to accept
a deception story involving ari armored brigade attack over
swampy terrain with no existing roads. Such operations Tight
be possible, but would rarely be attempted. They would not
seer olausifcle to the enemy. They would not seem very
plausible to the friendly commander end staff, as veil.
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An important consideration in deciding whether the
eneiry will accept the plausiblity of the deceptior story is
determining whether the deception plan might be acceptable as
the real plan. A variant of one o^ the discarded options for
the operations plan might make an excellent choice for a
deception. The enemy does not have perfect intelligence and
might be easily convinced that the logic of the operatic
requires the deception choice. Cdre would have to be taken
to insure that the discarded option is sufficiently different
from the operations plan as each option that is presented at
the commander 's- course of action briefing coe« share a large
proportion of common features. The common features establish
the "skein of truth" for the deception plan.
The features common to the deception and the opera-
tion [Tay not need to be portrayed. Those features involve
real forces conducting real operations which just happen to
support the deception story. Security for the common
features could he relaxed if doing so does rot produce
excessive danger, but even normal security will not be per-
fect. The enemy can ne expected to irtercept many n- the
indicators of such activity. Providing an alternate explana-
tion 'or the activity should help protect the security of the
operations plan.
The critical aspects of the ouerations plan rust ne
provided increased security so that con t ra H ictory signals are
not presented to the enemy. The critical aspects of the
deception plan need to be presented to credible sensors in a
[ranner that allows the signals tc oe rrutually supporting.
The number of sources that con-firm a fact and the credibility
of the sources are both important and thej r effects interact.
Knowledge of what the enemy will accept as plausible
and what degree of conf irmati-on is necessary before he will
believe a fact is a firm requirement for a successful decep-
tion. Knowledge of the enemy organization is the key to
prediction of how the enemy will react to the information he
receives. Much of the information he receives will oe real,
but it can be combined with deceptive information to produce
a plausible but false picture for the enemy commander. As
the false conception builds and is supported by confirming
signals, the enemy will tend to ignore or n 1 c i nt er pret r.he
details that do not "it.
3 . AdaptaMLi tjr
The deception must be a Die to change as reality
changes. The deception normally begins before the real
operation begins. If the real operation is changed after the
deception has started, it may oe impossible ir. support the
criminal deception plan. The signals that were pert, of the
"skein of truth" would prooasly De contradictory tc the
deception signals. There cire three options available in s 'cii
a situation: ( 1 ) abandon the deception, (
^
) continue T h
e
deception and hope that it a t least produces sere ambiguity,
or (?) adapt the deception tc support the new reality '
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the pew operation. It is obvious that the thira option would
be the most beneficial. It would also be the rrost difficult.
The ability to adapt a deception might require that
the deception signals nave more than one possible explana-
tion. The desired explanation would evolve from the enemy's
analysis of the composite set of signals. An adaptable
deception story might become very complex.
A conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary
to at least plan to execute an adaptable deceotion opera-
tion. It is necessary because of the systems theory applica-
bility to deception. It is not just the friendly situation
that changes. The enemy situation and the overall environ-
ment can change. The simple deception plan that has only one
explanation may deviate from the system reality tec soon tc
receive confirmation. That Fay be acceptable to maintain an
ambiguity producing deception but not to maintain a rislead-
i ng type deception. The misleading type deception is
considered the optimal choice.
Ar adaptable deception requires the ability to rea:t
to change and also requires knowledge about when to ree»*t.
The ability to react to change is a function of planning or.d
execution flexibility. The ability to know when a change is
needed is a function of coordination arc intelligence.
Flexibility in deception planning requires "li^
Picture" knowledge o^ what is really happening on the Battle-
field. That experience and expertise is not available under
the present system at division level where the deception
officer is usually a coordinating staff officer working in
the G3 plans section. Even if a deception planning section
was authorized and trained to the necessary level of ex-
pertise, it would be difficult to Keep such an element in-
formed to the "3ig Picture" level. Thus, the expertise ;:ou.ld
be provided by a trained deception officer or staff, but the
guidance which cotres frcrr knowledge end experience rust be
found elsewhere.
Execution flexibility requires positive control over
the execution forces. Positive control is not established
easily. Communications are required to insure that changes
can be made as needed. Controls are necessary to insure that
deception measures are executed as they were intended. A
corrrrander is needed to get the Jod done right. An ^dantarle
deception operation might be considered as having similar
command and control problems as these for a river-crossing
operation. An ad-hoc command headquarters is established
a river-crossing operation. It is conceivable that an ad-hec
headquarters might be necessary to implement 2 compie:
deception .
Coordination is a staff responsibility. The division
operations officer is responsible for insuring that the
deception plan is well coordinated. It is necessarv mat
coordination be continuous if the deception is required to
adapt as reality changes. The necessary information about
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friendly forces and the environment is available at the
division headquarters ard it must be readily available to tne
deception planners. Without that information, they could not
know what to change or what forces might be endangered by the
change
.
The ability to know when a change is needed is also a
function of intelligence about the enemy. Friendly intelli-
gence must provide feedback on what the enemy is doing and
why. The feedback from the enemy to the deception plarner
con indicate which deception measures are working and which
are not. Feedback is necessary if the deception planner is
to know if the enemy has interpreted the signals in the
desired manner sc that the deception execution can continue
as planned or so that the execution can be modified z^
produce the desired effect .
Intelligence can also indicate changes in the enemy
part of the system. Those changes can ir-valid^te the decep-
tion or require it to react. A different tailoring of r t e
enemy force, for example, might ruin the chances for decep-
tion success in one area while generating new opportunities
in another area.
-• £l££pncep.tions
The theoretical analysis aid tne case history
analysis strongly agree on tne need for the deception tc he
base^ on the preconceptions of the target. An enemy which
forms a preconception about what will happen is predisposed
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to act in a certain manner. A deception which pleys on the
predispositions of the target will be successful more often
than one which requires the target to change his mind or go
against his predispositions.
There are essentially three situations prior to the
battle. The enemy's estimation of the situation may have:
(1) been correct, (2) been wrong, or (3) been ambiguous. The
enemy may not know for sure if his conception of reality is
correct, but if he has formec. a firm conception it will
influence his battle planning and his intelligence collection
requirements. The preconceptions will also oias en* the
enerry processes and reports intelligence and will bias the
commander's decisions.
The first situation is the worst ^rom the point zf
view of the deception planner because the enerry expects t:
confirm his hypothesis. The enemy correctly diagnosed the
redl operation the execution of which will provide -lues
which confirm the enemy hypothesis. The deception must pre-
sent a more Salient fdlse hypothesis while discrediting the
true hypo the c i c . This may require initiating the deception
with strong and obviov. s evidence 'he deception mvst she
the enemy into considering that he has made a serious mistake
in his analysis. The deception must grab the ereTy's atten-
tion and provide supporting evidence to keej his attention.
The neceipt of contrary evidence at the s :-re lire
would probably defeat the deception. This demands that
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strict security for the real operation would have to be
rraintained, tut that security will never be perfect. Decep-
tion Fight or right not work to change the target's rind,
reception which goes against a target's predispositions
probably would have a better chance 10 produce arbiguity than
it would to produce a hypothesis change.
There is a great deal of threat involved when the
enerry expects the friendly operation to proceed in the same
banner in which it is actually planned. It would seer more
prudent to change that operation than it would be to take the
chance that deception would protect it.
The second possible outcome of the enerry's estirate
of the situation was that he had for/red the wrong conception.
That is the ideal situation for deception. The deception
can be designed to ^eed the enemy with exactly the ni^ht
i nf orrat ion to support his rr i spercept i en . The cc^rrci
features of the deception operation and the true operation
will be accepted as true indicators supporting t :^e f^i^e
hypothesis. The contrary evidence that will oe received ray
net be attended to or rray be misinterpreted to fit the false
hypot hesis.
The situation ir which the enemy remains in a state
of ar biguous conception has ra ny possibilities for deception.
The enerry has not f erred a preconception s^.d ray ^tent any
plausible hypothesi c as valid as long as it is confirmed.
This provides a great deal of flexibility in deception
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planning and is essentially the same as the case in which
intelligence cannot verify anything about the enemy's precon-
ceptions. The enerry cannot be as efficiently targeted
because there is less inf crmat ion available. It would seem
that there is a better chance to keep the ene-ny ambiguous
than there is tc convince him tc accept the deception story.
That is not a bad situation. The enemy who is not sure of
the friendly disposition or intentions will normally require
forces that are kept in reserve to react once the situation
is clarified. The deception may keep the enemy ambiguous
past the time needed to effectively commit these forces.
The preconceptions of the enemy predispose him to
make decisions and take actions that are consistent with his
initial preconceptions. Those decisions and actions c: j the
key factor in the success of the deception. If tne enemy '. •
not formed a preconception, deception can be used to help him
form one that is easier to target. Once the enemy has formed
a precorception, it is the responsibility of friend ..
intelligence to find out what it is and Keep track cf nry
chanr°s. That is a difficult task tut it is one that is not
impossible.
5- Initiative
reception cannot re used if there is no opportunity
to use it. There is ro opportunity to use deception o n tne
part of the force that is totally controlled hy another
^orcp. The force that is totally controlled is one that
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allows its enemy to act and than just reacts tc the
situation.
The initiative is the ability to act. Initiative has
little to do with the relative force sizes or the difference
between the offense and the defense. The initiative is
norrr.ally held by the superior force because the superior
force usually has the do.Tinant position. The superior force
has rrany options and it is the superior force that is
ncrrrally on the offense. The inferior force is usually en
the defense as it needs the inherent advantages the
defense. The defense provides fewer opticas due tc its lac'.
of mobility. The offense has rore options that =re
available but does not necessarily control the initiative.
An exarrple of defense having the initiative is the
Team Spirit S2 exercise conducted by the 2btfc Infantry
Pivisior. The division corrrrar der
,
who was "<?.;. -" General
Alexander I*. Weyand, had very few opticas. Ms division w a s
directed to be on the defense and the exercise scenario was
established by phase lines. The division was reouired
delay a fiven distance in a given period cf time. Tnere was
very little chance that the e^eny could oe surprised in the
rodes cf place, time, or strength. A passive defense,
however, was not in line with toeyand's style and it was not
his intention.
The deception nlan was simply thaT the c*th Infantry
Tivision was willing to trade spece for Tire in en effort
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to reduce casualties en both sides. Essentially, the war was
being won elsewhere so there was little need for costly
combat when.it could te avoided. The deception was cesig r.Pd
to surprise the enemy in the modes of style aid intention.
The ^cal was to set up a "luring" defense which would trap
the lead enemy forces at a time when the 25th Division was
thought to he most vulnerable to direct and indirect fire.
The style was that the defense would become ferccicus
and tenacious once the delay had reached the area of tne
retrograde river-crossing under enemy pressure. ,n.ie inten-
tion was to spring a trap using several reinforced battalion
tdSK forces which were tc errerge from hiding at the critical
hour. The desired operational advantage was to be fron a
surprise attach against the flanks or rear of tne enemy leal
battalions. The enemy fires against the vulnerable units
crossing the river would be denied.
The operation was a complete success. The e^emy lead
units were overextended and overconfident after the day c Df
easy victory. The enemy attack was stalled and the trapped
forces were decimated. The majority of the 25tr Tivisicr
forces were able to nrcss the river without enemy pressure.
The stay-behind forces were able to keen the enemy cway fror
the river long enough for the rest o r tne divisio." to
ccrrplete its preparations for the defense. Covering fi^es
were adequate to support the withdrawal of the stay-behind
forces e^ they suffered only a few casualties. [?ef. 154J
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The 25th Ei vision plan was risky. The stay-behind
forces could easily have been cut off from the rest of the
division and destroyed or captured. The risk was worth it.
The key to the success was that the initiative could be taken
by the defense.
L IMEGFATION 01 THE OPERATIONS PLAN ANT. THZ INCEPTION FLAN
The Tear Spirit 82 deception operation ^y the 25th Infan-
try Pivision can be used to support the conclusion that
integration of the operations plan and, the deception plan is
needed. The two nlans Fust be mutually supporting if the
deception is to be optimized.
The 25th livision's deception plan w^s of the misleading
type and the situation was such thct deception had to succeed
totally. There was no chance tnat the deception could de-
generate to produce ambiguity as there was no plausible
alternate explanation for the actions of the stay-behind
forces. I f the enemy located those forces once they bad
entered their "hiding" positions, the operation would n« ve to
be changed.
Security for the deception plan was essential. The
security measures were strict. First, initial coordination
and planning for the deception was limited to the division
commander and a few selected staff officers c i v i s i o n
commander used late-night sessions which were essentially
one-on-one so that security could be rrai n ta i n.ed
.
The
commander gave specific guidance to tne rest of the planning
2-62,
staff so that the bcdy of the real plan would be compatible
with the deception. [Ref. 155]
The deception officer worked as a member c+' the S3 plans
section. This insured that the deception rreasures were dene
in coordination with the operations plan. The map overlay for
the operations plan was the focus of attention of the
coordinating staff throughout the planning process. This
provided the rreans by which the deception officer interfaced
with the rest of the staff. The deception plan was never put
on the operation's rr a p overlay in order to maintain
security. The deception officer directed the corn terin telli-
gence teams to check the security of all staff sections to
insure that only the information that was necessary would be
displayed on similar maps. All planning a~eas had to be
guarded. Planning papers and overlays were secure: when not
in use. [Fef. 156]
Security reasures continued to re emphasized after the
plan was completed. An operations security and a deception
annex were published os part of the operations order. The
operations security annex was specific, but it addressed
security for the routine aspects of the operation. The
deception annex was itself part of the deception as it
addressed only the cover plan "or the urits and &ey personnel
of the division. It also addressed bumper markings and
provided instructions for sawe. It. was nope'' that the enemv
looking fcr deception might be satisfied with that part of
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the deception. These actions were in accordance with the
corps' deception plan. [P.ef. 15?] The actual deception plan
was written ty the deception officer, prepared and reproduced
by personnel cleared for the appropriate security, and
d isserrina ted separately from the operations order on a strict,
need-to-know basis [Fef. 158].
There were few soldiers who needed to know anything about
the deception plan supporting the use of the stay-behind
forces. If captured, they could reveal little information
other than unit identifications and the ^aot that the divi-
sion was not defending in its norrral manner. In fact, the
combat units were withdrawing by phase lines without being
decisively engaged. This was done for two reasons". It
confirmed the deception story and it denied the enemy the
receict of critical information. The enemy had no opportuni-
ty to keep track of the actual disposition of combat forces.
The stay-behind forces were able to disappear without
bein^ observed by the enemy. Once in their camouflaged
positions they were not allowed to move. Signals from th r se
positions were eliminate^. i:he security at that point was
essential and it was maintained, [He IF.ql
Organization for the deception va s established usin- the
normal command and control structure where possisle. "he
style of the delay was controlled cy the commanders on the
ground. The intention of the stay -be hind units was main-
tained by the strict discipline of the office -s which O Z
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those units secure. The corrbdt support forces involved in
the deception were organized under the operational control of
the division staff. Officers in charge of those forces,
however, did control the execution.
The division intelligence officer, 02, ma in t dined opera-
tional control over the intelligence and electronic warfare
forces. Intelligence collection was done to Keep track of
the enerry actions and intentions. The sections providing
interrogation of prisoners of war, counterintelligence,
ground surveillance, and signals intelligence were specific-
ally tasked throughout the operation. Deceptive jdrrrrinj ,
irritative corrrruni cations deception and manipulative communi-
cations deception were ordered. This was done in close
coordination with the deception officer wno controller the
rest cf the operation. !Ref. 160J
The deception officer performed several functions Tor the
G2 a nd did require additional equipment for the operatic n.
The deception officer exercised operational control ever the
functions of electronic Warfare, operations security, and
psychological warfare operations (FSYOFS). The four
functions were combined in order to insure that the deception
support provided ty those force mul tipli ers would have a
synergistic effect. The coordinated effort was established in
the planning process using phases which corresponded tc the
operations order sr^ detailed using specific implementation
schedules.
Specific measures for jamming, communications deception.
and operations security were not really different from nor-
rral. It was the timing of the signals and the content of the
signals sent to the enemy which were designed to support the
deception. The primary value in having central direction of
the four functional areas was that contradictory sis-naif were
eliminated in the planning process. [Ref. 161]
PSYOPS support to deception needs to be explained . The
first goal of PSYOPS is to destroy the enemy's will to fight.
Use of PSYOPS to support deception can degrade the effective-
ness of the overall PSYOPS program. PSYOPS was used to
support the 2£th Division's deception only after the plan was
approved by the corps commander. The vulnerability of the
?5th Eivision during the river-crossing operations Was high
enough to justify the calculated risk to the PSYOPS
operat ion
.
PSYOPS support to the deception involved numerous leaflet
drops and the use of two loudspeaker tean"b. The PSYOPS
theme was established as a duplication of the deception
story. The leaflets and the loudspeaker broadcasts were
designed to provide clear and obvious evidence that the ?5th
Eivision was willing to trade space for time. The PSYOPS
theme supportec the corps PSYOPS operation and also provided
explanation of the operations of the 25th Eivision up to the
time that the trap was sprung. It could oe argued that the
deception supported PSYOPS as much as PSYOPS supported
2 a4
deception. It worked well because the deception and the
operation were planned together. ["Ref. 162]
The leaflets did not have a fast response time. A p~e-
planned scenario was used for tne first four days of tne
operation. The leaflets were prepared in advance in several
varieties. The di sserrinat ion of the thousands of leaflets
was dene using the units conducting the delay. I?uring Tie
operation, additional leaflets were designee: using curr^"1 :
intelligence so that the deception content of tne leaflets
remained appropriate for the situation. [Pef . 163]
The loudspeaker teams were directed by tne deception
officer on a day-to-day basis. The teams deployed forward
before first light and returned for a midnight briefing ry
the deception officer. The voice res sages and vehicle uoise
broadcasts were based on current intelligence. The :ece: t.i
activities and the normal FSYOPS Broadcasts were tasked using
a master schedule and checked by a review of the activity
logs. [Ref. 1 e 4j
The c oord ira t ior requirements for the deception have been
addressed as a continuous staff function. It is else
necessary to brief the deception to higher, lower, ana
adjacent units. This was acne for the 25th Ei vision's incep-
tion plar. [Pef. 1651
Summarizing the deception, it can be seen t-nat tne decep-
tion plan was plausible. It was a ;:iose variant of the only
real option available to the division. The enemy was able tc
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confirm the deception plan because roughly 95 percent of the
deception story was real. The deception was based on the
preconceptions of the enemy and these preconceptions \*ere
verified by intelligence. The enerry remained predisposed to
accept tnat the division would continue tc traie space for
time. The indications of that fact were observed in his
radio communicat ions and was confirred by the actions of The
enemy forward units. Those units reccire increasingly less
cautious and more overconfident as the operation progressed.
The enemy had the initiative but lost it tc the "luring"
defense. [Pef. 166]
E. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
reception is no r easy to plan. It requires an under-
standing o ^ a complex process. Trie enemy is an uncooperative
part of that urocess. The enemy organization and the entire
systerr must be understood in order to control deception
signals and project a coherent deception story. Furan
behavior cannot be predicted, but patterns of behavior can oe
predicted. The prediction of those enemy behavior patterns
requires an understanding of the nature of the deception
process and the decision-making process.
The estimate of the situation establishes the preconcep-
tions of a force. The estimate is essentially a formulation
of a matrix game, thus, game theory is a quantification of
the estimate of the situation. The payoff matrix is r he
common link between decision theory and game theory.
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The payoff matrix can provide a measure of the worth of
intelligence as the difference in payoff between basing an
estimate on enemy capabilities and basing it on en emy
intentions. The authors of the took, Naval Operation*
Analysis, put it this way:
"Knowledge of the opponent's plan can ce valuable
if there is no saddle-point in the game matrix. 'This
intelligence allows a player to maximize against a single
enery course of action rather tnan .against his whole
Spectrum of capabilities. If it happens that tne
intelligence is not sufficiently complete to identii\v a
single course of action, but does eliminate certain of tne
enemy strategies, these letter courses of action may oe
treated as dominated and discdried from the matrix. Tne
use of intelligence is equivalent to listing enery
intentions instead of enemy capabilities. The value of
intelligence is related to tne difference between tne
ninimex and the maximin
—
the smaller this difference, the
less the intellige-.ee is worth." [P.ef. 167J
The value of deception is in tne change made tc
- *.e
payoff matrix which is apparent to the deceiver but nor to
the target. The inferior force commander ccn use iecepticn
to counter tne enemy's oroper course of action so that he
does not use it. The superior force cormander can use rejec-
tion to increase his payoff with regard tc accomplishment of
the mission, reduction of casualties, or territory exchanged.
Deception should be designed to procure an operational
advantage. Surprise is important to deception, mt surpris-
ing the enery is net the goal. Attaining a specific opera-
tional advantage is a goal which provides clarity :o~ the
deception mission. It helps insure that the deception is
properly coordinated and integrated with the operations plan
: or mutu her efi t
c ... <
Optimizing deception requires the establishment of secur-
ity, coordination, anc organization. The deception rust be
plausible and conf irma tie . The optimal deception is based on
the target's predispositions and is adaptable when the
situation changes. The use of deception requires the
initiative.
The modes of surprise and the intensity of surprise are
ideas which provide a starting point for deception planning.
reception planning requires imagination to thinir of what
might work to successfully deceive tne enemy. It requires
knowledge to determine the deception measures that are
possible. It requires intelligence support to determine tne
measures that, are optimal.
a
. rule o r thumb would be that a deception story should be
designed to produce surprise in two rode; rather than in one
mod?3 . The rule may be modified in certain Dperations where
it right seer necessary to attempt tc gain surprise in three
or more modes in order to insure trat surprise is achieved in
at lee st two rrodes. The a ec is ion would depend en how opera-
tionally critical the deception was anri on whether the
increased costs in Terms of deception assets *as acceptable.
The difference between coerationai deception to support
division and con c level operations and. tactical deception to
support brigade and lower level operations must re
recognized. reception rea c ures to support tne front line
com v dt should become an cut erratic oart of tattle tactics
,-_>
The primary Treasures are signature reduction and false target
genera ti or .
Signature reduction must go beyond the camouflage end
OPSFC procedures already being impl emented . Signature reduc-
tion should he expanded to include mil ti-spectral signal
suppression and the avoidance of predictable patterns. False
target generation should he supported by realistic and rugged
pieces of decoy equipment that can be quickly empldcea cy
front line soldiers to confuse enerry target acquisition.
There are two prirary benefits that are expected from the use
of such devices. The enerry will waste munitions on false
targets and the friendly 'nrces will be able to erfa e,e rore
lucrative enerry targets. Flank shots can te set uo against
an enerry that maneuvers to engage a false target.
reception has a place in modern war because o +> the human
i rvo lvemen t . It is not sufficient just to include deception
as an option? it must be supported. r-ulti-spectral decoys,
target simulators, and intrusion devices need to be developed
and oroducen. fodern technology ca^ rake such devices
possible and cost e"fective. Continued efforts tc improve
signature reduction techniques, camouflage, and obscurants is
necessary.
reception forces rust be made available at division
level. The size of the dejeptior forcp r.eed not re large as
rrost of the deception re c sures can am should be done ty
soldiers assigned deception tasks on an ad -hoc oasis. There
C fc'b?
are, however, certain tasks and specialized equipment trat
will require training and maintenance. Periodic requirements
for a platoon sized deception force could be handled as a
unit tasking.
Deception planning forces fray require that c team be
assigned that duty on a permanent basis so that they can
become deception and counter-deception experts. The function
is a G3 planning function. Increased errphasis en deception
Tay require that the deception officer perform that function
as a single duty. The officer should be assisted ry <at least
one soldier capable of maintaining deception files and a
ccrrput eri zed deception data base.
Cuantifiafcle measures of effectiveness are necessary. It
is possible to establish a quantitative rating for « qualita-
tive evaluation. An example of that is the .Handling quali-
ties Irating scale used for test pilot ratings of experimental
aircraft. Such a system mitrrt be applicable to the deception
process. [Hef. 1C8] If results are recorded in c scientific
manner, They ray rrovide a data base needed for complete
analysis cf deception. Computer algoithms might become
available tc provide on-line battlefield indications of
deception effectiveness, optimization measures, a n ~: counter-
deception measures.
A quantifiable data base is ais^ necessary :"or the isola-
tion of the deception effect frorr ctr.er effects. The -vhaiey
data used in this thesis provided a lot of cat a or surprise
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and deception, but it is only sufficient for an indication cf
trends. Part of this thesis, for example, tried to isolate
force effectiveness effects from the deception effect, tut
the Wnaley data specified only the relative forces.
F~rce effectiveness is not merely forces multiplied by
casualties. That definition was used in tnis thesis. There
are other parareters which combine tc define force effective-
ness more completely, out they were not available .n roT the
'A'haley lata. Eupuy's CJr'A model does account for force
effectiveness in a much oetter manner. It is possible that
additional research applied tc the esses in the r,.'h = ley decep-
tion nata base might allow the Eupuy model to be used. r .ne
factors affecting Da
t
tie outcomes and the interaction of





There are three recommendations that will be made. The
first recommendation is that the U.S. Army adopt /-ha ley's
theory of "alternative objectives" within its existing
decision-making process. The second recommendation is a
concept proposal as to how deception can re planned ^nc
executed at the division level using the existing force
structure. The third reoorrrencat ion is that additional
analysis of operational deception should be done.
A. AITFFNATIVE OBJECTIVES MODEL FOT? OPERATIONS
Sun T?u, the great military expert of ancient China,
advised in his tcok, The Art of ^e.r, that, "the *il
t
irate in
disposing o^e's troops is tc he without ascertainable s::n:e.
Then the most penetrating soies cannot pry in ror ;a n the
wise lay plans agcinst you." \?ef. 1C9J
The author of this thesis believes that Sun Tzu's concept
of "the shape of the enery" is the Seme ds the rodern icei ?f
needing to he able to "see the battlefield." Tne ilea is to
locate the enemy ^orces. The enemy force is sorted by
loccition, function, size, a*)* movement. The pattern th.-=>t
develops is the "shape' and it provides composite information
on intentions ds well n c capabilities. Eeing dble to see
the battlefield" requires the ability to perceive the
existing enemy situation, analyze it according tc es T nfcl:' >< I
cl2
stereotypes, and project the future situation teased on the
present one.
The fundamental military ideas proposed by Sun Tzu
remain applicable to modern war and, in many military
circles, his aphorisms have become cs familiar as these of
Clausevitz.
The logical ideals of Clausevitz are exempli f ied by his
principle of "the objective." The objective is the key to
the Dlanning process of the General Staff System in which all
effort is geared towards attaining the one common objective.
3arton tfhaley observed that "most battles si n oe 1914 have
been planned and launched with but a single objective cr goal
in mind." rBef. '170] The Army has designed its decision-
making rrocess in such a way as to insure that the single,
best course of action is chosen for the objective required.
The author of this thesis contends that executing a
single course of action provides a definite shape tc a force.
The shope Is a function cf the location and composition
combat forces, their direction, and their speed. The shape
is also identified by the actions of combat support
combat service support units. The location an:: activity of
friendly forces provide the enemy a chance to "see the
battlefield. The enemy can observe this shape even i*" it is
ve ry complex .
The technical advances in b'attlefielc reconnaissance may
have mad<= r.e r c p otioo of the battlefield possible. The
ClO
rroMlity of modern weapons is such that the enemy who per-
ceives the obviousness of a single friendly course of action
will be able to interdict it.
This thesis has proposed that deception can re used to
alter the snape that is seen by the enemy. A misleading
deception would use illusion to transform one shape into a
different one. An ambiguity deception would orccuc3 an
additional shape or shapes to keep the enemy from perceiving
the correct one. "his thesis has also shown the historical
ddvrtntages thdt have been achieved when the enemy has re 1
e
the wrong decisions. recent ion seems to oe the obvious and
effective method by which the shape of the single course cf
action can be con oealed .
!• 4ii?X5§ll26 QhjectjLves ana Deception
It Joes not seem prudent to assume that deception
will work for every operation. History has snewn thdt good
deceptions do not always succeed end often they only prcdr.ee
a small advantage. The optimal deceptions have '^eer those
that are based on the preconceptions of the e^ery. The
question is what s ho v. Id be done i " the enemy dies not ic r ~ a
preconception, if intelligence cannot ascertain the -nerry
situation, or if there is simply no plausible, serious, and
wcrknMe deception course of action thdt is iVd liable. v inv
operations may have to be conducted without a deception plan.
reception is termed as a cor Let power multiplier. It
Is not a very good asset i f it cannot be available f?r every
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operation. The author of this thesis suggests thdt deception
can be part of every operation if there is a change in the
decision-making process to adopt the "alternative objectives"
concept originated by Liddell Hart did developed by vhaley.
The suggested change in deci si on -making is simply
thdt the staff continuously evdluate dlterndtives tc the
choser course of action. A well defined objective repairs
essential to planning however, it is realized that there is
nore than ore way to achieve that objective. Alternative
paths to the objective ere kept in mine.
Continuously evaluating alternatives -is nothing r c *'.
That is d normal function of command and control. The author
is only suggesting that the orcjess be rade slightly more
forrral. The alternative plan, which right hr.vz re en one of
the options presented at the Course of Action trie*', should
he kept as a working *ile. The alternative plan should ce
periodically reviewed during the operation to refresn the
rirds of the planners a tout the good points c^ the
alternat i ve plan .
The situation rr ay change enough curing the rour c e of
battle so that the alternative plan i^^e-s the highest
probahility of success. It see rrs reasonable that vnen a
change must be made, that change should be to adopt an
alternative that has teen carefully evaluated.
Having a viable alternative plan re any in at least
outline form would simplify decision-making under stress. It
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would alleviate the detrimental effects of cognitive end
perceptual Diases. Further, it might reduce the chances of
having crisis decisions manipulated oy the enemy
The notion of alternative objectives is not new.
Barton Vhaley had studied Captain B.H. Liddell Hart's concept
of "alternative objectives" and noted that Pierre Joseph
Jourcet (1700-1780) had expressed the dictum ds fellows:
"Every plan of campaign ought to have several branches
and to have beer, so well thought out that one or other of
the said branches cannot fail of success." f?ef. 171]
^he idea o" "alternative objectives" is sased on
preparing several courses of action for each plan. The enemy
could be sold on one course of action while a different
course of action is implemented. The eie^y that sets itself
up to oppose the correct course of action could be thwarted
by a switch to a different course of action.
It is necessary to question wnether the concept cf
"alternative objectives" is in opposition to the principle of
rr-r
i
ntena nee of the objective." The author of this thesis
contends that the two need rot be in opposition, but there
can be no question ds to whdt the ultimate objective is. The
concept nf 'alternative objectives must ne qualified to
insure th.it there is no such question. This section cf the
thesis win use trie alternative objectives concept
expressed by Fort dnd Vhaley to introduce the possibility sf
dual paths to the same uLt irate objective. n .ne dual paths
are alternative courses of action that lead tc the o d 1 e c 1 1 v e
.
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Alternative objectives" should apply to intermediate
steps in the path to the ultimate objective. The path can be
changed along the way because one finds the enemy tc be
waiting in force along the path. I^any tirres it rray be wiser
to go around an obstacle than it would be tc rerrove the
obstacle. It should not rratter as long as the end resul 1:,
the ultimate objective, was satisfied.
One aspect of the [rod el is that the staff would cay
more attention to alternative courses o f action. The author
believes that the commanders are already doing this. The
result is that the corriranders respond quickly to changes i n
the situation but the staffs cannot. Battlefield. "ccrrrand
and control" can implement a plan rapidly. The sta*f oeeos
to prepare in odvance to react «s quickly.
A qualification to the idea of "alternative
objectives" is that there ray be higher and lower order
objectives. An eramole of the ultimate objective might re
the securing of rt particular road junction. The alternative
objectives mieht be: (1) control the terrain tr.at dominates
the r^ad junction, (2) destroy ail enemy forces i r the area.
(3) successfully attack elsewhere in order to draw the er e?
j
away, or (4) deceit the enemy into voluntarily movine M c
forces. The higher orcer objective is to accomplish the
mission. The lower order objectives rray be to secure the
road junction in the quickest time, with the smallest
expenditure of ammunition, or with the fewest casualties. It
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is obvious that lower order objectives may impact or. the
alternative objectives chosen by the commander
.
Other lover order objectives may be more systematic.
A commander may have a lower order objective that demands
that he follow certain rules. One such rule is that flanks
should never be left exposed. The commander would follow a
path which allocates fighting power to reinforce weakness.
An opposite rule would be to reinforce strength. If the left
is succeeding then the commander would continue tc give
priority to the left. Reinforcing strength to achieve
exploitation is a path which disregards threats tc the
flanks .
The "alternative objectives" model is a continuous
process of change as the situation changes . The ^ccti
assumes that changes will be necessary in any plan an d
anticipates them. Sun Tzu put it &s'
"Now an army may be likened to water, "or just as
flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the
lowlands, so an ar^y avoids strength a^6 strikes weakness.
And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the
ground, so an army manages i t s victory in accordance
with the situation of the enemy." [Ref. I 7 ?
'
The use of deception is enhanced by the use of the
duality planning mocel. The most significant advantage is
that the operation becomes a deception in itself. v^.cn
deviation bejorres an unexpected eve r t. Each choice of the
indirect approach defies enerry analysis as each pnase of the
operation rnay have alternate objectives fror which the **inal
objective cannot re determined.
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2. The Operational Advantage of Alternative Piths
A sirple example will be use! tc clarify hew the idea
of "alternative otjectives" can be used to achieve an













The friendly division shown in figure 1 has two
committed bri£ade task forces, A and B, with tas.K force C in
reserve. The ultimate objective o^ tne division is to seize
physical objective <*• . The enemy is defending as far forward
as possible, but is deterrrined to retain the dominant terrain
at objective 3 and has positioned its reserve '"orce there.
The friendly division course of action for the
situation is a ground assault by a" followed by r ~
objective 4 through intermediate objectives 1 and 2. The
alternative vAav. is to airmobile a portion of " C to
objective 3 which would allow "? to successfully att^cK
objective 4 once it had arrived at 3. Tne airmobile
operation cannot be implemented as Imp a s the enemy is at 3.
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The location of the enerry reserve is the key to the
operation. If that force stays at objective 3, the division
plan will succeed although force "a" will oe subjected to
heavy casualties. If the enerry reserve roves to a blocking
position between objectives 2 and 4, the division plan will
fail. The enerry preconception about the importance of
objective 3 can be used to advantage. The enemy commander
will keep his reserve at 3 at least until he observes the
direction that "a" takes once it leaves objective 2. At that
point, the enerry corrmander will have only a snort time to
rrake the right decision.
The deception plan for the situation is based on the
alternative course of action. The deception story is t.u at
the attack on objectives 1 dnd 2 is a diversion to drew tr.e
enerry reserve away fror the ultimate ocjective which is 3.
The airmobile operation will take place once the reserve has
rcved. The rrission of the airmobile force is tc hold
objective 3 until relieved.
The three combat forces participate in manipulative
communications deception to portray the deception story.
Force c' undergoes the airmobile rehearsals necessary 'or
such o complex operation. Aerinl reconnaissance is centered
on objective .? in such a way as it satis f'ie c the i :: T ell i ;je r ! ce
needs of the planned operation « s well.
The theoretical analysis of this thesis woulo suggest
that the preconceptions of the enerry commander -all be
sufficiently reinforced to keep the enemy reserves at
objective 3. That reserve force will be kept out cf the
battle and will have to be withdrawn once objective 4 is
taken by the friendly division. The value of the deception
is that the enemy is not able to use his force effectively.
The value of "alternative objectives" is shewn if the
enemy disregards the deception story and moves his reserve
force tc block the obvious attack. That reserve force is
again placed at a disadvantage since the alternative plan can
be immediately implemented. The necessary training,
coordination, and allocation of airmobile assets was
accomplished dS part of the portrayal of the deception story.
The in-mediate execution of the alternative plan dees
generate partial enemy surprise. ^cre importantly, it
executes a viable plan which produces en operational
advantage which insures at least partial success. The enemy
commander 1 s faced with two choices. If he uses his reserve
force to attempt to regain objective 3, it nay be subjected
tc attach from the rear cr flank by the *'orces frcr objective
?. On the other hand, the enemy commander must recognise
that his f^crs that remain between "B" and objective 3 are
threatened to be rut off if he does not regain objective 3.
Attacking objective 3 will have disadvantages. The enemy
force rust face direct fire to attach" the dominating terrain.
The flow of battle from that point and the taking of
objective 4 is beyond the scope of tnis thesis. It is
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obvious that a new situation exists. The new situation is
irore ^avorable to the friendly commander.
An advantage of "alternative objectives" is that the
deception planner is always provided the opportunity to
practice his craft. The enerry is always presented with an
ambiguous situation. The reason is obvious. A plan which
changes as the situation changes cannot be compromised nor
can it be predicted. This is a significant advantage over
the present planning process because it increases the enemy's
chance of making the wrong decisions even without the use of
an actual deception operation.
The author has suggested that the "alternative
objectives" concept is rot ir opposition to the principle of
I
rraintenanre of the objective. It is possible that 'the two
'
concerts will be opposed in a given situation and the concept
of "alternative objectives" rust not be used. It is disc
possible that only one viable course of action exists. Two
viable alternatives might net be compatible. "Alternative
objectives" can only be used in the right situations.
- • £;odel of the r ecept ion Flow
Figure 2 presents the conceptual flow of deception
as it right exist in a operation for which the alternative
objectives' concept is i mpleren ted usirg the primary course
of action as Plan A (operation) and the secondary course of
action as Plan E (deception).
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The central idea of "alternative oojectlves" is the
concept of ndving two viable courses of action instead of
just one. The alternate courses of action mist have a
discernible difference. The target rright provide the
difference. One option might be for gaining Key terrain
while another option right be for the destruction of key
enerry forces. The courses of action might be different i r. trie
modes of place, time, strength, style, intention, or they
might be different in combinations of several modes. The
intermediate objectives need not all lead directly to the
ultimate objective. The path taken might simply oe the oath
of least resistance which retains the initiative wnile the
ene^y force is manipulated into positions of disadvantage.
Tistracting the enemy's attention with actions T ha
t
he cannot anticipate should provide an advantage. Vhaiey
quoted Liddell Eart as having said:
"To insure reaching an objective one should have alter-
nate objectives. For if the en e^y is certain as to your
point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding
himself and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand,
you take a line that t hreat ens_ alt emate objectives, you
distract his mind anc his forces." [P.ef
. l?3j
Intelligence remains essential in the support of
duality planning. Intelligence must allow the commander tc
know the enemy so that the alternative plans can be shifted
back ^^6 forth to avoid the enemy's strengths. Intelligence
must -tlso find enemy weaknesses and this may entail the need
to discover ar-y or all o* the preconceptions that the er err y
has fnrmeo.
22
Knowledge of the enemy predisposition to act in a
certain manner is essential to the deceptive use of
alternative plans. Such knowledge allows the commander to
choose one course of action as a deception while the other is
chosen for the operation. The feedback channels are also
necessary to signal when changes to the plan are needed. The
changes Fay te simple timing rrodif ications designed to play
on the enemy's mental biases. The changes might interchange
the deception plan and the real plan as required tc insure
that the enemy is always wrong.
There are times in any operation wnen the "Fog of
War" is such that intelligence is unable to reliable predict
the enemy situation. The temporary advantage tnat the enemy
I
right have at such a tire ce 1 be offset if the enery is also
faced with the ambiguous situation provided by the "alterna-
tive objectives" model. The shifts in the plan during a
"fogged" situation could be mace m a totally random manner.
The theoretical advantage of random behavior could re ob-
tained without degrading tactics. Eaoh path would be equally
viable in a "fogged" environment.
reception is the basis for the "alternative
objectives' re del shown in Figure 2. The deception is three-
fold. The central deception is That the operation that
evolves is itself a deception oecav.se it is based on
nlter-iate objectives at the key tires during the battle. The
central deception is most important in that it is bases en
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achieving ar operational advantage rather than generating
surprise.
The operational deception conducted at division ievei
is the second of the three deceptions. It focuses on
confusing the enemy as to the final objective of the
campaign. Theoretically, the operational deception supported
by the central deception has a much greater probability cf
misleading the enemy than does a deception supporting a
single course of action. The ambiguity produced by the
central deception should insure that ambiguity is the least
expected result of the operational deception. The goal o^
the operational deception is reducer' to achieving advantage
at the °inal objective. The scope of the deception is re-
I
duced and the mo e simple and elegant solutions becore
via ble .
The third deception is a tactical deception conducted
by the maneuver units during each phase of the operation.
The tactical deception measures would rely on modern devices
such as false target generators, irult ispectral decoys, and
c ommunica tion s-node simulators. These devices would be com-
bined with maneuver to portray one plan while the ether was
in effect. The tactical deceptions would gain an opera r io::al
advantage 'or the maneuver forces due to their tendency to
collect enery bullets. Tactical deception would also
generate ambiguity to support the central deception without a
requirement for additional planning. The tactical deception
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planning is provided by the alternative plan. The path not
executed in the operation is the path to be executed in The
deception. Signals generated along both paths provide the
arrbiguity .
The threefold deception possible when using alterna-
tive plans optimizes deception because it goes beyond the
optimal deception practices that were reviewed in the
conclusions of this thesis. Alternative plans reduce the
risk that the enemy might correctly predict hew the
friendly operation will proceec . Alternative planning does
net reduce the demands for quality intelligence, but it does
provice mors security against the possibility that the
intelligence is v-ong or that it becomes "fogged". The model
provides for the cooperative use of operational and tactical
deception at the division level. It insures that the opera-
tion itself is basec on deception. The model seers to 7eet
the estimate made by Sun Tzu that "all warfare is based on
deception ." [Bef . 174j
.
Maintaining an alternative plan at division le
could satisfy the presert reaui regents for deception,
continuous search for paths of least resistance promises
treme r dous operational advantages while presenting ambiguity
signa Is to the enemy .
There ^re significant costs involved with raintaining
an alternative plan. The critical issue is finding addition-
al resources to accomodate the increased need for planning
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and coordination. The author of this thesis recommend s that
the "alternative objectives" model be adopted as a slight
rrod if icat ion of the present planning process and realized
through automation rather than additional manpower. A
multiple user computer/word pro-jessor serving the planners
would allow an increase in efficiency which would offset the
increased requirements.
P. EICFPTION PLANNING AND EXICUTION BY A U.S. AEP.Y DIVISION
Tactical deception can oe done to support U.S. Army
brigade level operations. Significant benefits can De ob-
tained simply by supporting tactical deceptions p or the "ront
line units and this can be done with only a modest investment
in resources. The use of active camouflage to complement
passive camouflage is a cost effective measure which carries
almost no overhead in terms of planning and support. A decoy
which costs d thousand dollars, for example, is cost
effective if it saves only one tank. The same decoy could re
built tough enough to be killed many times. Tne author - '
this thesis recomrends that procurement of tactical deception
devices for all combat units he developed, approved, and
funded
.
Operational deception (ran he done to support U.S. Army
di7ision level operations whether ^r not the "alternative
objectives model is adopted. The difference is That opera-
tional deception under the "aliencti're objectives" concept
would probably not te required for all operations. The
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occasional manipulative deception necessary to supplement
the built in ambiguity could be handled on a case by case
basis. The routine use of deception as a combat multiplier;
however, would overload the part-time resources thct present-
ly are used to plan and execute deception operations. The
author of this thesis recommends that operational deception
be planned on a routine basis and executed as often as the
situd t ion demands .
The requirements for increasing the use of operational
deception follow tbe arguments developed in this thesis. The
needs for secrecy, organization, and coordination produce a
substantial resource demand. Competition for resources of
the division is such that the requirements will have to re
filled using the existing force structure. Any proposal -" r
how to do that will have significant drawbacks and wiil
produce many reasons why it cannot be dore. Tne author of
this thesis recommends that the resource proolem should oe
studied in terms of how it ccn be done so that an eventual
compromise can evolve into a viable deception organization
and operations concept.
The author -proposes one solution to the deception
resource problem. It is recommenaeo. as « starting ooirt for
additional studies as it does provide ideas as to new decep-
tion could be done at the division level without increasing
or chcngjng the force structure. The solution dnes involve
some changes in roles and responsibilities.
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!• E§ce.ption Planning Resources
d . Corrmand Level
The commander Terrains the central character in
deception planning. The corrrander must extend his corrrand
and control to include the enerry by retaining the initiative.
He rrust keep the enemy's possible options in mind and rrust
try to Keep at least one rrove ahead of the enerry decision-
maker. Fe will retain the initiative if he is able to reduce
the enemy's options and manipulate the enemy's forces into
positions of disadvantage. The commander provides focus to
"both the deception plan and the operations plcn to insure
that the central aspects of the plans are complimentary.
b. Coordinating Staff Level
i
The coordinating staff level contains rrfch of the
talent, knowledge, a^d experience that allows a division to
conduct efficient operations. These senior personnel manage
and direct the action staff and they are the principle
advisors for the commander. They rarely becore as directly
involved in deception planning as they do in operations
planning.
The proposal is that the commander select appro-
priate personnel from the coordinating staff level, augment
them with seme additional expertise, ano charge the group
with providing the deception guidance n c cessary to translate
the desires of the commander into cohesive deception ob-
jectives. This group tight meet with the commander after
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evening rress to address deception requirements 'or the medium
to long range battle. reception may not be applicable to
every battle and this group might only rreet occasionally.
The author of this thesis would call this group
the "Extended Battle Planning Group' and would organize it
with well-experienced personnel. The group might be formed
around the division Chief of Staff and his assistants in
charge of the functional staff sections. The G3 ana the G2
would be required as a minimum. Executive officers from the
major subordinate units might be included whenever they were
available and special staff officers for deception might be
added. The deception staff expert might oe a deception
expert of whatever rank, a member of the local resistance, cr
even a converted civilian with special attributes. Magicians
might be particularly adept at the application of illusions.
c. Action Staff Level
The action officers in the division staff
sections actually conduct most of the planning and coordina-
tion of orders. They also supervise the execution of the
operation as it pretains to their functional areas. The
action staff should not normally be involved m deception
planning and execution.
d. reception Planning Level
A deception planning cell should be formed with
the G2 deception officer as the officer in charge (OIC). A
staff representative should be provided from G3 operations,
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G3 plans, G4 plans, and G2 plans, the fire support office,
and the signal office. The QIC's for PSYOFS and OPSEC and
the MI battalion (CIWI) S3 should also he included.
The deception planning cell is a subset of the
dction staff hut the separation is necessary for security
reasons. The members of the cell must plan the specific
deception requirements from the guidance received frorr the
Extended Battle Planning Group and trust integrate the re-
quirements into cohesive deception plans. They must insure
that conflicts with the operations plan are resolved without
compromising the deception plan to the rest of the
headquarters.
2- The How of Pece_ption Planning
The commander initiates duality planning. The
Extended Battle Planning Group attempts to predict enemy
actions, assign probabilities, and predict outcomes of
possible scenarios. It also attempts to predict enemy
reactions, determine enemy preconceptions, and focus intelli-
gence requirements. It would be expected that much of this
work would b a ^ e to be done in conjunction with the analysts
in charge of the All Source Analysis Center (ASAS ) supporting
the division tactical operations center (PTOC).
The commander presents guidance for duality planning
alternatives based on results of the extended battle esti-
mate. The staff estimates of the situation are prepared and
briefed .
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The course of action briefing is conducted as it
normally would be> however, the commander would then select
two courses of action instead of just one.
The Extended Battle Planning Group would then conduct
a revision of the two courses of action to establish duality
using a phased approach of intersection points, decision
points, milestones, or phase lines. An alternate method
could include a tirre line or snapshot approach. Zhe revised
courses of action would then be coordinated a^d receive
command approval. The Extended Battle Planning ^rcup would
then prepare the deception theme and guidance for the opera-
tional deception to support the alternative plan.
The next phase in the flow of deception planning is
done in conjunction with i etailed planning. The division G3
planning section initiates the detailed planning by providing
guidance to the sta~f action officers. The section conducts
tfie supervision, the coordination, and the prepa ra r ion of the
operations order. It is also responsiole for disseminating
the operations order by phases. The deception OIC woulc have
to u^rk closely with the plans OIC to estaolish the non-
essential aspects of the operations plan which can be used in
the deception to provide a oasis of truth. The critical
aspects nf the operation would be identified, to insure their
protection. The deception OIC would then pnepa-e the details
of the deception story u c ing the guidance that wa c received
and the openotions information that was provided.
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The deceotion OIC would then form the deception
planning cell and would provide guidance. The OIC wculd
serve as the focal point in the preparation and coordination
of functions aspects of the deception. The deception CIC
would prepare the detailed deception plan after the coordina-
tion was complete. The deception plan would be reviewed oy
the Extended Battle Planning Group and would be presented in
a decision briefing to receive command approval. The decep-
tion OIC would then translate the plan into an execution
rratri* specifying the action agency, the activity, the time,
and the location. The execution of the plan would begin.
The Extended Battle Planning Group would conduct
continuous review? of the environment by applying The princi-
ples cf war, cos", o*' actions, cost effectiveness of actions,
chances of succes;, and freedom of action effects. The Group
wculd base their evaluations on enemy action, changes i i the
enery situation, changes in enemy preconceptions, anc appro-
priate measures of effectiveness. The Group would be in a
position to appreciate the operational situation of the
friendly forces and would be able to anply their operational
expertise to recommend changes in the deception plan. The
Group would te able to specify (additions to the intelligence
collection requirements and would rronitcr feedback on the
deception progress through reports from QPSEC, counter-
intelligence, end interrogation of enemy prisoners of war.
Croup actions would oh on a continuous D^sis.
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3- Deception ExiSllIiflU H£SflLlir£££ aHl Q^§Idtions
Execution resources are an essential part of a decep-
tion organization. The deception measures rust re executed
in a very precise manner if they are to convey the correct
signals to the enerry. Positive control over deception rust
he established. The author of this thesis recommends that
the execution requirement be considered a command
responsibility of a subordinate unit. The unit used as an
example will be the division's military i^t ell i^e^ce
battalion (CIW-I).
The first requirement is 'or i cojrrander o * the
deception forces. The M battalion commander would have tne
required experience in operations and in intelligence. .As a
commander cf one of the division's major subordinate units,
the m*I commander has an established relationship with the
members of the Fxtended fdttle Planning Sroup. Fe also has
direct access to the division commander which would oe
essential for such an operation.
The !* I commander runs a very complex unit, but fcr
the sake of argument, he does not have an additional job.
The engineer battalion ccmrander is also the ti vision.
engineer. The signal battalion comnander is also tne
division signal o +"fir*er. The division intelligence officer
is the G? , not the r" T battalion con-manner.
Thp second requirement for the execution forces is a
c^mrand and control organization. The use of an existing
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force structure is an obvious improvement over an ad-hoc
organization. Deception measures may be required over the
entire division area of operations. This requires communica-
tions which for security reasons should be Kept encrypted en
nets that are not used for normal division operations.
The 1*1 battalion has assets located throughout the
division area. Each maneuver brigade is provided a brigade
support team that is the size of a reinforced company. There
are battalion liaison teams at each of the brigade head-
quarters. The battalion heaquarters ana the battalion Tech-
nical Control and Analysis Center are centrally located in
the division area. The ASAS at the ETOC is provided and
manned by personnel organic to the MI battalion. The
battalion has aviation assets in the form of the CUICKFIX
platoon. There are battalion assets lecated in ire division
support area and, finally, there are OFSFC teams and counter-
intelligence teams which nay >e anywhere. All of these
elements are connected using organic communications. The MI
battalion commander owns more internal communications than
would be found in en infantry or armored brigade. The
communications are in place and should be sufficient to
handle the increased requirements fcr deception command an."!
control.
The third requirement is "or deception forces. A
unit the si7e of a battalion snouii have enough flexibility
to divert small forces ^or limited oeriods o*" tire. The
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advantage of using the MI battalion is that it includes a
wide variety of assets. The battalion has 13 tracked
vehicles in the TEAILELAZER, TACJAM, And TEAMPACK sections
which might be used to lay a false track pattern. The
"battalion has more than twenty large trucks, rrore than fcrty
rrediurr sized trucks, and more than sixty snail trucks. The
vast majority of these vehicles are associated with small
tearrs which are normally deployed independently and so rright
be given short duration deception tasks without a significant
impact on their intelligence missions. The battalion aisc
owr.s over a hundred generators which provide acoustic and
thermal emissions that are of increasing value in deception
operations.
The fourth requirement for deception execution fcrces
is an ability to provide the right signals to the enemy. The
use of intelligence soldiers should reduce the need for
detailed scripts that would nave to ce prepcred by me
ola.nners. That would te a tire consuming task that would ::
near impossible during war. It would be ^kc':i easier if trie
specific signals were determined ay the execution forces.
The MI battalion could use the operational and tech-
nical expertise of its more than forty officers a nd warrant
officers to advantage. The division's expertise ir all o"
the functional areas of intelligence is directly available to
the MI battalion commander who controls sufficient assets to
choreograph individual signals into a coordinated operation.
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The MI battalion's rTain function is to collect and analyze
signals of the enemy and it is in a good position to know the
signals frorr friendly forces that are equally important tc
the enemy.
A fi-fth requirement for a deception execution fo -ce
is that it rust have the capability to support assigned or
attached deception elements. A battalion-sized unit could do
that better than if it was attached to the division head-
quarters company.
An M battalion has the additional advantage of
having an organic general support maintenance capability "or
communications and electronic equipment. There will be an
increased need for the fielding of new deception equipment to
meet the advances in eneiry intelligence collect j or. capabil-
ity. Much of this equipment will be electronic in nature and
will probably' operate automatically once it is placed In
position. The equiprent will need to te store:', maintained,
and transported. The authorized manning for such an element
may have to be minimal. Support would have to be provided by
a host unit.
The use of a battalion sized unit in the executicr of
a deception operation should he much more efficient than the
use of an ad-hoc organ: zation or the use of decentralized
control. The deception mission could be handled in the same
ranner as eny other mission. The existing command and
control structure could provide the positive control needed
for adaptability. The use of only one unit has .security
advantages. The designation of one headquarters should ease
the coordination problems. The flow of the deception opera-
tion could become a srrooth and envious extension of commar c
.
There are many obvious advantages to giving the c e-
ception rrission to the division's MI battalion. Some of
those advantages have been discussed. Others include such
things as a direct link to both &2 and G3 through the support
tears provided to those sections and also the direct links to
feedback channels through signals intelligence, counter-
intelligence, and interrogation. A CI i r e r t link to r\ Li C T? "
exists to provide immediate feedback on friendly signals that
might compromise the deception.
Another advantage is that many measures sucn as
imitative communications deception and jamming a -e already
tasks for the N'I battalion. The very Fission or intelligence
will always link the battalion to deception because of the
requirement to know the enemy before you can deceive him.
The importance of the intelligence nnissior, however,
is and should be sufficient to justify the idea that *'T
battalions should not be assignee the deception mission. The
author has used the M battalion example simply te< a ise he is
most familiar with that organization. Deception is ar\ opera-
tions function and an increased tie to intelligence might be
a serious mistake. The author recommend c that seric-'S study
be given to determining the best w*y tc organize.
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C. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Deception seers to be a wide open area in which there ere
few experts and fewer solutions. This thesis has tried to
present 5orre of the issues and provide some ideas regarding
tactical deception. There is a lot more work that is neces-
sary before it will even "be possible tc "begin detailed
analysis of the problem. The development of capa Dili ties,
programs, tactics, erployment concepts and intelligence and
communications support applicable to future tactical decep-
tion requirements are just some of the initial analysis
requirements .
Studies must be done cq methods to train commanders end
other decision makers, operating elements, and staffs to
understand the deception process. The} must ne trainee tc
effectively plan for, make, and execute deception decisicr-s
and integrated actions.
Analysis must bE dene To identify and provide the addi-
tional intelligence requirements in support of deception.
The key issue will have to be on the intelligence required tc
identify enemy oredispositions ani preconceptions.
Ara lysis is needed to identify training requirements and
qualifications for personnel who perform d ecept ion-rela tec
act i viti es.
Research, development, test ar\n evaluation, and procure-
ment of systems applicable to deception are ail possible
requirements that require analysis.
?i.(/
Analysis is required to identify all options available
for use in tactical deception. Because each option rr a y not
be sufficient to accomplish the deception tasi: alone, the
options rrust he carefully hlended to insure that cptirnl
advantage is obtained frorr available resources.
Finally, additional work is needed to insure that the
test possible deception data base is available. >'haiey's
ddtd base is a good start, but it could be improved. The
best possible data base is required before rrucfc of the other
work can be done.
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APPFNIIX A. LISTS OF BATTLES IN TFE DATA SFT
A. LIST A: CASES OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE ANL/OR DECEPTION
CASE TATE PLACE OPPONENTS
Al 2/11/14 TANGA (GER. EAST AFRICA) BRITAIN/GSR.
A2 25/04/15 GALLIPOLI (TURKEY) JRIT-FR/GiR-TURK
A? 2/05/15 GORLICE (GALICIA) GERMANY /BUSS IA
A4 4/06/16 BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE (PUS.) RUSSIA/AUSTRIA
Ad 24/10/1? CAPORETTO (ITALY) AUSTRIA-GER/ITALY
A6 31/10/17 3RD BATTLE CF GAZA (PAL.) BRITAIN /GER -TURK
A7 21/03/18 ST. CUENTIN (FRANCF) GEF, /IE IT-TPAN CF
A8 31/09/18 ST. MIHIFL (FRANCE) U.S ./GERMANY
A9 19/09/18 MEGIIDO (PALESTINE) 3RIT/GER-T JRK
A9A 26/09/18 MEl'SF-ARGCNN E (FRANCE) U .S .-ER/GERMAf* Y
A10 16/08/20 VARSAW (POLAND POLANT/RIJSSIA
All 26/08/22 DUMLUPINAR (TURKEY) TURKEY/GREECE
A12 12/03/37 GUADALAJARA (SPAIN) REP. SPAIN/ITALY
A13 15/12/37 TERUEL (SPAIN) REP. SP/'NAT. Si5
A 14 25/07/38 E1PO (SPAIN) PEP. SP-'NAT. SF
A15 20/08/39 KFALKEIN-GCL (MANCHURIA) RUSSIA/JAPAN
A16 1/0C/3S POLAND GERMANY ,'POLAND
A17 9/04/40 DENMAFK GIF MA NY -T ENM« p \.
A18 9/04/40 NORWAY GER/NCRWA Y-ER-FR
A19 10/05/40 NETHERLANDS GER .'NETH-FP-B?
A20 10/05/40 BELGIUM GF^ /EELG-ER-xP
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A 21 10/05/40 FRANCE GER/FR-BR
A22 06-09/40 INV. OF BRIT (PLANNING) GERMANY /BRITAIN
A23 09/40-42 INV. OF BRIT (HOAX PEASE) GERMAN! /"BR ITA IN
A24 23/09/41 DAKAR BRITAIN/VICE. FR
A 25 9/12/41 Sin 3ARF.AM (W. DESERT) BRITAIN/ ITALY
A26 31/03/41 MERSA EL BREGA (CYRENAICA) GERMANY/BRITAI!
A2? 6/04/41 YUGOSLAVIA GER/YUGOS LAVIJ
A28 22/06/41 RUSSIA GERMANY/PUSS I*
A29 25/08/41 KIEV (RUSSIA) GERMANY /RUSS IA
A30 7/12/41 PEARL HAPIOR (U.S.) JAPAN-'U.S.
A31 8/12/41 MAIAYA JAPAN/BPITAIN
A32 26/05/42 GAZALA (V. DESERT) GERMANY 'BRITAIN
A33 3-4/06/42 MIDWAY (PACIFIC) JAPAN /U.S.
A34 28/06/42 SOUTHERN RUSSIA GERMANY /RUSS IA
A35 23/10/42 ALAMEIN (V. DESERT) EF.IT/GEP-TTAI Y
A36 8/11/42 NCRTF AFRICA U .S .-BR /GER-VICi
A3? 06-10/43 EUON PENINSULA ( N. GUINEA) U.S. /JAPAN
A38 10/07/43 SICILY (ITAL V ) BR-U .S . 'GER-IT
A39 1/11/43 BOUGAINVILLE (S. PACIFIC) U.S. /JAVA I
A40 20/11/43 TARAWA fGTLBFPT IS.) U.S. /JAPAN
A41 22/01/44 ANZIC (ITALY) U .S .-BR /GERMAN"'
A42 1/P2/44 JWJALEIN (MAPSFAL IS.) U.S. /JAPAN
A43 22/04/44 FOLLANDIN (NEV GUINEA) U.S. /JAPAN
«44 11/05/44 4TF BATTLE CT CASS IMC ALLIES /GERMANY
A45 5/06/44 NCRMANDY (FRANCE) " T . J .-BR 'G IRM A "'
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P. LIST B: CASFS OF TACTICAL SURPKISr AND OR DECEPTION
CASE TATE PLACE OPPONENTS
PI 4/08/14 LIEGE (EEIGIU V )
32 27/08/14 OSTENI rEMONSTRATION






E4 10/03/16 NEUVE CHAPELLE (FRANCE) ERITAItf /GERMANY
35 22/04/15 2ND BATTLE OF IP RES (BELG) GERMANY /3R-FB
16 6/08/1S SUVLA PAY (GALLIPOLI
)
BRITAIN /TURK-GIB
36A 7/10/15 SERBIA GEF-AUS -3UL/SER'3
B7 20/12/15 FVAC. OF SUVLA AND ANZAC ERITAIN/TURK-GER
18 9/01/1C EVAC. OF CAFE BELLES - ER-FR/TURK-GIR
B8A 21/02/16 VERDUN (FRANCE) GERMANY .'FRANC 2
B9 18/03/16 LAKE NAPOCF (RUSSIA^ RUSSIA/GERMANY
B10 31/05/16 RATTLE OF JUTLAND GERMANY /BRITAIN
Ell 9/04/17 SCAPPF S, VIMY RIEG5 (FR) ERITAIN/GIRMANK
B12 7/06/17 BATTLE OF MEiiSINES (BELG) BRITAIN /GERMANY
B13 20/11/17 CAMBPAl (FRANCE) BRITAIN/GERMANY
B14 27/05/18 CKEMIN-DES-DAMES GER /FR-BR-U. S
.
B15 4/07/18 FAMIL (FRANCE) ER-U.S . /GERMANY
B16 18/07/18 2ND RATTLE CF TEE MARNE FR-BR-U .S . /GER
117 8/08/18 AMIENS (FRANCE) BR-FR/GIRMANY
B18 9/0 7/21 BATTLE OF ESKISEEEIR (TUR) GREECE /TURKEY
EISA 6/02/37 JAFAi*A (SPAIN) tllELS/tOYAIlSTS
3183 6/07/37 3RUNETE (SPAIN) LOYALISTS /RE3ILS
B19 02-05/41 ITALIAN FAST AFRICA BRITAIN /ITALY
320 20/0 5/41 CRETE GER /3R-GREFCE
E21 16/11/41 SIDI RFZEGE (¥ . EESERT) BRITAIN /GFR-ITAI.Y
B22 21/01/42 MEFSA EL 3P EGA GERMANY '8? ITA IN
±23 6/^5/42 KEPCF (RUSSIA) GERMANY /PUSS IA
324 20/06/42 TOBPTJK ( T* . EESERT) GER MANY/ BR ITA IN
































































AUSTRIA /S RJ *IA
TANNEN5ERG (E. PRUSSIA) PUSS IA/GER* ANY
2ND BATTLE OF APTOIS (FR) FRANCE/GERMANY
1ST & 2ND BATTLE OF ISONZO ITALY/AUSTRIA
BATTLF OF LOOS (FRANCE) i¥ ITA IN ''GERMA NY





























3RP. 6. 4TH 3ATTLE 01 ISONZO ITALY /AUSTRIA
TIROL (ITALY) AUSTRIA/ ITALY
3ATTLE OF SOMME (FRANCE) 0R-ER/GFRMANY
6TH BATTLE OF ISONZO ITALY /AUSTRIA
RUMANIA RUM/AUS-GIRM-BULG
3ATTLF OF MONASTIR ( SERBIA) FR-3P-SFR3/GEPM-3U
7TF-9TF EATTLF OS ISONZO ITALY /AUSTP *A
1ST 3ATTLE OF GAZA
2M EATTLE OF AISNE (ER)
2ND 9ATTLE OF GAZA
2ND EATTLF OF SCARPI
10TH 3ATTLJ OF ISONZO
EAT TIT OJ PASS CHEN-DA ILI
11TH 3ATTLE OF ISONZO
NOYCN-MONTLIDIEF (FR)
3ATTLF OF PIAVF (ITALY)
CKAMFAGNE-MARNE (FRANCE)
EATTIF OF VITTOPIO VINFTO IT ALY-EP-FP. /AIjST
3ATTLE OF SAKARYA (TURKEY) GREECF/TURK" £Y






BRITAIN /GERI* A NY
ITALY/AUSTRIA







3 ATT IF OF SOLLUM
KUPS" (PUSSIAj
RUSSIA /'cINLA NI
FTAI v 'EF ITA T N





C26A 1/28/43 PLOESTI (RUMANIA) U.S ./GERMANY
C27 9/09/43 SALERNO (ITALY) U .S .-BR/GIRMA NY
C28 20/01/44 1ST RATTLE CF CASSINO U.S ,-ER-FR/GEFMANY
C29 3/02/44 ANZIO, 1ST PREP. ATTACK GERMANY /U .S .-3R
C30 15/02/44 2NE BATTLE CF CASSINO ALL IIS /GERMANY
C31 16/02/44 ANZIO, 1ST COUNTEROfFENSE GERMANY'U. S .-3B
C32 7/03/44 IMPFAL (BURMA) JAPAN/BRITAIN
C33 15/03/44 3RE 3ATTLE CF CASSINO ALLIES /GERMAN
Y
C34 21/07/44 GUAM U.S. /JAPAN
C34A 2/11/44 VOSSENACK-SCEMIET (GER) U.S. /GERMANY
C35 26/12/44 SIRCFIO VALLEY (ITALY) ITALY -GER/ALLIIS
C35A 5/e3/4 5 LAKE 3ALATCN (HUNGARY) GERMANY /RUSS IA
C36 1/04/45 OKINAWA * U.S. /JAPAN
C37 22/24/51 1ST COMM. SPRING OFF. CHINA -N .KOR/U. I
.
C37A 20/05/51 KANSAS LINE (KOREA) U .N ./CH INA-N. KOR
C3S 18/08/51 BLOOEY RIEGE U.N»/NORTS KOREA.
C39 13/09/51 HEARTBREAK RIDGE U .N . /N .KOR-CEINA
C40 3/10/51 JAMESTCV/N LINE U.N./CEINA
C41 11/12/51 LITTLE ANE BIG NORI CHINA'S. KOREA
C4.1A 14/10/52 TRIANGLE PILL U.S./N. KOREA
C42 2d/05/53 NEVAEA OUTPOSTS CRINA/TUREEY
C43 1/26/53 FINAI COMMUNIST Off. (KOREA) CFINA/U.N.
248
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